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Abstract
In this thesis we consider generic tools and techniques for the proof-theoretic investigation of
not necessarily normal modal logics based on minimal, intuitionistic or classical propositional
logic. The underlying framework is that of ordinary symmetric or asymmetric two-sided sequent
calculi without additional structural connectives, and the point of interest are the logical rules
in such a system. We introduce the format of a sequent rule with context restrictions and
the slightly weaker format of a shallow rule. The format of a rule with context restrictions
is expressive enough to capture most normal modal logics in the S5 cube, standard systems
for minimal, intuitionistic and classical propositional logic and a wide variety of non-normal
modal logics. For systems given by such rules we provide sufficient criteria for cut elimination
and decidability together with generic complexity results. We also explore the expressivity of
such systems with the cut rule in terms of axioms in a Hilbert-style system by exhibiting a
corresponding syntactically defined class of axioms along with automatic translations between
axioms and rules. This enables us to show a number of limitative results concerning amongst
others the modal logic S5. As a step towards a generic construction of cut free and tractable
sequent calculi we then introduce the notion of cut trees as representations of rules constructed
by absorbing cuts. With certain limitations this allows the automatic construction of a cut
free and tractable sequent system from a finite number of rules. For cases where such a system
is to be constructed by hand we introduce a graphical representation of rules with context
restrictions which simplifies this process. Finally, we apply the developed tools and techniques
and construct new cut free sequent systems for a number of Lewis’ conditional logics extending
the logic V. The systems yield purely syntactic decision procedures of optimal complexity and
proofs of the Craig interpolation property for the logics at hand.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Questions
The emergence of ever new propositional modal logics in particular in the field of Computer
Science calls for the development of generic methods to deal with such logics in a systematic
way. Not only can such generic methods provide a starting point for more specific treatments
of particular logics, they can also serve to reveal general principles which in turn may
guide the development and discovery of new logics with good properties. Unfortunately, the
matter is slightly complicated by the fact that the introduced logics often are based on a
semantics different from the standard Kripke semantics and hence often make use of non-
normal modalities. Moreover, e.g. in the context of logics describing aspects of computation,
there is an increasing number of modal logics based on non-classical propositional logic, and
in particular on intuitionistic propositional logic (see e.g. [Wij90, FM97, GGGP11]). To be
maximally useful a generic treatment should therefore try to incorporate non-normal modalities
and non-classical propositional base logics as well.
One of the main questions when dealing with such logics, and therefore a good candidate
for a generic treatment, is that of decidability and complexity of the logic in question. Proof
theory, and in particular its branch dedicated to the study of sequent calculi, has turned out
to be a valuable tool for tackling these questions. This is mainly due to the fact that cut free
sequent calculi, the main objects of study in this field, usually enjoy the subformula property
which in turn often can be exploited to derive decidability and complexity results. Combining
all the mentioned aspects it is therefore of increasing interest to study generic methods in the
proof theory, and in particular the theory of sequent calculi, for such logics. This gives rise
to the first main question we are going to consider, a question of distinctively constructive
character:
Question 1.1.1. Are there generic methods to automatically generate ’nice’ sequent calculi
for modal logics?
Ideally, such generic methods would yield sequent calculi which can be used in generic
decision procedures for the logics in question. But of course there are (even reasonably simple)
undecidable modal logics [KNSS95], so we should not expect to find methods which work for
arbitrary modal logics. In order to delineate the domain where the envisaged generic methods
have a chance of succeeding it is therefore imperative to investigate limiting factors as well.
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Thus immediately connected with our first question is the second main question considered
here, the character of which is best described as limitative:
Question 1.1.2. Exactly which modal logics have ’nice’ sequent calculi?
Obviously, the answers to these questions depend on at least two major factors. On the one
hand we need to know which format the modal logics originally are given in. On the other
hand it is necessary to clarify what exactly we mean by a ’nice’ sequent calculus. While for
normal modal logics the semantics offers a convenient starting point (see e.g. [Neg05, Lah13]),
due to the plethora of different semantics for non-normal modal logics or logics based on
non-classical propositional logic this seems not to be the optimal approach in our setting. On
the other hand, the purely syntactic formulation of modal logics in terms of axioms for a
Hilbert-style system can be and very often is used to give a relatively concise and intuitive
presentation of the logic under scrutiny. Moreover, this formulation is independent of the
semantics and can be used also if the underlying propositional logic is non-classical. For these
reasons here we take the formulation in terms of axioms as the point of departure.
Regarding the second major factor, the question what exactly is meant by a ’nice’ sequent
calculus, things become a little bit more complicated. The first issue is that there are many
different formats of ’sequent calculi’ for modal logics. Apart from extensions of the original
sequent calculi for propositional logic introduced by Gentzen [ Gen34] with new logical rules
for the modalities [Gob74, Lei81] there are the formats of labelled sequent calculi [Neg05],
hypersequent calculi [Avr96, Pog08], nested sequent calculi [Bru¨09, Pog09] or display logic
[Bel82, Kra96] just to name a few. While some of these extensions are very powerful, it should
be noted that this comes at the price of considerable additional machinery, typically mirrored
by less efficient decision procedures as well. Of course ultimately we would like to have generic
treatments incorporating all of the mentioned frameworks, but this should perhaps be seen
more as a research programme, founded on detailed studies for each framework on its own.
As a starting point for such a programme it seems wise to first consider frameworks with
little additional machinery and to try to fully understand and exploit the power of one formal
framework before considering extensions or different frameworks. For this reason here we are
going to stick to the first mentioned framework of standard sequent calculi with new logical
rules for the modalities, not because the other extensions are not interesting or fruitful – they
most certainly are – but because this extension is one of the simplest and requires the least
additional machinery.
Having settled the question of what kind of sequent calculus we are going to consider we
need to clarify which properties a ’nice’ sequent calculus should possess. There is a lot of
philosophically minded debate about this question (see e.g. [ Wan02, Pog11]), but since here
we are mainly concerned with the computational properties of the sequent calculi we are not
going to enter this discussion. But even ignoring all philosophical considerations, the fact
that we are aiming for decidability of the calculi in question gives some clues about which
17
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properties we should demand of such a system. Since the subformula property is one of the
standard tools for proving decidability results and since the presence of the cut rule tends to
destroy this property, surely at least admissibility of the cut rule should be one of the criteria
for a ’nice’ system. On the other hand, this can not be the only such condition, since given
a Hilbert-style system we may simply introduce zero-premiss sequent rules ⇒ A for every
theorem A of the Hilbert-style system. The cut rule is trivially admissible in the resulting
sequent system, but obviously the computational properties of this system are no better than
those of the original Hilbert-system, so we have not gained anything. In order to prevent
trivial systems as the one mentioned, we will restrict the format of the sequent rules in a
suitable way. Ideally, the rule format should strike a sensible balance between tractability
and expressivity: it should allow for a generic proof theoretic treatment, ideally resulting in
relatively efficient decision procedures, while at the same time being general enough to cover
a wide variety of logics. Here we introduce and propose the format of a rule with context
restrictions, an abstraction of the standard sequent rules for modal logics such as K,KT or S4.
As such this format is general enough to capture many of the standard normal modal logics,
all logics axiomatised by non-iterative modal axioms over classical propositional logic and
many non-normal logics based on intuitionistic or classical propositional logic. At the same
time we can give reasonably simple criteria on the rule set ensuring that generic syntactic cut
elimination or complexity theorems hold. Since ultimately we would like to generate cut free
systems we will take these criteria as a guide as to what constitutes a ’nice’ sequent system.
This finally allows us to make Question 1.1.1 more precise:
Question 1.1.3. Are there generic methods to automatically generate sets of rules with
context restrictions satisfying the generic criteria for cut elimination and complexity from sets
of axioms for a Hilbert-style system?
Regarding our second question we will need to take into account that unfortunately our
generic criteria for cut elimination are only sufficient and not necessary for admissibility of the
cut rule. While due to the fact that syntactic cut elimination is only one method of proving cut
admissibility this situation might be expected, it also means that we cannot use these criteria
to characterise the class of (sets of) axioms corresponding to (sets of) rules with restrictions
which generate cut free systems. But even so we may still try to limit this class from above
using the fact that adding the cut rule to a sequent calculus does not jeopardise soundness.
This gives us the following more precise formulation of Question 1.1.2:
Question 1.1.4. Exactly which sets of axioms for a Hilbert-style system correspond to sets
of rules with context restrictions?
We will see that this question can be answered by defining a purely syntactically characterised
class of axioms for Hilbert-style systems and translations from axioms in this class into
equivalent rules with restrictions and vice versa. This also allows us to begin to extend a
18
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research programme originally developed in the field of substructural logics to the realm of
modal logics, namely the programme of characterising logics according to the necessary proof-
theoretic strength of corresponding sequent-style derivation systems (see e.g. [CGT08, CGT12]).
In this spirit we will see limitative results about a number of standard normal modal logics
including the logics KT,K4,B,GL and S5. Even though these results should only be considered
a first step towards a comprehensive characterisation, they might also provide a small step
towards a formal explanation of why certain logics (most notably S5) seem to require additional
machinery on top of the format of ’standard’ sequent calculi, machinery such as labelled
sequents, hypersequents or nested sequents.
While Question 1.1.4 thus has a reasonably comprehensive answer, the situation for Ques-
tion 1.1.3 is somewhat less satisfying. While we will see a number of generic results, we will
not see a fully automatic procedure to turn a set of axiom into a cut free sequent system
given by rules of our format which also gives rise to efficient decision procedures. In many
cases we will still need to manually check that the rule sets satisfy certain criteria. The fact
that it is not always easy to check whether these criteria are satisfied and that for some sets
of axioms this semi-automatic procedure does not yield a satisfactory set of sequent rules
furthermore suggests the development of tools to aid the manual construction of cut-free
sequent calculi from sets of axioms. With this in mind we will develop a graphical tool for
manually manipulating sequent rules and absorbing cuts into the rule set. Finally, we will put
the introduced tools and techniques to work and construct new cut-free sequent calculi for a
number of strong systems of conditional logic.
1.2 Contribution and Organisation of the Thesis
In summary, the main contributions reported in this thesis are the following.
1. The conceptual development of the notions of shallow rules and rules with context
restrictions (Definition 2.3.3) together with generic cut elimination and complexity
theorems for sequent calculi given by such rules (Theorems 2.4.16, 2.7.5, 2.7.8) which
significantly extend the results from [SP09, PS09].
2. The identification and purely syntactical characterisation of classes of axioms for a
Hilbert-style system corresponding to shallow rules or rules with restrictions including
translations from axiom into rules and vice versa (Theorem 3.3.18).
3. The application of these characterisations to derive limitative results for a number of
modal logics including GL (Theorem 3.4.16) and S5 (Theorem 3.4.18).
4. The introduction of the notion of cut trees (Definition 4.1.3) to automate the absorption
of cuts into a set of rules which under certain conditions gives an automatic construction
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of a cut-free sequent calculus suitable for deciding the logic (Theorem 4.1.19 and
Corollaries 4.1.20 and 4.1.21).
5. The introduction of a graphical tool for the manipulation of sequent rules (Defini-
tion 4.2.14) which aids the process of manually absorbing cuts into a set of rules.
6. New cut free sequent calculi for a number of conditional logics extending Lewis’ logic V
formulated using the comparative plausibility operator or the strong counterfactual impli-
cation (Definitions 5.2.1, 5.3.3, 5.4.4) which yield syntactic decision procedures of optimal
complexity and facilitate proofs of the Craig interpolation property (Theorem 5.5.4 and
Corollary 5.5.7).
The remainder of the work is organised as follows.
After a brief recapitulation of some basic notions and notations in Section 1.4 we delve
into the main part of the thesis in Chapter 2. Here we introduce the fundamental notions
including the rule formats of one-step rules, shallow rules and rules with context restrictions
in Section 2.3. This is followed by a close investigation of the sequent calculi generated
by sets of such rules, including the criteria for generic cut elimination in Sections 2.4 and
2.5, admissibility of the contraction rule in a slightly modified rule set in Section 2.6 and
decidability and complexity issues in Section 2.7.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the study of the connection between rules with context restrictions
and axioms for Hilbert-style systems. Following some preparatory considerations in Section 3.1
we define the syntactic format of a translatable clause in Section 3.2 and provide a translation
from axioms of this format into sequent rules with context restrictions. The translation from
sequent rules with context restrictions into sets of translatable clauses for monotone modalities
is given in Section 3.3. Together, these two translations yield characterisations of the classes
of axioms corresponding to each of the formats of one-step rules, shallow rules and rules with
context restrictions. These characterisations are summarised in Table 3.2 on page 96. In the
following Section 3.4 we put the characterisations to work and prove limitative results about a
number of standard normal modal logics.
Generic methods and tools for the construction of cut-free sequent systems from a finite set
of rules with context restrictions are the subject of Chaper 4. In Section 4.1 we consider
the method of absorbing (principal) cuts into the rule set and identify a representation of
the resulting rules in terms of cut trees. Provided the corresponding rule sets satisfy certain
criteria these representations can be used in the generic decision procedures introduced earlier
and thus provide a step towards generic decidability and complexity results. For cases where
these criteria are not satisfied we then introduce in Section 4.2 a graphical representation of
sequents and sequent rules by doodles resp. rule doodles, which can be used in the manual
construction of such a cut absorbing rule set. Examples considered in this chapter include
Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability and weak systems of conditional logic.
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Finally, in Chapter 5 we apply these methods in the construction of new cut free sequent
calculi for strong systems of conditional logic formulated using the comparative plausibility
operator. After a brief introduction to conditional logics with sphere semantics in Section 5.1
the basic systems are constructed using the representation of sequent rules as rule doodles
in Section 5.2 for the basic logic V4 and in Section 5.3 for extensions of this logic. These
calculi are then adapted to the strong counterfactual implication as primitive connective in
Section 5.4 and used to prove new interpolation results in Section 5.5.
Each chapter closes with a short section titled ’Notes’ containing further discussions about
related approaches, literature or open problems. Pointers to the relevant notions and definitions
can be found in the index.
1.3 Publications
This work is based on the following publications.
1. Bjo¨rn Lellmann and Dirk Pattinson. Cut elimination for shallow modal logics. In Kai
Bru¨nnler and George Metcalfe, editors, TABLEAUX 2011, volume 6793 of LNAI, pages
211–225. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
2. Bjo¨rn Lellmann and Dirk Pattinson. Graphical construction of cut-free sequent systems
suitable for backwards proof search (extended abstract). In Renate A. Schmidt and
Fabio Papacchini, editors, Proceedings of the 19th Automated Reasoning Workshop, pages
17–18, Manchester, 2012. School of Computer Science, The University of Manchester.
3. Bjo¨rn Lellmann and Dirk Pattinson. Sequent systems for Lewis’ conditional logics.
In Luis Farin˜as del Cerro, Andreas Herzig, and Jerome Mengin, editors, JELIA 2012,
volume 7519 of LNCS, pages 320–332. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
4. Bjo¨rn Lellmann and Dirk Pattinson. Constructing cut free sequent systems with context
restrictions based on classical or intuitionistic logic. In Kamal Lodaya, editor, ICLA
2013, volume 7750 of LNAI, pages 148–160. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
5. Bjo¨rn Lellmann and Dirk Pattinson. Correspondence between modal Hilbert axioms
and sequent rules with an application to S5. In Didier Galmiche and Dominique
Larchey-Wendling, editors, TABLEAUX 2013, volume 8123 of LNCS, pages 219–233.
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1.4 Notation and Other Preliminaries
Notation. We use the following standard notation.
N = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . }
[n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} for n ∈ N with n > 0
[0] = ∅
brc = max{n ∈ N | n ≤ r} for non-negative rational r
dre = min{n ∈ N | n ≥ r} for non-negative rational r
|A| = cardinality of the set A
P(A) = powerset of the set A
Complexity Theory. While not fundamental to the understanding of this work, we make
use of some basic notions from computational complexity theory for which we briefly recall the
main intuitions. The complexity classes occurring are based on the notion of a deterministic
or non-deterministic Turing machine, where a deterministic Turing machine intuitively on
receiving a string over a finite alphabet as input calculates simple functions such as boolean
addition and multiplication on the cells of a work tape according to a fixed set of instructions
and depending on the input. A computation of such a machine on a given input is successful
if it eventually stops and returns ’yes’. A non-deterministic Turing machines in addition can
make existential or universal guesses by non-deterministically writing a symbol in a cell on its
work tape. A computation of a non-deterministic Turing machine beginning with an existential
guess is successful if at least one of the immediate subcomputations is successful, whereas for a
computation beginning with a universal guess to be successful all immediate subcomputations
need to be successful. The time and space needed by the computation are measured in terms
of the size n of (the encoding of) the input and are given by the maximal number of steps
a computation executes on a given input resp. the amount of cells the computation uses on
the work tape. Time and space required to solve a problem are called polynomial if they are
bounded by a polynomial, i.e. by nk for some k ∈ N and exponential if they are bounded by
an exponential function, i.e. by 2n
k
for some k ∈ N. The considered complexity classes are
given in Table 1.1. The relations between these classes are
coNP ⊆ APtime = Pspace ⊆ Exptime ⊆ NExptime .
Detailed treatments of these notions can be found e.g. in [Pap94, AB09].
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coNP the class of decision problems accepted in polynomial time by a
non-deterministic Turing machine making universal guesses
APtime the class of decision problems accepted in polynomial time by a
non-deterministic Turing machine making universal and existential guesses
Pspace the class of decision problems accepted in polynomial space by a
deterministic Turing machine
Exptime the class of decision problems accepted in exponential time by a
deterministic Turing machine
NExptime the class of decision problems accepted in exponential time by a
non-deterministic Turing machine making existential guesses
Table 1.1: Overview over the considered complexity classes.
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2 Sequent Systems and Cut Elimination
We begin our investigations by defining three different formats of sequent rules, those of
one-step rules, shallow rules and rules with context restrictions. While the general format of
one-step rules has been investigated before in the context of rank-1 modal logics [PS08, PS10]
and the format of shallow rules is a natural extension of this format, which captures e.g. the
standard propositional rules, the most general of these formats, that of rules with context
restrictions, is motivated by standard sequent calculi for common normal modal logics. In
such calculi one often restricts the context formulae in the premisses to formulae of a certain
format, e.g. to boxed formulae. Furthermore, usually only one layer of modalities is introduced
in the principal formulae of the rule. These two properties will be the main ingredients of the
notion of a rule with context restrictions.
After a brief introduction of the fundamental notions in Section 2.1 we will informally
consider some intuitions in Section 2.2 using standard sequent rules for some well-known modal
logics. This will be followed by a formal introduction of the rule format in Section 2.3 before
we take a look at one of the main issues when investigating sequent calculi: cut elimination.
Standard syntactical proofs of cut elimination by stepwise transformation of derivations usually
involve two or more nested inductions and a plethora of cases. Moreover, adapting the standard
proofs to a new calculus often involves ad hoc constructions or modifications to ensure that
all the cases go through. These two issues might account for the fact that syntactic cut
elimination proofs are notoriously error-prone, as witnessed e.g. by the quest for a correct cut
elimination proof for the sequent calculus for Go¨del Lo¨b logic GL [Lei81, Moe01, Val83, GR08].
Thus, similar in spirit to the methods used in display logic [Bel82] and building on the
characterisations in [PS08, PS10] we try to simplify this process in Sections 2.4 and 2.5
by identifying reasonably simple syntactic criteria on rule sets, which are verifiable on a
rule-by-rule basis, and which are sufficient to allow a generic proof of cut elimination to go
through.
If we are interested in not only constructing a cut-free sequent calculus, but also in using it
to decide which formulae are valid in the corresponding logic, we normally also would like
to show that the structural rule of Contraction is admissible. In Section 2.6 we will see how
cut-free systems given by sets of rules with context restrictions can be slightly modified in
the spirit of the G3-systems of [Kle52] to ensure that this is the case. Since the resulting
cut-free sequent calculi enjoy the subformula property, they often can be used to decide which
formulae are derivable. In Section 2.7 we give generic decision procedures for such sequent
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calculi along with generic complexity results.
The format of rules with restrictions together with a variant of the cut elimination theorem,
admissibility of contraction and decidability has been published in [LP13a]. Analogous results
for shallow rules were published in [LP11].
2.1 Connectives, Formulae and Sequents
Let us first consider the basic notions. Although the emphasis of this work lies on sequent
systems for modal logics, from a syntactical point of view the modalities are on par with
the standard boolean connectives. Thus we will take a slightly more general perspective and
consider modalities as connectives.
Definition 2.1.1. Let Λ be a finite set of connectives, that is symbols with associated
arities in N. Furthermore let Var be a countable set of propositional variable symbols.
The set F(Λ) of formulae over Λ is defined by F(Λ) 3 ϕ ::= p | ♥(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) where
p ∈ Var and ♥ ∈ Λ has arity n. If F is a set of formulae we write Λ(F ) for the set
{♥(A1, . . . , An) | ♥ ∈ Λ n-ary and Ai ∈ F for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. For a formula A we write
var (A) for the set of propositional variable symbols occurring in A. We sometimes abbreviate
finite sequences A1, . . . , An of formulae to ~A.
Usually we stipulate that the binary boolean connectives →,∧,∨ and the 0-ary connective
⊥ are in Λ, and we write the former ones in infix notation. We use the standard definitions
> := ⊥ → ⊥
¬A := A→ ⊥
A↔ B := (A→ B) ∧ (B → A) .
Furthermore we adopt the standard conventions concerning the binding strength of the unary
and binary boolean connectives to economise on brackets with the order (from strongest to
weakest binding strength): ¬,∧,∨,→,↔. Connectives other than the boolean connectives are
also called modal connectives or simply modalities. The notions of rank and modal nesting
depth are defined as usual and give rise to the important notions of shallow and rank-1
formulae.
Definition 2.1.2. For a set Λ of connectives the rank of a formula A over Λ is the number
rk (A) defined by rk (p) := 0 for every propositional variable p and rk (♥(A1, . . . , An)) :=
max({0} ∪ {rk (Ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) + 1 for n ≥ 0 and ♥ an n-ary connective. The modal nesting
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depth or modal rank of formulae in F(Λ) is defined by mrk (p) := mrk (⊥) := 0 and
mrk (♥(A1, . . . , An)) :=
max{mrk (Ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} if ♥ ∈ {→,∧,∨}max({0} ∪ {mrk (Ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) + 1 otherwise.
A formula A is called non-iterative if mrk (A) ≤ 1. A propositional variable occurs on the top
level of a formula if it occurs at least once in the formula and none of its occurrences in the
formula are in the scope of a modality. A formula A is a rank-1 formula if mrk (A) = 1 and
no propositional variable occurs on its top level.
Thus the rank of a formula is the maximal nesting depth of connectives including the
boolean connectives, whereas the modal rank only counts the modalities. In particular, rank-1
formulae are non-iterative formulae as well.
Example 2.1.3. We consider formulae over the set Λ := {→,∧,∨,⊥,} of connectives.
1. The formula p∧q → (p∧ q) has rank 3 and modal rank 1. Thus it is a non-iterative
formula. Since moreover all occurring propositional variables are in the scope of a
modality it is also a rank-1 formula.
2. The formula (T) = p → p has rank 2 and modal rank 1 and thus is a non-iterative
formula. Since the variable p occurs on the top level of (T) it is not a rank-1 formula.
3. The formula (4) = p → p has rank 3 and modal rank 2. Thus it is neither a
non-iterative nor a rank-1 formula.
We will also make use of the standard notion of a substitution:
Definition 2.1.4. For a finite set Λ of connectives a Λ-substitution is a function σ : Var→
F(Λ). If the set Λ is clear from the context we also simply say that such a σ is a substitution.
As usual we extend substitutions to functions on F(Λ) by the clauses
σ(♥(A1, . . . , An)) := ♥(σ(A1), . . . , σ(An))
for every n > 0 and n-ary connective ♥ from Λ and also write Aσ for σ(A).
We are mainly going to consider modal logics based on some form of propositional logic.
This motivates the following definition of a logic as a set of formulae including the theorems
of the respective propositional logic.
Definition 2.1.5. Let Λ be a finite set of connectives including the boolean connectives. A
Λ-logic based on classical (resp. intuitionistic resp. minimal) propositional logic is a set L of
formulae from F(Λ) which
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1. includes all theorems of classical (resp. intuitionistic resp. minimal) propositional logic
2. is closed under substitution: if A ∈ L and σ is a substitution, then Aσ ∈ L
3. is closed under modus ponens: if A→ B ∈ L and A ∈ L, then B ∈ L.
If the set Λ of connectives and the underlying propositional logic are clear from the context,
we also simply speak of a logic. Keeping to the standard notations we also write |=L A for
A ∈ L and 6|=L A for A /∈ L and say that A is L-valid if |=L A. If Λ = {} we say that a
Λ-logic is normal if it contains the formulae p ∧q ↔ (p ∧ q) and > and is closed under
congruence: if A↔ B ∈ L, then A↔ B ∈ L.
Example 2.1.6. 1. The set of theorems of classical (resp. intuitionistic resp. minimal)
logic itself is a {→,∧,∨,⊥}-logic based on classical (resp. intuitionistic resp. minimal)
logic.
2. The standard modal logics such as K,KT,K4 and S4 (see e.g. [HC96, BdRV01]) are
normal Λ-logics based on classical propositional logic.
For more details on classical, intuitionistic of minimal propositional logic see e.g. [TS00]. In
order to make the roles of certain structural rules precise we will follow the standard procedure
[NvP01, TS00] and treat sequents over a set F of formulae in terms of finite multisets.
Definition 2.1.7. Formally, for a set F a finite multiset over F is a function Γ : F → N
with finite support. If Γ is a multiset over F , then for elements A of F we say that A is an
element of Γ and write A ∈ Γ, if Γ(A) > 0. Similarly, we extend the set theoretic notion of
union to multisets: if Γ and ∆ are multisets over F , then Γ ∪∆ is the multiset defined by
(Γ ∪∆)(A) := Γ(A) + ∆(A) for all A ∈ F . We also often write Γ,∆ for the union Γ ∪∆. If
Γ is a multiset, then the support of Γ is the multiset Supp (Γ) defined by Supp (Γ) (A) = 0
if Γ(A) = 0 and Supp (Γ) (A) = 1 otherwise. We sometimes write A ∈ Γ ∩∆ for A ∈ Γ and
A ∈ ∆. For a multiset Γ the size of Γ is defined as |Γ| := ∑A∈Γ Γ(A). Since every finite set
can be viewed as the support of a finite multiset we also identify finite sets with multisets
where every element occurs with multiplicity one. For a finite multiset Γ = A1, . . . , An we also
write
∧
Γ for A1 ∧ . . . ∧An and
∨
Γ for A1 ∨ · · · ∨An. If Γ is empty as usual we set
∧
Γ := >
and
∨
Γ := ⊥.
Definition 2.1.8. Let F be a set of formulae. A symmetric sequent over F is a tuple Γ⇒ ∆
of finite multisets of formulae in F . The set of all symmetric sequents over F is denoted
by S(F ). An asymmetric sequent over F is a symmetric sequent Γ ⇒ δ over F , where δ
is subject to the cardinality restriction |δ| ≤ 1. The size of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is defined
as |Γ ⇒ ∆| := |Γ| + |∆|. Occasionally we slightly abuse notation and given two sequents
Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 and Σ1 ⇒ Σ2 write Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 ⊆ Σ1 ⇒ Σ2 if for i = 1, 2 and every formula A we have
Γi(A) ≤ Σi(A).
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p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q
p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ q (⇒ )1
Γ, p⇒ ∆
Γ,p⇒ ∆ (⇒)0
Γ⇒ p
Γ⇒ p (⇒ )0
Table 2.1: Some standard sequent rules for modal logics taken from [Wan02]. The notation is
slightly adapted.
Example 2.1.9. We consider sequents over the set F(Λ) of formulae.
1. For the two symmetric sequents Γ⇒ ∆ := (p ∧ q), q ∨ r ⇒ s, s, r → ⊥ and Σ⇒ Π :=
(p ∧ q) ⇒ we have |Γ ⇒ ∆| = 5 and |Σ ⇒ Π| = 1. Furthermore since the formula
(p ∧ q) occurs on the left hand side of Γ⇒ ∆ we have Σ⇒ Π ⊆ Γ⇒ ∆.
2. For the two asymmetric sequents Γ ⇒ δ := (p ∧ q), q ∨ r, q ∨ r ⇒ s and Σ ⇒ pi :=
(p∧ q),(p∧ q), q∨ r ⇒ s we have |Γ⇒ δ| = |Σ⇒ pi| = 4, but neither Γ⇒ δ ⊆ Σ⇒ pi
nor Σ⇒ pi ⊆ Γ⇒ δ.
Symmetric and asymmetric sequents are also known in the literature as multi- and single-
succedent sequents respectively. In the following we will develop our theory for the symmetric
and asymmetric frameworks in parallel. Thus unless otherwise stated all definitions and results
apply to both frameworks, where in the asymmetric case we silently impose the cardinality
restriction on every sequent. Later we will use the symmetric framework for modal logics based
on classical propositional logic and the asymmetric framework for those based on minimal or
intuitionistic propositional logic.
2.2 Intuitions
Before futher developing our general framework for sequent calculi and cut elimination we
briefly pause and consider some concrete examples which showcase the intuitions behind the
technical definitions. More precisely we are going to look at the modal rules for the well-known
modal logics K, KT and S4, which already introduce the concepts fundamental for the general
framework. Since this section is concerned only with the intuitions we do not concern ourselves
with precise definitions – these are given in the subsequent sections. The standard sequent
rules governing the behaviour of the modality  in these modal logics as found in the literature
[Wan02] are given with slightly adapted notation in Table 2.1. Precise definitions of these
rules and the notion of a sequent rule itself will be given in Section 2.3. To construct a sequent
calculus for modal logic K we need to add the rule (⇒ )1 to a standard sequent calculus for
classical propositional logic. For now we do not consider the propositional rules, again they
will be examined in the following section. For the modal logic KT we need to add both the
rule (⇒ )1 and the rule ( ⇒)0, and finally for the logic S4 we add all three of the rules
(⇒ )1, (⇒)0 and (⇒ )0. While in the last case it would also suffice to add only (⇒)0
and (⇒ )0 for illustrative purposes we consider the calculus with all three rules.
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If we take a closer look at these three rules we see the common characteristic that when
passing from the premiss (at the top) to the conclusion (at the bottom) they introduce a
single layer of modalities but otherwise keep all involved formulae intact and on the same
side of the sequent. On the other hand they differ in the way they deal with the context,
i.e., those formulae which occur unchanged both in the premiss and the conclusion. The rule
(⇒ )1 is very simple in this respect since it does not involve any context at all. This rule
is an example of what we will later call one-step rules. The rule (⇒)0 on the other hand
allows for a context, but without restricting it at all and is an example of a shallow rule. It
should be noted that the structure of this rule is the same as that of the propositional rules,
so the following remarks about this rule carry over to the propositional rules as well. Finally,
the context in rule (⇒ )0 is restricted to boxed formulae on the left hand side of the sequent.
To handle this kind of rules we will introduce the notion of acontext restriction. These three
kinds of sequent rules will be defined precisely in Definitions 2.3.3 and 2.3.6 and will form the
fundamental notions for the rest of our investigations.
Since logics in the sense of Definition 2.1.5 are closed under modus ponens, one way of
constructing a complete sequent calculus for such a logic is to initially consider the sequent
calculus with an additional rule called the cut rule. This rule has the form
Γ⇒ A,∆ Σ, A⇒ Π
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
and, while allowing us to simulate modus ponens, is rather unpleasant in that it involves a
formula, called the cut formula, which occurs in its premisses but not in its conclusion. This
makes the uncontrolled use of the cut rule unsuitable for the purpose of a decision procedure
for the logic under consideration since in derivations using this rule the occurring formulae
may not be part of the conclusion. Thus the next and very important step is to show that the
cut rule can be eliminated from the calculus, i.e., that every sequent which is derivable using
the cut rule is also derivable without using this rule.
The main intuition behind this procedure of cut elimination is that applications of the cut
rule are permuted upwards in a derivation until they arrive at the leaves, where they usually
are easily replaced by a different rule. Wherever it is not possible to permute the application
of the cut rule upwards it is replaced by an application of the cut rule where the cut formula
is of lower complexity than the cut formula of the original cut. Then by induction on the
complexity of the cut formula we eliminate all such cuts. Thus for example in the calculus for
modal logic K the situation
....
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B (⇒ )1
....
B,C1, . . . , Cm ⇒ D
B,C1, . . . ,Cm ⇒ D (⇒ )1
A1, . . . ,An,C1, . . . ,Cm ⇒ D Cut
29
CHAPTER 2. SEQUENT SYSTEMS AND CUT ELIMINATION
is transformed into
....
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
....
B,C1, . . . , Cm ⇒ D
A1, . . . , An, C1, . . . , Cm ⇒ D Cut
A1, . . . ,An,C1, . . . ,Cm ⇒ D (⇒ )1
Here the original application of the cut rule with cut formula B is replaced by an application
of the cut rule with cut formula B. This new cut is both further up in the derivation and on a
formula with lower complexity than the original cut formula. Note that in order to be able
to perform this transformation we need to be able to apply the rule (⇒ )1 to the sequent
A1, . . . , An, C1, . . . , Cm ⇒ D. In general this is a property of the set of sequent rules and not
always possible. We will investigate this further in Section 2.4.
For rules such as the rule ( ⇒)0 in the sequent calculus for modal logic KT or the
propositional rules which involve a context we might encounter the new situation that the cut
formula is part of the context. In this case the cut is pushed upwards into the premisses of
the corresponding rule. Thus e.g. the situation:
....
Γ, A⇒ ∆,B
Γ,A⇒ ∆,B (⇒)0
....
B,C1, . . . , Cn ⇒ D
B,C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ D (⇒ )1
Γ,A,C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ ∆,D Cut
where the cut formula B is part of the context of the rule (⇒)0 is transformed into
....
Γ, A⇒ ∆,B
....
B,C1, . . . , Cn ⇒ D
B,C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ D (⇒ )1
Γ, A,C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ ∆,D Cut
Γ,A,C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ ∆,D (⇒)0
Here the new application of the cut rule is one step closer to the leaves of the derivation. The
situation that the cut formula is part of the context in both of the last applied rules is similar.
Note that since arbitrary formulae are allowed to occur in the context of rules like (⇒)0 we
can always perform such a transformation if the cut formula is part of the context of at least
one of the last applied rules. This changes if we consider rules with restricted context such as
the rule (⇒ )0 for modal logic S4. In this case we might encounter the following situation:
....
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B (⇒ )1
....
B,Γ⇒ C
B,Γ⇒ C (⇒ )0
Γ,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ C Cut
30
2.3. RULES WITH CONTEXT RESTRICTIONS
This is transformed into
....
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B (⇒ )1
....
B,Γ⇒ C
Γ,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ C Cut
Γ,A1,An ⇒ C (⇒ )0
where again the newly introduced cut is one step closer to the leaves of the derivation. In this
case we can apply the rule (⇒ )0 below the cut only because the formulae A1, . . . ,An
introduced by the rule (⇒ )1 are boxed and therefore satisfy the restriction imposed on the
context in rule (⇒ )0. For arbitrary rule sets this can not always be done. Again a similar
situation arises if the cut formula is part of the context in both last applied rules above the
cut. We will see a formalisation of these intuitions in Section 2.4.
One important application of cut-free sequent calculi is their use in decision procedures
for the corresponding logics. The main intuition here is that if all of the logical rules of the
sequent calculus have the subformula property, i.e., if the premisses of applications of these
rules only contain subformulae of their conclusions, then the number of different formulae
possibly relevant for a derivation of a given sequent is bounded. Of course the cut rule does
not satisfy this property, but often the rules of a cut-free calculus do. In particular we will
only consider logical rules which satisfy the subformula property. Under some additional
assumptions this means that also the number of different sequents possibly relevant for such a
derivation is bounded. In many cases this is enough to obtain a decision procedure for the
logic, either by enumerating all the derivable sequents possibly occurring in a derivation of
a given sequent or by employing the method of backwards proof search. While in our case
the first method in general necessitates the enumeration of exponentially many sequents and
thus typically results in a decision procedure of exponential time complexity, backwards proof
search often can be done depth first and thus due to the specific format of the rules often
results in a procedure of polynomial space complexity. We will consider a detailed treatment
of these issues in Section 2.7. But let us first turn to the precise definitions of sequent rules.
2.3 Rules with Context Restrictions
As mentioned in the previous section when looking at standard sequent systems for most
modal logics such as K,KT,KD or S4 as given e.g. in [Wan02] we notice two main features of
the logical rules (again consider Table 2.1 on p. 28 for examples). First, we have a number
of principal formulae in the conclusion, which are stripped of one layer of modalities when
passing over to the premisses. The latter point is particularly interesting from the perspective
of backwards proof search, since it can be used to ensure termination of the procedure. Second,
we might have a context, that is a number of formulae which are not changed when passing
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from conclusion to premisses. These context formulae can be arbitrary, as in rule ( ⇒)0,
or they can be restricted to a certain component of the sequent or a certain format, e.g. to
boxed formulae in the left component as in rule (⇒ )0. In order to make these distinctions
precise, we introduce the notion of context restrictions:
Definition 2.3.1. Let F be a set of formulae. A context restriction over F is a tuple 〈F1, F2〉
of sets of formulae in F . The set F1 is called the left component of the restriction. Analogously,
F2 is called the right component . For a (symmetric or asymmetric) sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ and
a context restriction C = 〈F1, F2〉 the restriction of Γ ⇒ ∆ according to C is the sequent
(Γ ⇒ ∆) C := Γ F1⇒ ∆ F2 , where Γ F1 is the multiset Γ restricted to substitution
instances of formulae in F1. We say that a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ satisfies the restriction C if
(Γ⇒ ∆) C= Γ⇒ ∆ and write C(F ) for the set of context restrictions over F . If C1 and C2
are context restrictions we say that the restriction C1 satisfies the restriction C2 if for every
sequent Γ⇒ ∆ we have (Γ⇒ ∆) C1C2= (Γ⇒ ∆) C1 .
Example 2.3.2. The following are some often encountered context restrictions which we will
also use later on.
1. The trivial restriction Cid := 〈{p}, {p}〉 poses no restriction at all to the sequents since
every formula is a substitution instance of the formula p. Thus for every sequent we
have (Γ⇒ ∆) Cid= Γ⇒ ∆. Every context restriction satisfies the trivial restriction.
2. The empty restriction C∅ := 〈∅, ∅〉 deletes every formula in a sequent since no formula is
a substitution instance of a formula in ∅. For every sequent we have (Γ⇒ ∆) C∅= ⇒ .
The empty restriction satisfies every context restriction.
3. The restriction C4 := 〈{p}, ∅〉 restricts the left hand side of a sequent to boxed formulae
and deletes the every formula on the right hand side. E.g we have (q, C ∧D,(A∨B)⇒
D, p) C4= (A ∨B)⇒ .
4. The restriction C45 := 〈{p}, {p}〉 restricts both left and right hand side of a sequent
to boxed formulae: we have (q, C ∧D,(A ∨B)⇒ D, p) C45= (A ∨B)⇒ D. The
restriction C4 satisfies the restriction C45 but not vice versa since for the sequent ⇒ p
we have (⇒ p) C45C4= ⇒ 6= ⇒ p = (⇒ p) C45 .
Using the notion of a context restriction we generalise the above given examples of modal
sequent rules to the format of rules with context restrictions.
Definition 2.3.3. A rule with context restrictions or simply a rule is a tuple (P/Σ ⇒ Π)
where P ⊆ S(Var) × C(F) is the set of premisses with associated context restrictions and
Σ ⇒ Π ∈ S(Λ(Var)) are the principal formulae. We furthermore stipulate that every rule
with context restrictions is subject to the variable condition, which states that no variable
occurs more than once in the principal formulae and that every variable occurring in the
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premisses also occurs in the principal formulae. In the asymmetric case moreover we assume
that for every premiss (Γ ⇒ δ; C) with δ 6= ∅ the right component of C is empty. For a
rule R we sometimes write PF (R) for the principal formulae of R. An application of a rule
R = (P/Σ ⇒ Π) is given by a substitution σ : Var → F and a context Θ ⇒ Ξ ∈ S(F) and
written as { Θ C ,Γσ ⇒ ∆σ,Ξ C | (Γ⇒ ∆; C) ∈ P }
Θ,Σσ ⇒ Πσ,Ξ R
We call the sequent Θ,Σσ ⇒ Πσ,Ξ the conclusion and the sequents Θ C ,Γσ ⇒ ∆σ,Ξ C the
premisses of the application of R. Thus the variables in the principal formulae and the active
part of the premisses are substituted by formulae, and each premiss carries over the context
restricted according to its associated context restriction.
Example 2.3.4. Consider the set Λ = {♥} of connectives. We take as an example the rule
R = {(⇒ q; 〈{♥p}, ∅〉), (p⇒ ; C∅)}/♥p⇒ ♥q .
The context restriction 〈{♥p}, ∅〉 copies over all formulae of the form ♥A from the context.
Thus an application of this rule is given e.g. by the substitution σ with σ(p) = B and σ(q) = C
and the context Γ,♥A1, . . . ,♥An ⇒ ∆, where no formula in Γ has the form ♥A and is written
as ♥A1, . . . ,♥An ⇒ C B ⇒
Γ,♥A1, . . . ,♥An,♥B ⇒ ♥C,∆
If the boolean operators are in the set of connectives it will be convenient to distinguish
purely modal from mixed rules.
Definition 2.3.5. A rule with context restrictions R = P/Σ ⇒ Π is a modal rule if no
boolean connectives occur in its principal formulae Σ⇒ Π.
In the following we will also consider two slightly smaller classes of sequent rules. These are
the result of limiting the context restrictions occurring in the premisses in different ways. The
first format, that of one-step rules stems from [PS08] and does not allow the propagation of
any context formulae, while the format of shallow rules is a natural extension which already
captures the standard propositional rules.
Definition 2.3.6. A rule with restrictions is called a one-step rule if the only restriction
occurring in it is C∅ and a shallow rule if all its restrictions are either C∅ or Cid. In the
asymmetric case for shallow rules we also allow the restriction 〈{p}, ∅〉 for premisses (Γ⇒ δ; C)
with δ 6= ∅.
Example 2.3.7. 1. The set Gc of rules of classical propositional logic as given in Table
2.2 as well as the sets Gi and Gm of rules for intuitionistic resp. minimal logic as given in
Table 2.3 can be seen as sets of rules with restrictions. Since the only context restriction
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Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆ ⊥L
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ⇒ B,∆
Γ⇒ A ∧B,∆ ∧R
Γ⇒ A,B,∆
Γ⇒ A ∨B,∆ ∨R
Γ, A⇒ B,∆
Γ⇒ A→ B,∆ →R
Γ, A,B ⇒ ∆
Γ, A ∧B ⇒ ∆ ∧L
Γ, A⇒ ∆ Γ, B ⇒ ∆
Γ, A ∨B ⇒ ∆ ∨L
Γ,⇒ A,∆ Γ, B ⇒ ∆
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆ →L
Table 2.2: The rules in Gc.
Γ,⊥ ⇒ δ ⊥L
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A ∧B ∧R
Γ⇒ Ai
Γ⇒ A1 ∨A2 ∨R (i = 1, 2)
Γ, A⇒ B
Γ⇒ A→ B →R
Γ, A,B ⇒ δ
Γ, A ∧B ⇒ δ ∧L
Γ, A⇒ δ Γ, B ⇒ δ
Γ, A ∨B ⇒ δ ∨L
Γ,⇒ A Γ, B ⇒ δ
Γ, A→ B ⇒ δ →L
Table 2.3: The rules in Gi. For Gm we drop the rule ⊥L from Gi.
occurring in the rules is Cid they are in particular shallow rules. Table 2.4 gives the rules
in our notation for a few examples.
2. For every n-ary modality ♥ ∈ Λ the congruence rule for ♥ given by Cong♥ = {(pi ⇒
qi; C∅) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {(qi ⇒ pi; C∅) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}/♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn) and the
monotonicity rule for ♥ given by Mon♥ = {(pi ⇒ qi; C∅) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}/♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒
♥(q1, . . . , qn) are rules with restrictions. Since the restriction C∅ is the only restriction
occurring in these rules they are also one-step rules (and shallow rules).
3. The modal rules Kn, RT, 4n and R45 given in Table 2.4 are rules with restrictions. Rules
Kn and RT are shallow rules, while Kn also is a one-step rule. (A brief note on notation:
we use subscripts for variable numbers of principal formulae. For rules which are the
result of translating an axiom (A) into a rule we write RA.)
4. The modal rule
Γ,B ⇒ B
Γ⇒ B
from [Lei81], which is used in sequent style presentations of Go¨del-Lo¨b logic, cannot be
seen as a rule with context restrictions, since the formulaB occurs in its premiss and
thus cannot be principal in its conclusion, but on the other hand it changes the side of
the sequent and thus is not a context formula.
5. The modal rule
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B,C1, . . . ,Cm
A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B,C1, . . . , Cm
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Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆ ⊥L ∅/⊥ ⇒
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ⇒ B,∆
Γ⇒ A ∧B,∆ ∧R {(⇒ p; Cid), (⇒ q; Cid)}/ ⇒ p ∧ q
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
Γ,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B,∆ Kn {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C∅)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ q
Γ, A⇒ ∆
Γ,A⇒ ∆ RT {(p⇒ ; Cid)}/p⇒
Γ, A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
Σ,Γ,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B,∆ 4n {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C4)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ q
Γ⇒ A,∆
Σ,Γ⇒ A,∆,Π R45 {(⇒ p; C45)}/ ⇒ p
Table 2.4: Some standard modal rules in the notation as rules with context restrictions
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ, A⇒ ∆ WL
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ A,∆ WR
Γ, A,A⇒ ∆
Γ, A⇒ ∆ ConL
Γ⇒ B,B,∆
Γ⇒ B,∆ ConR
Γ⇒ A,∆ Σ, A⇒ Π
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
Γ,Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,∆,Π
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Mcon
Table 2.5: The structural rules.
which is often used to capture modal logic B (see e.g. [Tak92, Wan02]) also cannot be
seen as a rule with context restrictions, since this format does not allow the modal rank
to decrease when passing from the premisses to the conclusion of a rule.
Notation 2.3.8. If a result holds for the rule set Gc in the symmetric framework as well
as for the rule sets Gi and Gm in the asymmetric framework, then we also write G[cim] and
similarly for G[ci]. Furthermore, if a lemma or theorem presupposes the propositional rules
we mark it with the corresponding letter c, i,m or a combination of these if it holds for the
corresponding rule sets.
We also consider the standard structural rules.
Definition 2.3.9. The structural rules of right- (resp. left-) Weakening and right-(resp. left-)
Contraction as well as Cut and multi-Contraction Mcon are given in Table 2.5. We also write
W for {WL,WR} and Con for {ConL,ConR}. The notion of application of a rule is extended
to the structural rules in the obvious way. For the contraction rules we also call the formula
on which the contraction is performed the contraction formula and its occurrence in the
conclusion the principal formula of the rule.
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The structural rules are not rules with context restrictions in our sense since they do not
introduce a layer of connectives in the principal formulae. The notions of a derivation and a
derivable sequent are now defined in the standard way.
Definition 2.3.10. Let R be a set of structural rules and / or rules with context restrictions
including the axiom rules
Γ, A⇒ A,∆ A
with principal formulae A⇒ A where A is an arbitrary formula and context formulae Γ⇒ ∆.
A derivation in R is a finite tree where each node is labelled with a sequent such that for
every node its sequent is the conclusion of an application of a rule in R and the sequents of
the predecessors of this node are the premisses of this application. The depth of a derivation
is the height of the underlying tree, that is the maximal length of a path from the root to a
leaf. A sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in R if there is a derivation in R whose root is labelled
with Γ⇒ ∆. If Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in R we also write `R Γ⇒ ∆. If R is a rule set and R a
rule, then we often slightly abuse notation and write `RR instead of `R∪{R}. Furthermore,
we write e.g. `R[ConCutW] if the statement holds for the rule set R extended with an arbitrary
subset of ConCutW and similarly for other sets of structural rules. If S is a set of sequents we
say that a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable from S in R[ConCutW] and write S `R[ConCutW] Γ⇒ ∆
if there is a derivation of Γ⇒ ∆ where the leafs are labelled with conclusions of applications
of the axiom rule or sequents in S. A rule is derivable in a rule set R[ConCutW] if for all
its applications the conclusion is derivable from the set of its premisses in R[ConCutW] and
admissible in R[ConCutW] if every sequent is derivable in RR[ConConW] if and only if it is
derivable in R[ConCutW].
Convention: From now on unless stated otherwise whenever we talk about
a set R of rules with restrictions we assume that R is closed under injective
renamings of the variables and contains the axiom rules A, the identity rule Rid
and the congruence rules Cong♥ for every modality ♥ ∈ Λ.
As usual when presenting derivations we will sometimes abbreviate multiple applications of
the same rule using double lines instead of single lines. Thus e.g. the derivation below left is
abbreviated as shown below right.
....
Γ, A,B,C,D ⇒ ∆
Γ, A,B,C ∧D ⇒ ∆ ∧L
Γ, A ∧B,C ∧D ⇒ ∆ ∧L
....
Γ, A,B,C,D ⇒ ∆
Γ, A ∧B,C ∧D ⇒ ∆ ∧L
The connection between logics and sequent calculi is given by the standard notions of soundness
and completeness.
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Definition 2.3.11. Let Λ be a set of connectives including the boolean connectives. Fur-
thermore, let R be a set of rules with context restrictions and let L be a logic based on
classical, intuitionistic or minimal propositional logic. We say that the sequent calculus given
by R[CutConW] is sound for L if for all sequents Γ⇒ ∆ we have
`R[CutConW] Γ⇒ ∆ implies
∧
Γ→
∨
∆ ∈ L .
Similarly, we say that the sequent calculus given by R[CutConW] is complete for L if for every
sequent Γ⇒ ∆ we have∧
Γ→
∨
∆ ∈ L implies `R[CutConW] Γ⇒ ∆ .
Note that in the asymmetric framework the right hand side of the sequent and thus also the
succedent of the implication contains at most one formula. If R[ConW] is complete for L, then
we also explicitly mention the absence of the cut rule and say that the calculus is cut free
complete for L.
By virtue of the format of rules with restrictions we now immediately obtain our first result.
Lemma 2.3.12 (Admissibility of Weakening). Let R be a set of rules with restrictions and
let Γ⇒ ∆ be a sequent. Then we have
`RW[CutCon] Γ⇒ ∆ iff `R[CutCon] Γ⇒ ∆
and the depth of the derivations is preserved.
Proof. Standard by induction on the depth of the derivation, using the fact that in applications
of rules with restrictions the weakening can be pushed into all those premisses whose restrictions
are satisfied by the weakening formula.
Thus we may simply drop the rule of Weakening from our rule set without changing the
set of derivable sequents. Nevertheless, for convenience we will sometimes make use of the
weakening rule.
2.4 Cut Elimination
Arguably one of the most important properties of a sequent system is admissibility of the cut
rule. While this can be shown by semantically driven arguments such as proving completeness
of the system without the cut rule, often we are interested in a constructive method for
transforming a derivation with the cut rule into one without it, the standard reference for this
of course being Gentzen’s original proof of Cut Elimination for first-order logic in [Gen34].
The idea here is to permute applications of the cut rule upwards in the derivation until only
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cuts involving conclusions of the axiom rule or the rule ⊥L remain. These cuts can then easily
be eliminated. For the permutation steps, depending on whether the cut formula was principal
in the last applied rules of both premisses of the application of cut or not, the cut is either
replaced by cuts on proper subformulae of the original cut formula or permuted upwards into
the premisses of a rule where the cut formula was contextual.
We are now going to see some criteria on sets of rules which ensure that a modal analogue
of this proof goes through. The main idea is that applications of cut where the cut formula is
principal in the last applied rules of both premisses of the cut can be absorbed into the rule
set. This way such an application of cut can be replaced by a number of cuts on formulae of
lower complexity and an application of a rule from the rule set. In order to state this formally
we are going to construct this latter rule in a uniform way. To get an idea of how this works
assume we have the rules
R1 = P1/Σ1 ⇒ Π1,♥p and R2 = P2/♥p,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 .
Applying cut to the conclusions of these two rules yields the sequent Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ Π1,Π2, which
we will take to be the conclusion of the new rule. The easiest option for the premisses of the
new rule would be to simply take P1∪P2, but unfortunately in this case we might end up with
the variable p occurring in the premisses but not in the conclusion, a situation which is not
allowed by the rule format. Fortunately this can be easily changed by intuitively performing
all the possible cuts between the premisses on the variable p. This process is captured in the
following definition.
Definition 2.4.1. If P ⊆ S(Var)× C(F) is a set of premisses with context restrictions, then
for p ∈ Var the p-elimination of P is the set
P 	 p := { (Supp (Γ,Σ)⇒ Supp (∆,Π) ; C1 ∪ C2) | (Γ⇒ ∆, p; C1) ∈ P, (p,Σ⇒ Π; C2) ∈ P }
∪ { (Γ⇒ ∆; C) | (Γ⇒ ∆; C) ∈ P, p /∈ Γ,∆ } ,
where for restrictions C1 = 〈F1, F2〉 and C2 = 〈G1, G2〉 we write C1 ∪ C2 for 〈F1 ∪G1, F2 ∪G2〉.
Iterated elimination of variables ~p = p1, . . . , pn is denoted by P 	 ~p. For rules R = (PR; Γ⇒
∆,♥~p) and Q = (PQ;♥~p,Σ⇒ Π) the cut between R and Q on ♥~p is the rule
cut(R,Q,♥~p) := ((PR ∪ PQ)	 ~p; Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π) .
If for two context restrictions C1 = 〈F1, F2〉 and C2 = 〈G1, G2〉 for i = 1, 2 every formula
which is a substitution instance of a formula in Gi is also a substitution instance of a formula
in Fi, we also abbreviate the restriction C1 ∪ C2 to C1.
Example 2.4.2. Let P := {(p, q ⇒ r; C∅), (⇒ p; C4), (p ⇒ q; Cid)}. Then the variable
eliminations for the variables p, q, r are as follows.
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1. The p-elimination of P is P 	 p = {(q ⇒ r; C4), (⇒ q; Cid)}.
2. The q-elimination of P is P 	 q = {(p⇒ r; Cid), (⇒ p; C4)}.
3. The r-elimination of P is P 	 r = {(⇒ p; C4), (⇒ q; Cid)}.
Thus for a set P of premisses and a variable p the p-elimination of P is obtained by
“performing all possible cuts on p”. The concept of a cut between rules is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 2.4.3. 1. For P = {(⇒ p; Cid), (⇒ q; Cid), (p, q ⇒ ; Cid)} we have P 	 (p, q) =
{ ⇒ ; Cid)} and thus cut(∧R,∧L, p ∧ q) is the identity rule Rid = { ⇒ ; Cid)}/ ⇒ .
2. For P = {(p1, p2 ⇒ q1; C∅), (q1, q2 ⇒ r; , C∅)} we have P 	 q = {(p1, p2, q2 ⇒ r; C∅)}
and thus cut(K2,K2,q1) is the rule K3 = {(p1, p2, q2 ⇒ r; C∅)}/p1,p2,q2 ⇒ r.
3. For P = {(p1, p2 ⇒ q; C∅), ( ⇒ p1; C4)} we have P 	 p1 = {(p2 ⇒ q; C4)} and thus
cut(40,K2,p1) is the rule 41 = {(p2 ⇒ q; C4)}/p2 ⇒ q.
As a convenient fact about variable elimination and cuts between rules we note that modulo
Weakening and Contraction the order in which we eliminate the variables in the premisses is
not important.
Lemma 2.4.4. For a set P of premisses and a sequent Θ⇒ Ξ write P(Θ⇒ Ξ) for the set
{Θ F1 ,Γ⇒ ∆,Ξ F2 | (Γ⇒ ∆; 〈F1, F2〉) ∈ P} .
Let P be a set of premisses, let p, q be variables and let Θ ⇒ Ξ be a sequent. Then every
sequent in (P 	 p, q)(Θ⇒ Ξ) is derivable from the sequents in (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ) using only
Weakening and Contraction.
Proof. Let Σ ⇒ Π be a sequent in (P 	 p, q)(Θ ⇒ Ξ). We show that there is a sequent in
(P 	 q, p)(Θ ⇒ Ξ) such that Σ ⇒ Π is derivable from this sequent using Contraction and
Weakening. We consider all possible cases for the construction of the sequent Σ⇒ Π.
1. Σ⇒ Π ∈ (P 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ). Then q does not occur in Σ⇒ Π.
a) Σ ⇒ Π ∈ P(Θ ⇒ Ξ). Then p does not occur in Σ ⇒ Π either, and thus
Σ⇒ Π ∈ (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ).
b) Σ ⇒ Π = Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ Π1,Π2 where Σ1 ⇒ Π1, p ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ ⇒ Ξ) and p,Σ2 ⇒
Π2 ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ ⇒ Ξ). Since q does not occur in Σi ⇒ Πi for i = 1, 2 we have
Σi ⇒ Πi ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ⇒ Ξ) and thus Σ⇒ Π ∈ (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ).
2. Σ ⇒ Π = Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ Π1,Π2 where Σ1 ⇒ Π1, q ∈ (P 	 p)(Θ ⇒ Ξ) and q,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 ∈
(P 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ).
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a) Σ1 ⇒ Π1, q ∈ P(Θ⇒ Ξ) and q,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 ∈ P(Θ⇒ Ξ). Then p does not occur in
these sequents and we have Σ⇒ Π ∈ (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ).
b) Σ1 ⇒ Π1, q ∈ P(Θ ⇒ Ξ) and q,Σ2,⇒ Π2 = Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2 for Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, p ∈
P(Θ⇒ Ξ) and p,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2 ∈ P(Θ⇒ Ξ). Then first cutting on q, then cutting on p
yields a sequent in (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ). Now applying Contraction gives the original
sequent.
c) q,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 ∈ P(Θ ⇒ Ξ) and Σ1 ⇒ Π1, q = Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2 for Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, p ∈
P(Θ⇒ Ξ) and p,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2 ∈ P(Θ⇒ Ξ). Similar to the previous case.
d) Σ1 ⇒ Π1, q = Γ1,1,Γ1,2 ⇒ ∆1,1,∆1,2 and q,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 = Γ2,1,Γ2,2 ⇒ ∆2,1,∆2,2
where all of the sequents
Γ1,1 ⇒ ∆1,1, p p,Γ1,2 ⇒ ∆1,2 Γ2,1 ⇒ ∆2,1, p p,Γ2,2 ⇒ ∆2,2
are in P(Θ⇒ Ξ). Then we have q ∈ ∆1,1 ∪∆1,2 and q ∈ Γ2,1 ∪ Γ2,2.
i. q /∈ ∆1,1 and q /∈ Γ2,2. Then Γ1,1,Γ2,1 ⇒ ∆1,1,∆2,2 ∈ (P 	 q, p)(Θ ⇒ Ξ) and
the original sequent follows using Weakening.
ii. q /∈ ∆1,2 and q /∈ Γ2,1. As in the last case.
iii. q /∈ ∆1,2 and q /∈ Γ2,2. Then Γ1,1,Γ2,1 ⇒ ∆1,1,∆2,1, p ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ ⇒ Ξ)
and thus Γ1,1,Γ2,1,Γ2,2 ⇒ ∆1,2,∆2,1,∆2,2 ∈ (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ). The original
sequent follows using Weakening.
iv. q /∈ ∆1,1 and q /∈ Γ2,1. As in the last case.
v. q /∈ Ω for Ω exactly one of the multisets ∆1,1, ∆1,2, Γ2,1, Γ2,2. We consider the
case q /∈ ∆1,1 and q ∈ ∆1,2 ∩Γ2,1 ∩Γ2,2. Then Γ1,1 ⇒ ∆1,1, p ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ⇒ Ξ)
and p,Γ1,2,Γ2,2 ⇒ ∆1,2,∆2,2 ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ ⇒ Ξ). Thus Γ1,1,Γ1,2,Γ2,2 ⇒
∆1,1,∆1,2,∆2,2 ∈ (P 	 q, p)(Θ ⇒ Ξ) and the original sequent follows using
Weakening. The other cases are similar.
vi. q ∈ ∆1,1 ∩∆1,2 ∩ Γ2,1 ∩ Γ2,2. Then Γ1,1,Γ2,1 ⇒ ∆1,1,∆2,1, p ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ⇒ Ξ)
and p,Γ1,2,Γ2,2 ⇒ ∆1,2,∆2,2 ∈ (P 	 q)(Θ⇒ Ξ) and thus the original sequent
is in (P 	 q, p)(Θ⇒ Ξ).
Cuts between rules will also play a major role later when we consider the construction of
rule sets satisfying the criteria for Cut Elimination. For this reason we notice another very
convenient property of cuts between modal rules in a rule set which also includes the standard
propositional rules.
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Lemma 2.4.5 (Soundness of Cuts). Let R be a set of rules with restrictions such that
G[cim] ⊆ R, and let R1, R2 ∈ R. Then every cut between R1 and R2 is a derivable rule in
RCutConW.
Proof. For the asymmetric case consider a unary modality ♥ and the cut cut(R1, R2,♥p)
between two rules R1 = (P1; Γ⇒ ♥p) and R2 = (P2;♥p,∆⇒ α). By definition we have
cut(R1, R2,♥p) = ((P1 ∪ P2)	 p; Γ,∆⇒ α). Our goal is to replace an arbitrary application
of cut(R1, R2,♥p) in a derivation by applications ofR1 and R2 and an application of the cut
rule. Suppose the combined premisses of the two rules are
P1 ∪ P2 = {(Θi ⇒ p; Cri ) | i ∈ I} ∪ {(p,Υj ⇒ βj ; C`j) | j ∈ J} ∪ {(Ξk ⇒ γk; Cnk ) | k ∈ K} ,
where p /∈ Ξk, γk for all k ∈ K. Now consider an application
{Σ C`i∪Crj , (Θi,Υj)σ ⇒ βjσ | i ∈ I, j ∈ J} ∪ {Σ Cnk ,Ξkσ ⇒ γkσ | k ∈ K}
Σ, (Γ,∆)σ ⇒ ασ
of the rule cut(R1, R2, p) in a derivation. We construct a substitution instance of p by setting
P :=
∨
i∈I
(∧
Σ Cri ∧
∧
Θiσ
)
.
Note that in case I = ∅ we have P = ⊥. If the base logic is minimal propositional logic in this
case we set P :=
∧
j∈J βj . Then for every i ∈ I we can derive Σ Cri ,Θiσ ⇒ P from axioms
using the right conjunction and disjunction rules. Furthermore for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J we
get Σ C`j ,Σ Cri ,Θiσ,Υjσ ⇒ βjσ from the premisses of the application using Weakening. Thus
for every j ∈ J we have Σ C`j , P,Υjσ ⇒ βjσ by left conjunction and disjunction. If I = ∅ in
the intuitionistic case we use the rule ⊥L and in the minimal case the rules A,∧L. Now we can
apply the rules R1 and R2 to these premisses, apply cut to the conclusions with cut formula
♥P and contract duplicate context formulae to arrive at the conclusion of the application of
the cut. If the modality has arity greater than 1 we iterate the process.
The symmetric case is treated similarly. Remember that for a formula A we write ¬A as an
abbreviation for the formula A→ ⊥. Now again we take I to be the set of indices for which
(Θi ⇒ p,Ωi; Cri ) occurs in the combined premisses of the two rules and set
P :=
∨
i∈I
(∧
Σ Cri ∧¬
∨
Π Cri ∧
∧
Θiσ ∧ ¬
∨
Ωiσ
)
where Π is the right hand part of the context of the rule application. Then again we can derive
Σ Cri ,Θiσ ⇒ P,Ωiσ,Π Cri from axioms and for every j ∈ J the sequent Σ C`j ,Υjσ, P ⇒
Ξσ,Π C`j from the premisses of cut(R1, R2, p) using propositional logic. Now applications of
R1 and R2, a cut and contractions yield the conclusion of cut(R1, R2, p).
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Using the notion of a cut between two rules of the rule set we can now state the first of our
conditions on the rule set.
Definition 2.4.6. A rule R = PR/ΣR ⇒ ΠR subsumes a rule Q = PQ/ΣQ ⇒ ΠQ if
ΣR ⇒ ΠR = ΣQ ⇒ ΠQ and the premisses of Q follow by WCon from the premisses of R, i.e.,
for every sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ the sequents in PQ(Γ ⇒ ∆) are derivable from PR(Γ ⇒ ∆) using
only ConW.
Example 2.4.7. 1. Every rule trivially subsumes itself.
2. The rule 4n subsumes the rule Kn, since if we have an application of Kn with premiss
A1, . . . , An ⇒ B and conclusion Γ,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B,∆, then from the premiss using
only Weakening we can derive the premiss Γ C4 , A1, . . . , An ⇒ B,∆ C4 of an application
of the rule 4n with the same conclusion.
Definition 2.4.8. A rule set R is called principal-cut closed if for every two rules R1, R2 from
R and every formula ♥~p: whenever the rule cut(R1, R2,♥~p) is defined, then it is subsumed by
a rule from R.
Example 2.4.9. 1. The sets G[cim] of propositional rules are principal-cut closed since all
possible principal cuts are subsumed by the identity rule.
2. The rule set RK = {Kn | n ≥ 0} is principal cut closed since for rules
Kn = {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C∅)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ q
Km+1 = {(q, q1, . . . , qm ⇒ r; C∅)}/q,q1, . . . ,qm ⇒ r
the rule cut(Kn,Km+1,q) is subsumed by the rule Kn+m.
3. Similarly, the rule set RK4 := RK ∪ {4n | n ≥ 0} is principal-cut closed, since in addition
for m,n ≥ 0 the rule cut(4m,Kn,p) is subsumed by the rule 4m+n and similarly for
cuts between rules 4m and 4n.
4. The rule set RK ∪{40} is not principal-cut closed, since e.g. the rule cut(K2, 40,p) = 41
is not subsumed by any rule in the rule set.
5. Finally, the rule sets RKT := RK ∪ {Tn | n ≥ 1} and RS4 := RK4 ∪ {Tn | n ≥ 1} with
Tn := {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ ; Cid)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒
are principal-cut closed, but the rule sets RK ∪ {T1} and RK ∪ {T1, 40} are not.
Remark 2.4.10. Under this definition of principal-cut closure e.g. the standard rule sets
RK ∪ {T1} for modal logic KT and RK ∪ {T1, 40} for modal logic S4 are as we have seen not
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principal-cut closed. The condition can be weakened to include these rule sets by demanding
that the cut between two rules be only derivable instead of subsumed by a rule from the
rule set (more details will be mentioned in Remark 2.4.18). For a better integration with the
remaining conditions we keep to the present condition.
The criterion of principal-cut closure enables us to permute applications of the cut rule
above applications of rules with restrictions whenever the cut formula was principal in the
two last applied rules. If the cut formula was contextual in at least one of the two last applied
rules we would like to be able to permute the application of cut into the premisses of one of
the rules. Unfortunately, this might not always be possible, since the context restrictions of
this rule might prevent its application below the cut. The following criteria ensure that this is
not the case.
Definition 2.4.11. Two restrictions C1 = 〈F1, F2〉, C2 = 〈G1, G2〉 overlap if there are formulae
A1 ∈ F2, A2 ∈ G1 and substitutions σ1, σ2 with A1σ1 = A2σ2. A rule set R is
1. context-cut closed if whenever R0, R1 ∈ R and there are context restrictions C0 of R0
and C1 of R1 which overlap, then there is i ∈ {0, 1} such that all context restrictions of
Ri which overlap C1−i and the principal formulae of Ri satisfy C1−i.
2. mixed-cut closed if whenever R,Q ∈ R and a principal formula A of R satisfies a context
restriction of Q, then all context restrictions of R and all principal formulae of R except
for possibly A satisfy all those context restrictions of Q satisfied by A.
Example 2.4.12. 1. Rule sets containing only shallow or one-step rules are trivially
context- and mixed-cut closed. Thus all of G[cim],GcRK,GcRKT are context- and
mixed-cut closed.
2. The rule set RS4 = RKT ∪ {4n | n ≥ 0} is context-cut closed, since for every non-
propositional R0, R1 with overlapping context restrictions we must have R0 = Tm for
some m and every formula satisfies the context restriction of Tm.
3. The rule set RS4 is also mixed-cut closed, since (for the only non-trivial case) the left
part of the principal formulae of the rule Kn or 4n consists only of boxed formulae and
thus satisfies the restriction C4 of rule 4m.
4. Similarly, the rule set RK4 is context-cut and mixed-cut closed.
5. Every rule set containing the two rules with context restrictions 〈∅, {p}〉 and 〈{p}, ∅〉
respectively is not context-cut closed, since these two context relations overlap, but
neither satisfies the other. Thus e.g. the system SKL1 from [Cro01] is not context-cut
closed.
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6. The well-known rule set RS5 := {R45,T1} is not mixed-cut closed, since the context
restriction C45 of the rule R45 is satisfied by the principal formula of T1, but the context
restriction Cid of T1 does not satisfy the restriction C45.
While these criteria might on the surface seem sufficient to ensure Cut Elimination, we
need another condition on the rule set, which enables us to permute certain applications of
the contraction rule above applications of rules with restrictions. This is necessary to deal
with the problematic case that the cut formula is the principal formula in applications of the
contraction rule in both premisses of the cut, and that on each side at least two instances of
the cut formula have been introduced by a rule from the rule set. On the other hand, this is
not too much of a restriction, since we will also need it later on in Section 2.6 to show that
Contraction is admissible in the system with slightly modified rules. Similarly to the case of
cut we first lift the notion of contraction from sequents to sequent rules.
Definition 2.4.13. If P is a set of premisses with restrictions and ~p = (p1, . . . , pn) and
~q = (q1, . . . , qn) are n-tuples of variables, then P[~q ← ~p] is the result of replacing every
occurrence of qi in a sequent occurring in a premiss in P by pi for all i = 1, . . . , n and
contracting duplicate instances of p1, . . . , pn. Let R = P/Σ,♥~p,♥~q ⇒ Π be a rule. The
left contraction of R on ♥~p and ♥~q is the rule ConL(R,♥~p,♥~q) = P[~q ← ~p]/Σ,♥~p ⇒ Π.
The right contraction ConR(R,♥~p,♥~q) is defined dually. A rule set R is left-contraction
closed (resp. right-contraction closed), if for every rule R from R applications of the rules
ConL(R,♥~p,♥~q) (resp. ConR(R,♥~p,♥~q)) can be simulated by applications of Weakening and
Contraction followed by at most one application of a rule R′ from R and Weakening. A
rule set is contraction closed if it is left- and right-contraction closed and saturated if it is
contraction, principal-cut, context-cut, and mixed-cut closed.
Example 2.4.14. 1. Every rule set R in which the principal formulae of every rule have
the form Γ⇒ δ (resp. γ ⇒ ∆) is trivially right- (resp. left-)contraction closed. Thus in
the asymmetric framework every rule set is trivially right-contraction closed (but not
necessarily contraction closed).
2. For P = {(q1, . . . , qn, qn+1 ⇒ r; C∅)} we have P[qn+1 ← qn] = {(q1, . . . , qn ⇒ r; C∅)}.
Thus for the rule Kn+1 = {(q1, . . . , qn, qn+1 ⇒ r; C∅)}/q1, . . . ,qn,qn+1 ⇒ r we
have ConL(Kn,qn,qn+1) = {(q1, . . . , qn ⇒ r; C∅)}/q1, . . . ,qn ⇒ r. Thus the
set RK is left-contraction closed. It is also trivially right-contraction closed and thus
contraction closed. Together with Examples 2.4.9 and 2.4.12 this shows that RK is
saturated.
3. Similarly, the rule sets RKT,RK4 and RS4 are contraction closed and thus with Exam-
ples 2.4.9 and 2.4.12 saturated.
4. The rule set {RK2} is trivially right-contraction closed, but not left-contraction closed.
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5. Since the principal formulae of the propositional rules contain at most one formula on
the left resp. right hand side, the rule sets G[cim] are trivially left- and right-contraction
closed and thus contraction closed and with Examples 2.4.9 and 2.4.12 saturated.
The benefit of demanding that the rule sets are left- or right-contraction closed lies in the
fact that if a rule set is right-contraction closed, then we can permute contractions on the
right hand side of the principal formulae of a rule into the premisses of this rule (and dually
for left-contraction closed rule sets). This gives us the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4.15. Let R be a left-contraction closed (resp. right-contraction closed) set of rules.
If a sequent is derivable in RCon[CutW], then there is a derivation of it in RCon[CutW], in
which in every application of a rule from R every formula occurs at most once on the left
(resp. right) hand side of the principal formulae of this application.
Proof. We show the statement for left-contraction closed rule sets. The proof for right-
contraction closed rule sets is analogous.
We first show that whenever we have a derivation of a sequent Γ, Ak ⇒ ∆ which ends
in an application of a rule R from R and in which in every application of a rule from R
above this application of R every formula occurs at most once on the left hand side of the
principal formulae, we can transform this into a derivation where in every application of a
rule from R every formula occurs at most once on the left hand side of the principal formulae.
The statement of the Lemma then follows by repeatedly eliminating topmost applications of
contraction in the principal formulae. The proof is by induction on rk (A).
If rk (A) = 0, then due to the format of rules with restrictions the formula A cannot occur
on the left hand side of the principal formulae of an application of a rule from R and thus the
derivation already has the desired form.
So suppose that rk (A) = n+ 1. Then the derivation ends as follows:
D1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 . . .
Dn....
Γn ⇒ ∆n
Σ, Ak ⇒ Π R
where all k displayed instances of the formula A are principal in the application of the rule R.
Possible additional instances of A in the context are not problematic. Since the rule set is
left-contraction closed we can turn this into
D1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
Γ′1 ⇒ ∆′1
ConW
. . .
D1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
Γ′1 ⇒ ∆′1
ConW
Σ′, Ak−i ⇒ Π′ Q
Σ, Ak ⇒ Π W
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where Q is a rule in R and where again all k − i displayed instances of A in the conclusion
of the application of Q are principal. Moreover, it can be seen that the contractions in the
premisses must be on proper subformulae of A, and thus are on formulae of rank at most n.
Any newly introduced contractions of formulae occurring on the left hand side of the principal
formulae of an application of a rule in this derivation therefore must be on formulae of rank at
most n and are eliminated using the induction hypothesis. Repeating this proces we eliminate
the remaining duplicates of the formula A in the conclusion of the application of Q. Finally,
if Weakening is not in the rule set, we use admissibility of Weakening (Lemma 2.3.12) to
eliminate applications of W. Note that this introduces additional instances of formulae only in
the context and not in the principal formulae of applications of rules.
Using this lemma if we have a right-contraction closed rule set, then we may assume w.l.o.g.
that in a derivation the right hand sides of the principal formulae of applications of rules
contain at most one instance of every formula. Thus the above mentioned problematic case in
the proof of cut elimination does not occur and we can build on the techniques of [vP01] and
[PS08] to show cut elimination.
Theorem 2.4.16 (Cut Elimination). Let R be a cut closed set of rules with restrictions. If
R is left-contraction closed or right-contraction closed, then the cut rule can be eliminated, i.e.
for every sequent Γ⇒ ∆ we have `RCut[Con] Γ⇒ ∆ if and only if `R[Con] Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. We show the theorem for right-contraction closed rule sets. The proof for left-contraction
closed rule sets is similar. For an application
D1....
Γ⇒ ∆, A
D2....
A,Σ⇒ Π
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
of the cut rule we call Γ ⇒ ∆, A the left premiss and A,Σ ⇒ Π the right premiss of this
application. Furthermore, we say that the rank of this application is the rank of the cut
formula A, and its height is the sum of the depths of the two derivations D1 and D2 of its left
resp. right premisses. In the context of this proof we say that a derivation D has property
(P) if in every application of a rule from R every formula occurs at most once on the right
hand side of the principal formulae of this application. Given a derivation D with property
(P) as usual we transform topmost applications of Cut in it into (possibly several) applications
of Cut with lower rank or equal rank and lower height. Then by a double induction on the
rank and the height of the applications of Cut we eliminate all applications of Cut in D, where
after eliminating each application we appeal to Lemma 2.4.15 to ensure that the resulting
derivation again has property (P). While Lemma 2.4.15 does not guarantee that the depth
of the derivation is preserved, this is not a problem, since cuts with lower height than the
original cut will only be followed by cuts with lower rank.
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So suppose we have a topmost application of Cut. Then this has the form
E1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 . . .
Ei....
Γi ⇒ ∆i
Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, An R
Γ⇒ ∆, A Con
F1....
Σ1 ⇒ Π1 . . .
Fj....
Σj ⇒ Πj
Ak,Σ′ ⇒ Π′ Q
A,Σ⇒ Π Con
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
where R and Q are rules in R or applications of the axiom rule. In the latter case we take the
number of premisses to be 0. In a first step we permute contractions so that all contractions
of the cut formula occur just below the applications of R and Q. This gives
E1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 . . .
Ei....
Γi ⇒ ∆i
Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, An R
Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, A ConR
Γ⇒ ∆, A Con
F1....
Σ1 ⇒ Π1 . . .
Fj....
Σj ⇒ Πj
Ak,Σ′ ⇒ Π′ Q
A,Σ′ ⇒ Π′ ConL
A,Σ⇒ Π Con
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
Note that this does not change the height or the rank of the cut.
Now suppose that the last applied rule in at least one of the two premisses of the cut was a
contraction rule where the cut formula is not principal. We show the transformation for the
rule ConL, the case of ConR is analogous. We have one of the two following situations:
D′1....
Γ, B,B ⇒ ∆, A
Γ, B ⇒ ∆, A ConL
D2....
A,Σ⇒ Π
Γ, B,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
D′1....
Γ⇒ ∆, A
D′2....
A,B,B,Σ⇒ Π
A,B,Σ⇒ Π ConL
Γ,Σ, B ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
By permuting the application of Cut above the applications of ConL these are transformed
into the derivations
D′1....
Γ, B,B ⇒ ∆, A
D2....
A,Σ⇒ Π
Γ, B,B,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
Γ, B,Σ⇒ ∆,Π ConL
D1....
Γ⇒ ∆, A
D′2....
A,Σ, B,B ⇒ Π
Γ,Σ, B,B ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
Γ,Σ, B ⇒ ∆,Π ConL
where the application of Cut has the same rank and lower height than the original cut.
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Otherwise all contractions were on the cut formula and we have the situation
E1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 . . .
Ei....
Γi ⇒ ∆i
Γ⇒ ∆, An R
Γ⇒ ∆, A ConR
F1....
Σ1 ⇒ Π1 . . .
Fj....
Σj ⇒ Πj
Ak,Σ⇒ Π Q
A,Σ⇒ Π ConL
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
where again R and Q are rules from R or the axiom rule.
If at least one of R and Q was the axiom rule, we have the following cases.
1. R = A and A is contextual in R. Then we have (abbreviating the derivation of the right
premiss A,Σ⇒ Π with F):
Γ′, B ⇒ ∆′, B,Am A
Γ′, B ⇒ ∆′, B,A ConR
F....
A,Σ⇒ Π
Γ′, B,Σ⇒ ∆′, B,Π Cut
which is transformed into the cut-free derivation
Γ′, B,Σ⇒ ∆′, B,Π A
2. R = A and A is principal in R. Then we have (again abbreviating the derivation of the
right premiss of the cut):
Γ′, A⇒ ∆, Am A
Γ′, A⇒ ∆, A ConR
F....
A,Σ⇒ Π
Γ′, A,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
and the application of Cut can be omitted using admissibility of Weakening.
3. R 6= A and Q = A and A is contextual in Q. Dual to Case 1.
4. R 6= A and Q = A and A is principal in Q. Dual to Case 2.
Now suppose that neither of R,Q is the axiom rule. Then instances of the cut formula A
might be introduced by the applications of R resp. Q or be part of the context. For the sake
of presentation we assume that every premiss of R and Q carries over formulae of the form A.
The treatment of rules involving premisses not carrying over formulae of this form is similar.
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Thus for some n,m, k, ` ≥ 0 we have:
E1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, Am . . .
Ei....
Γi ⇒ ∆i, Am
Γ⇒ ∆, An, Am R
Γ⇒ ∆, A ConR
F1....
Ak,Σ1 ⇒ Π1 . . .
Fj....
Ak,Σj ⇒ Πj
Ak, A`,Σ⇒ Π Q
A,Σ⇒ Π ConL
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Cut
Note that since the derivation has property (P), the formula A occurs at most once in the
principal formulae of the application of R, and thus we have n ∈ {0, 1}. This derivation is
now transformed into a derivation of Γ,Σ ⇒ ∆,Π using several cuts of the same rank and
lower height or of lower rank as follows.
Consider the case that n+ ` > 0, that is that not all instances of A are contextual. First if
m > 0, then we eliminate the instances of the cut formula A in the premisses of the application
of R using the derivation
E1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, Am
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, A Con
F1....
Ak,Σ1 ⇒ Π1 . . .
Fj....
Ak,Σj ⇒ Πj
Ak, A`,Σ⇒ Π Q
A,Σ⇒ Π Con
Γ1,Σ⇒ ∆1,Π Cut . . .
. . . . . .
Γi,Σ⇒ ∆i,Π Cut
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆, An,Π R
The cut can be permuted into the premisses of R since the rule set is mixed-cut closed and
thus the additional formulae Σ⇒ Π in the premisses satisfy all context restrictions occurring
in R. All the newly introduced cuts have the same rank and lower height than the original
cut. If n = 0, that is if all instances of A in the application of R were contextual, we are
done. Otherwise we have n = 1. For s ∈ {1, . . . , i} let us write Gs for the subderivation of
the premiss Γs,Σ⇒ ∆s,Π of R. In case m = 0 we set Gs = Es. Similar to above, if k > 0 we
eliminate the instances of the cut formula in the premisses of the application of Q using
E1....
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, Am . . .
En....
Γn ⇒ ∆n, Am
Γ⇒ ∆, Am R
Γ⇒ ∆, A Con
F1....
Ak,Σ1 ⇒ Π1
A,Σ1 ⇒ Π1 Con
Γ,Σ1 ⇒ ∆,Π1 Cut . . .
. . . . . .
Γ,Σj ⇒ ∆,Πj Cut
Γ, A`,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Q
Again the cuts can be permuted into the premisses of the application of Q since the rule set
is mixed-cut closed, and all the newly introduced cuts have the same rank and lower height
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than the original cut. If ` = 0, then we are done. Otherwise for t ∈ {1, . . . , j} we write Ht for
the derivation of the premiss Γ,Σt ⇒ ∆,Πt of this application of Q. If k = 0 we set Ht = Ft.
Now we piece these derivations together using cuts to get
G1.... . . .
Gn....
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆, A,Π R
G1.... . . .
Gn....
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆, A,Π R
H1.... . . .
Hj....
Γ, A`,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Q
Γ2, A`−1,Σ2 ⇒ ∆2,Π2 Cut....
Γ`, A,Σ` ⇒ ∆`,Π`
Γ`+1,Σ`+1 ⇒ ∆`+1,Π`+1 Cut
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Con
The newly introduced cuts still have the same rank but possibly greater height than the
original cut. But since the cut formula A is principal in the topmost application of R and
the application of Q, and since the rule set is principal-cut closed, the rule cut(R,Q,A) is
subsumed by a rule Scut(R,Q,A) in R and we can replace the topmost cut by cuts on proper
subformulae of A followed by Weakenings and Contractions and an application of the rule
Scut(R,Q,A). This gives
G1.... . . .
Gn....
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆, A,Π R
G1.... . . .
Gn....
H1.... . . .
Hj....
Θ1 ⇒ Ξ1 Cut
Θ′1 ⇒ Ξ′1
ConW
. . .
G1.... . . .
Gn....
H1.... . . .
Hj....
Θr ⇒ Ξr Cut
Θ′r ⇒ Ξ′r ConW
Γ2, A`−1,Σ2 ⇒ ∆2,Π2
Scut(R,Q,A)
....
Γ`, A,Σ` ⇒ ∆`,Π`
Γ`+1,Σ`+1 ⇒ ∆`+1,Π`+1 Cut
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Con
Note that since the remaining ` − 1 occurrences of A in the conclusion of Scut(R,Q,A) were
principal in Q, they are principal in cut(R,Q,A), and thus also principal in Scut(R,Q,A).
Moreover, if Scut(R,Q,A) was the identity rule Rid, then we must have ` = 1 and this was the
only remaining cut on A. Otherwise, continuing like this we replace all the remaining cuts on
A by cuts on proper subformulae of A and applications of rules from the rule set. Since this
does not change the cuts in the derivations Gs and Ht, all the cuts in the resulting derivation
of Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π thus have either the same rank as the original cut and lower height or lower
rank.
In the remaining case we have n = ` = 0, and in the original derivation all instances
of A are contextual in the applications of R and Q. Then if m = 0 or k = 0 we get the
sequent Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π from one of the conclusions of R,Q by admissibility of weakening, thus
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eliminating the application of Cut. On the other hand, if m 6= 0 and k 6= 0, then since the
rule set is context-cut closed we know that we can permute the application of Cut into the
premisses of the application of R or the application of Q. The derivation then is transformed
as in the first steps of the previous case.
As we have seen in Example 2.4.14 the standard systems G[cim] of propositional rules and
the systems GcRK,GcRK4,GcRKT and GcRS4 are saturated sets of rules with restrictions in
the sense of Definition 2.4.13. Thus we obtain cut elimination for these systems as a corollary
from the previous theorem.
Corollary 2.4.17. The sequent calculi given by the rules G[cim] as well as GcRK,GcRK4,GcRKT
and GcRS4 have cut elimination. 
Remark 2.4.18. It is also possible to show a slightly different version of the generic cut
elimination theorem based on a more lenient definition of principal-cut closed rule sets.
Let us call a rule set R principal-cut deriving if for every two rules R1, R2 from R the
rule cut(R1, R2,♥~p) is derivable in RConW. Then we can show the following analogue of
Theorem 2.4.16, where we strengthen the condition of left- or right-contraction closure of the
rule set R in to full contraction closure:
Let R be a principal-cut deriving, mixed-cut closed, context-cut closed and contraction
closed set of rules with restrictions. Then RCon has cut elimination, i.e. for every sequent
Γ⇒ ∆ we have `RConCut Γ⇒ ∆ iff `RCon Γ⇒ ∆.
The proof uses Lemma 2.4.15 to ensure that no formula occurs more than once in the
principal formulae of each application of a rule in a derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆, and then proceeds
in the spirit of [Gen34] to eliminate applications of the multicut rule
Γ⇒ ∆, Am An,Σ⇒ Π
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Mcut
via double induction on the rank of the cut formula and the sum of the depths of the derivations
of the two premisses of the multicut. The remainder of the proof is essentially the same as
that given for Theorem 2.4.16, with the difference that contractions of the cut formula are
absorbed into the application of multicut. In case the last applied rules in the derivations
of both premisses of the multicut were rules from R we again use mixed-cut closure and
context-cut closure of the rule set and the same technique to first eliminate all duplicates of
the cut formula in the contexts. Then since by the lemma the cut formula occurs only once
in the principal formulae of both rules we now only need to eliminate one more cut. We do
this by first replacing it with the cut between the two rules, and then replacing this rule by a
derivation in RConW using the fact that by principal-cut derivability it is derivable in this
rule set. The newly introduced cuts now have smaller rank and are eliminated as above.
Obviously the condition of being principal-cut deriving is weaker than that of being principal-
cut closed. In particular the standard rule sets RK ∪ {T1} and RK ∪ {T1, 40} for modal logics
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KT and S4 are principal-cut deriving but not principal-cut closed. But on the other hand
for these rule sets we can also show cut elimination by taking a derivation in e.g. RK ∪ {T1}
to be a derivation in RKT, eliminating the cuts using Theorem 2.4.16, and replacing in the
resulting cut free derivation all the rules Tn by their derivations in RK ∪ {T1}. For this reason
and since it better integrates with the rest of the conditions we use the condition of being
principal-cut closed in the following.
2.5 Cut Elimination and Invertibility
While the proof of cut elimination via saturation of the rule set has the advantage of being
very general and in particular of applying to the propositional rules themselves as well there
is another possibility for showing cut elimination. Instead of using mixed-cut closure to push
cuts on a propositional formula which is principal in one rule and contextual in the other
into the premisses of the second rule, we might use invertibility of the propositional rules to
replace this cut by cuts of lower rank. Let us make this precise. Since in general in asymmetric
sequent systems not all the propositional rules are invertible in this section we consider only
the symmetric framework.
Definition 2.5.1. Let R be a set of rules with context restrictions. A rule R = P/Σ⇒ Π is
called invertible in R[Con] if for every context Θ⇒ Ξ and substitution σ we have: whenever
`R[Con] Θ,Σσ ⇒ Πσ,Ξ, then for every premiss (Γ⇒ ∆; C) from P we have `R[Con] Θ C ,Γσ ⇒
∆σ,Ξ C .
Example 2.5.2. Let R be the rule set Gc. Then as is well-known e.g. the rule →L= {(p⇒
; Cid), ( ⇒ q; Cid)}/p → q ⇒ is invertible in Gc, since whenever for a context Θ ⇒ Ξ and
a substitution σ the sequent Θ, pσ → qσ ⇒ Ξ is derivable in Gc, then so are the sequents
Θ, pσ ⇒ Ξ and Θ⇒ qσ,Ξ.
The standard way to show that the propositional rules are invertible in Gc is to use a
permutation of rules argument similar to the condition of mixed-cut closure, but permuting
applications of the propositional rules below applications of the rules in R. Similarly to the
case for cut elimination we can generalise this method and distill the following sufficient
criterion for invertibility of the propositional rules from it.
Definition 2.5.3 (c). A rule set R is Gc-inverting if for every restriction 〈F0;F1〉 of a rule
in R and i ∈ {0, 1} we have: whenever A ◦B ∈ Fi with ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}, then also A,B ∈ Fi and
whenever A→ B ∈ Fi, then also A ∈ F1−i and B ∈ Fi.
Example 2.5.4 (c). 1. Since the context restrictions Cid and C∅ satisfy the requirements
given in Definition 2.5.3 it is clear that every set of shallow rules is Gc-inverting.
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2. Since the propositional connectives do not occur in the context restriction C4 = 〈{p}, ∅〉,
this restriction also satisfies the requirements from Definition 2.5.3 and together with
the above argument for the rules Kn and Tn we have that the rule sets RK4 and RS4 are
Gc-inverting.
And indeed, if a rule set R is Gc-inverting we can show invertibility of the rules in Gc via a
permutation-of-rules argument.
Lemma 2.5.5 (Inversion Lemma)(c). Let R be a Gc-inverting set of rules. Then the proposi-
tional rules are invertible in GcR[Con].
Proof. Since our rule set might include the rule Con we need to adapt the standard proof
a bit. Similar to Gentzen’s original proof of cut elimination [Gen34] instead of showing the
result for the set GcR[Con] we show it for the system G′cR[Mcon]. Here Mcon is the rule
Γ,Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,∆,Π
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π Mcon
which allows to contract several different formulae at the same time, and G′c has axioms
Γ, p⇒ p,∆ which allow only propositional variables as the principal formulae instead of
the general axioms Γ, A⇒ A,∆. Obviously the rule Mcon can be simulated by multiple
applications of the rules ConL and ConR and vice versa. Moreover, since R contains the
congruence rules, applications of the general axioms can be derived inG′cR[Mcon], as is seen
by an easy induction on the complexity of the principal formula of the generalised axiom.
Thus a sequent is derivable in GcR[Con] iff it is derivable in G′cR[Mcon]. Hence invertibility
of the propositional rules in G′cR[Mcon] yields the result for GcR[Con] as well (but without
necessarily preserving the depth of the derivations).
So consider e.g. the rule →R. We show by induction on the depth of the derivation that →R
is depth-preserving invertible in G′cR[Mcon], i.e. that if a sequent Γ⇒ ∆, A→ B is derivable
in G′cR[Mcon] with a derivation of depth n, then so is the sequent Γ, A ⇒ ∆, B. If n = 0,
then the last applied rule was the axiom rule and we have a derivation
Γ′, p⇒ p,∆′, A→ B A
and thus the formula A→ B cannot have been principal. Thus the sequent Γ′, p, A⇒ p,∆′, B
is derivable using the axiom rule as well. The case of the last applied rule being ⊥L is similar.
If n = m + 1, then if the last applied rule was Mcon and the formula A → B was not part
of the contracted sequent, then an application of the induction hypothesis to the premiss
followed by an application of Mcon gives the sequent Γ, A⇒ ∆, B. If A→ B was part of the
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contracted sequent we have the situation
D....
Γ′,Γ′,Σ⇒ ∆′, A→ B,∆′, A→ B,Π
Γ′,Σ⇒ ∆′, A→ B,Π Mcon
which using the induction hypothesis this is easily turned into
D′....
Γ′, A,Γ′, A,Σ⇒ ∆′, B,∆′, B,Π
Γ′, A,Σ⇒ ∆′, B,Π Mcon .
If the last applied rule was the rule →R with principal formulae ⇒ A→ B, then its premiss
Γ, A⇒ ∆, B is obviously derivable in depth m. Otherwise the last applied rule was a rule in
R or a propositional rule. Since we can view the propositional rules as rules with restrictions
as well and since it is easy to see that the rule set G′c is Gc-inverting, it suffices to consider
the case of a rule R ∈ R. Since R is Gc-inverting we know that for every restriction C from
R with ( ⇒ A → B) C= ⇒ A → B we also have (A ⇒ B) C= A ⇒ B. Thus applying
the induction hypothesis to the premisses of the application of R, then applying the rule R
(possibly together with depth preserving admissibility of weakening) yields a derivation of
Γ, A⇒ ∆, B of depth n.
The proofs for the other propositional rules are similar.
Thus instead of showing mixed-cut closure for the whole set GcR of rules we might be
tempted to only show mixed-cut closure and Gc-invertibility for R and use the latter in the
proof of cut elimination whenever the cut formula is principal in a propositional rule and
contextual in a rule from R. But interestingly it turns out that if we can prove cut elimination
for a sequent system which is sound and complete for a modal logic with non-trivial modalities
at all, then invertibility of the propositional rules and mixed-cut closure are equivalent in the
sense that we can convert a rule set satisfying one condition into one satisfying the other.
Theorem 2.5.6 (c). Let L be a logic based on classical propositional logic such that
• the modalities of L satisfy congruence, i.e. for every n ∈ N and n-ary modality ♥ from
Λ we have: whenever |=L pi ↔ qi for i ≤ n, then |=L ♥(p1, . . . , pn)↔ ♥(q1, . . . , qn)
• the modalities of L are non-trivial, i.e. for every n ∈ N and n-ary modality ♥ from Λ
we have 6|=L ♥(p1, . . . , pn) and 6|=L ♥(p1, . . . , pn)→ ⊥.
Then there is a set R1 of modal rules such that GcR1Con[W] is sound and complete for L and
GcR1 is mixed-cut closed if and only if there is a mixed-cut closed set R2 of modal rules such
that GcR2Con[W] is sound and complete for L and R2 is Gc-inverting.
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Proof. The first observation is that whenever GcR is mixed-cut closed or R is Gc-inverting,
then whenever a rule has a restriction 〈F1, F2〉 with p ∈ F1 (resp. p ∈ F2), then also p ∈ F2
(resp. p ∈ F1). This is seen by either applying the criterion of mixed-cut closure to this rule
and the propositional rule ∨R (resp. ∧L), or the invertibility criterion on this rule and the rule
→L (resp. →R).
Now we show that for every n-ary modality ♥ such a set of rules must contain either a rule
R whose principal formulae contain the sequent ♥(p1, . . . , p2)⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn), or two rules
R1, R2 such that
• ⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn) ⊆ PF (R1) and ♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ satisfies a restriction of R1
• ♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ⊆ PF (R2) and ⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn) satisfies a restriction of R2.
To see this consider that since the formula ♥(p1, . . . , pn)→ ♥(p1∨p1, p2, . . . , pn) is L-valid the
sequent ♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(p1 ∨ p1, p2, . . . , pn) must be GcRCon-derivable. Now suppose that
in this derivation there is no application of a rule Q with ⇒ ♥(p1 ∨ p1, p2, . . . , pn) ⊆ PF (Q).
Then, since no rule decreases the complexity of a formula when passing from the premisses
to the conclusion, all the sequents at the leafs of the derivation have the form Γ⇒ ∆ with
Supp (Γ) ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn,♥(p1, . . . , pn)} and Supp (∆) ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn,♥(p1 ∨ p1, p2, . . . , pn)}.
Thus the formula ♥(p1 ∨ p1, p2, . . . , pn) cannot have been principal in any of the applications
of the axiom rule, and by omitting every occurrence of this formula we obtain a derivation
of the sequent ♥(p1, . . . , pn) ⇒ . But this contradicts non-triviality of the modalities of L.
Thus there must be an application of such a rule Q with ⇒ ♥(p1 ∨ p1, p2, . . . , pn) ⊆ PF (Q).
If we take the lowermost of such applications, then its conclusion is of the form Σ ⇒ Π with
Supp (Σ) ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn,♥(p1, . . . , pn)} and Supp (Π) ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn,♥(p1 ∨ p1, p2, . . . , pn)}.
If ♥(p1, . . . , pn) ⇒ ⊆ PF (Q) then we have found the desired rule R. Otherwise one of
♥(p1, . . . , pn) ⇒ , p ⇒ or ⇒ p must satisfy a restriction of Q, since otherwise ⇒ ♥(p1 ∨
p1, p2, . . . , pn) would be derivable, in contradiction to non-triviality of the modalities of L. In
the first two cases we have found our rule R1, and in the third case we use the fact shown
above that if ⇒ p satisfies a restriction, then so does p ⇒ . In the same way we show the
existence of a rule R2, starting with the formula ♥(p1∧p1, p2, . . . , pn)→ ♥(p1, . . . , pn) instead.
Now assume that GcR1 is mixed-cut closed and take a rule Q ∈ R1 with restriction 〈F1, F2〉.
If ♥(A1, . . . , An) ∈ F1 for any formulae A1, . . . , An we may apply the condition of mixed-cut
closure on this rule and rule R or R1 from above to get that also ♥(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ F1, and
analogously for ♥(A1, . . . , An) ∈ F2 with R or R2. In the same way using the propositional
rules instead of R1, R2 we show that if a formula B whose top-level connective is propositional
is in F1 (resp. F2), then so is p. Thus w.l.o.g. for all restrictions 〈F1, F2〉 of rules in R1
we have Fi ⊆ {p} ∪ {♥(p1, . . . , pn) | ♥ ∈ Λ r {¬,∨,∧,→,↔}}. But since the propositional
connectives are not in Λ it is not hard to see that such a rule set is Gc-inverting.
If on the other hand R2 is Gc-inverting, then again we get an equivalent rule set with the
restriction on the context restrictions of rules in this set, although this case is slightly more
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involved. The first step is that since R2 is Gc-inverting, we may permute all applications
of propositional rules in a derivation below the applications of modal rules. But then all
context formulae in the applications of modal rules are variables or modal formulae, so we
may equivalently replace the rule set R2 with a rule set R′2 where the context restrictions only
contain variables or modalised formulae. Since the set R2 is mixed-cut closed and contains only
modal rules the set R′2 is mixed-cut closed as well. Now as above using mixed-cut closure and
the existence of the rules R resp. R1 and R2 from above we get that w.l.o.g. the restrictions
contain only variables or modalised variables. Again since the rules in R′2 are modal rules we
obtain that GcR′2 is mixed-cut closed.
The preceding proof moreover shows that the rules in such a rule set have a very specific
form, a very interesting result which is worth stating in its own right, and which we will
use extensively when investigating the limits of expressibility of systems given by rules with
restrictions in the next chapter.
Corollary 2.5.7 (c). Let L be a logic with congruence and non-trivial modalities and let R
be a mixed-cut closed set of modal rules such that GcRCon[W] is sound and complete for L
and such that GcR is mixed-cut closed or R is Gc-inverting. Then w.l.o.g. every restriction of
a rule in R contains only variables or modalised variables. 
2.6 Dealing with Contraction
In the proof of cut elimination for saturated rule sets we already made use of the property of a
rule set being contraction-closed. Intuitively, this allows to permute applications of Con above
applications of rules from the rule set whenever the two contracted instances of a formula
both were principal in the last applied rule. For admissibility of contraction this is not quite
enough: we also need to consider the cases where both instances were contextual or where one
instance was contextual and one instance was principal in the last applied rule. While the
first of these cases can be dealt with in the standard fashion, for the second case we need to
slightly modify our sequent calculi. For this we follow Kleene’s method for theG3-systems of
propositional logic from [Kle52] and not only copy the context, but also the relevant parts of
the principal formulae into the premisses. This might be considered a very coarse method,
and indeed for classical or intuitionistic propositional logic there are other methods available
[TS00]. Unfortunately these methods heavily rely on invertibility of the logical rules, a feature
which logical rules for modalities in general do not possess.
Definition 2.6.1. For a rule R = (P; Σ⇒ Π) a modified application
{(Γ,Σσ) F1 ,Θσ ⇒ (∆,Πσ) F2 ,Υσ | (Θ⇒ Υ; 〈F1, F2〉) ∈ P}
Γ,Σσ ⇒ ∆,Πσ
56
2.6. DEALING WITH CONTRACTION
of R is given by a substitution σ : Var→ F and a context Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S(F). We write `R∗ for
derivability using modified applications instead of applications of rules in R.
Example 2.6.2. 1. A modified application of the propositional rule →L has the form
Γ, A→ B,B ⇒ ∆ Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆, A
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
2. Modified applications of the rules 4n have the form
Σ,A1, . . . ,An, A1, . . . , An ⇒ B
Γ,Σ,A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B,∆
where none of the formulae in Γ has  as its main connective.
3. A modified application of the rule {(p1, p2 ⇒ q; C∅), (⇒ q; C4)}/p1,♥p2 ⇒ q has the
form
A1, A2 ⇒ B Γ {p},A1 ⇒ B
Γ,A1,♥A2 ⇒ B,∆
Thus if Γ = Σ,Θ where no formula in Σ is of the form A this modified application
takes the form
A1, A2 ⇒ B Θ,A1 ⇒ B
Σ,Θ,A1,♥A2 ⇒ B,∆
It is not hard to see that the weakening rule is still admissible.
Lemma 2.6.3 (Admissibility of Weakening). Let R be a set of rules with restrictions and let
Γ⇒ ∆ be a sequent. Then we have
`R∗W[Con] Γ⇒ ∆ iff `R∗[Con] Γ⇒ ∆
and the depth of the derivations is preserved.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.3.12
Since Weakening is admissible it follows that in the presence of Contraction a sequent is
derivable using applications of rules if and only if it is derivable using modified applications of
rules.
Proposition 2.6.4. Let R be a set of rules with restrictions. Then for every sequent Γ⇒ ∆
we have `RCon Γ⇒ ∆ iff `R∗Con Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. By admissibility of Weakening it is clear that we can derive the premisses of a modified
application of a rule from the premisses of the corresponding application. On the other hand
given the premisses of a modified application of a rule we simply use a standard application of
this rule followed by a number of contractions of the principal formulae.
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The move to modified applications instead of applications of rules allows us to permute
contractions between principal and context formulae into the premisses of a rule, thus yielding
admissibility of contraction in cut-free sequent systems given by contraction-closed rule sets.
Theorem 2.6.5 (Admissibility of Contraction). For every contraction-closed set R of rules
and sequent Γ⇒ ∆ we have `R∗Con Γ⇒ ∆ iff `R∗ Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. The “if” direction is immediate. For the “only if” direction we employ a double
induction on the modal nesting depth of the contracted formula and on the depth of the
derivation. If the Contraction is applied to an axiom or the conclusion of an application of
the left introduction rule for ⊥ we eliminate it the standard way. So suppose the premiss of
the application of the Contraction rule is the conclusion of a rule in R. If the Contraction
is between two context formulae or between a context formula and a principal formula, we
permute the application of Contraction into the premisses of this rule and eliminate it using
the inner induction hypothesis. If Contraction is applied to two principal formulae of a rule
R we use contraction closure of the rule set to replace the application of the rule and the
Contraction by a number of Contractions and Weakenings on the premisses of that rule and
a rule application Q from the rule set. W.l.o.g. all of the newly introduced Contractions
are above the newly introduced Weakenings and none of the Contractions is on a context
formula of Q. Since the rules add one layer of modalities in the principal formulae, the newly
introduced Contractions must be on formulae of lower modal nesting depth and we may
eliminate them using the outer induction hypothesis. Finally the applications of Weakening
are eliminated using admissibility of Weakening. It is clear from the proof of the latter that
this does not introduce any new Contractions.
Remark 2.6.6. The results of this section show that we can view many sequent calculi which
copy the principal formulae into the premisses to ensure admissibility of contraction basically
as calculi given by rules with context restrictions if by deleting the copies of the principal
formulae from the premisses we obtain rules with context restrictions. This applies e.g. to the
sequent calculus G3s for S4 given in [TS00, p.287].
2.7 Generic Decision Procedures and Complexity
Ultimately, we are interested in deciding for a given formula whether it is a theorem of a
particular logic. We call this problem the validity problem for a logic.
Validity in L
Input: A formula A
Question: Is |=L A?
From the point of view of the sequent calculi considered here this problem takes the form of
deciding whether a given sequent is derivable in a sequent system given by a set of rules with
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context restrictions. That is, for a given set R of rules with context restrictions we consider
the following decision problem:
Derivability in R
Input: A sequent Γ⇒ ∆
Question: Is Γ⇒ ∆ derivable in RCutConW?
Provided we know that the sequent calculus under consideration is saturated, by the generic
cut elimination theorem, admissibility of Weakening and the results of the previous section it
is clear that we might also equivalently consider the problem of cut-free derivability in the
modified rule set R∗:
Cut-free Derivability in R∗
Input: A sequent Γ⇒ ∆
Question: Is Γ⇒ ∆ derivable in R∗?
Before taking a closer look at generic decidability and complexity results for these problems we
briefly recapitulate different representations and measures of size of formulae. The standard
representation of formulae is as a string of symbols.
Definition 2.7.1. Let Λ be a finite set of connectives with associated arities and let F be a
formula with connectives in Λ. The formula size of F is the number ||F || of symbols in F .
We will also consider the more succinct circuit (or DAG-) representation of formulae. This
representation allows us to identify different occurrences of the same subformula.
Definition 2.7.2. Let Λ be a finite set of connectives with associated arities. A Λ-circuit is
a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are labelled in the following way:
1. Nodes without any predecessors are called input nodes and are labelled with a proposi-
tional variable or a 0-ary connective from Λ.
2. Nodes with k > 0 predecessors are labelled with a k-ary connective from Λ.
We assume that the predecessors of every node are ordered. Nodes without any successors are
called output nodes. The size of a Λ-circuit C is the number s(C) of nodes in C. A Λ-circuit
with one output node corresponds in the obvious way to a formula with connectives in Λ.
For such a formula F the circuit size of F is the minimal size of a Λ-circuit representing F .
The circuit size of the formula F is denoted by ||F ||c. For a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ the circuit size of
Γ⇒ ∆ is defined as ||Γ⇒ ∆||c :=
∑
F∈Supp(Γ,∆) ||F ||c.
Thus the circuit size of a formula is the number of different subformulae occurring in it.
Using e.g. the formulae from the family of formulae {An | n ∈ N} defined by A0 := p and
An+1 := An∧An for n ∈ N it can be seen that the circuit presentation of formulae is potentially
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exponentially more succinct than the standard representation. The general idea for our generic
decision procedure now is the following: Given a saturated set of rules with restrictions we
know by Theorem 2.4.16 that the cut rule is admissible and thus safely can be dropped. Then
we modify the sequent system as described in the previous section, yielding admissibility of
contraction. Furthermore, by admissibility of Weakening the Weakening rule can be dropped
as well. Now we would like to either use the subformula property of the resulting sequent
system to enumerate all sequents possibly occurring in the derivation of a given sequent, or
we would like to try backwards proof search to find a derivation for it. In general our rule sets
will comprise infinitely many rules, though, so we will need to impose another condition on
the rule sets which ensures that the necessary rules can be computed fast enough.
Definition 2.7.3. We write A∗ for the set of finite strings of symbols from a set A. For finite
sets A,B a relation R ⊆ A∗ ×B∗ is called Pspace-tractable if given a tuple (a, b) ∈ A∗ ×B∗
it is decidable in space polynomial in the length of a whether (a, b) ∈ R. A set R of rules
is tractable if there exists an encoding of the applications of rules in R such that both the
relation holding between sequents and codes of applications of rules with this sequent as
conclusion and the relation holding between codes of applications of rules and their premisses
are Pspace-tractable.
Example 2.7.4. The rule sets G[cim] as well as RK,RKT,RK4 and RS4 are tractable.
Indeed, if a saturated rule set is tractable, then we can use a generic algorithm to decide
whether a sequent is derivable using modified applications.
Theorem 2.7.5. Let R be a saturated and tractable set of rules with restrictions. Then the
cut-free derivability problem for R∗ is in Exptime. More precisely, it is decidable in time
exponential in the circuit size of the input.
Proof. The idea is to work on fully contracted sequents and make use of the subformula
property of the system to compute all the derivable sequents built from subformulae of the
original sequent. Since all formulae occurring in the premisses of modified applications of
rules in R are subformulae of the formulae occurring in the conclusion of this application, it is
clear that if a sequent is derivable, then it has a derivation in which only such sequents occur
(although not necessarily fully contracted).
Recall that for a multiset Γ of formulae we write Supp (Γ) for the support of Γ, that is the
multiset of formulae in Γ disregarding their multiplicities. Furthermore, for a sequent Γ⇒ ∆
let Sf(Γ⇒ ∆) denote the set of subformulae of Γ⇒ ∆, where as usual we identify different
occurrences of the same formula. Then obviously we have |Sf(Γ⇒ ∆)| ≤ ||Γ ⇒ ∆||c. Since
the rule set is contraction closed, by Theorem 2.6.5 the contraction rule is admissible, and by
Lemma 2.6.3 the weakening rule is admissible as well. Thus it is clear that a sequent Γ⇒ ∆
is derivable in R∗ if and only if the sequent Supp (Γ) ⇒ Supp (∆) is derivable in R∗. Let
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S(Γ⇒ ∆) denote the set of sequents Supp (Σ)⇒ Supp (Π) with Σ⇒ Π ∈ S(Sf(Γ⇒ ∆)). The
procedure given as Algorithm 1 checks derivability in R∗ on input Γ⇒ ∆ by first iteratively
constructing all relevant derivable sequents and then checking whether Γ⇒ ∆ is in this set.
Algorithm 1: Decision procedure for derivability in R∗
Input: a sequent Γ⇒ ∆
set D,D′ := ∅;
repeat
set D := D′;
foreach Σ⇒ Π ∈ S(Γ⇒ ∆) do
if exists application of R ∈ R∗ with conclusion Σ⇒ Π s.t. for all premisses
Θ⇒ Ξ of this application of R: Supp (Θ)⇒ Supp (Ξ) ∈ D then
add Σ⇒ Π to D′
until D = D′ ;
Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable iff Γ⇒ ∆ ∈ D
Since D ⊆ D′ ⊆ S(Γ⇒ ∆) and since the number of sequents in S(Γ⇒ ∆) is only exponential
in |Sf(Γ⇒ ∆)| =: s, the repeat-loop in the procedure is executed at most exponentially often
(in s). Furthermore, in each execution of the loop the procedure checks at most exponentially
many sequents, and since the rule set is tractable, checking each sequent can be done in time
exponential in s. Thus the overall runtime of the procedure is exponential in the number of
subformulae of the input sequent. Since |Sf(Γ⇒ ∆)| ≤ ||Γ⇒ ∆||c this yields the result.
Corollary 2.7.6. Let R be a saturated and tractable set of rules with restrictions. Then the
derivability problem for R is in Exptime.
Proof. We have for every sequent Γ⇒ ∆:
`RCutConW Γ⇒ ∆ Lem. 2.3.12⇐⇒ `RCutCon Γ⇒ ∆ Thm. 2.4.16⇐⇒ `RCon Γ⇒ ∆
Prop. 2.6.4⇐⇒ `R∗Con Γ⇒ ∆ Thm. 2.6.5⇐⇒ `R∗ Γ⇒ ∆ .
Together with Theorem 2.7.5 this yields the result.
Corollary 2.7.7. Since the rule sets RK4 and RS4 are as we have seen saturated and tractable,
their derivability problems are in Exptime.
Of course it is well-known that the logics K4 and S4 are decidable in Pspace [Lad77], and
so the complexity bounds obtained in the previous corollary are not optimal. This raises the
question whether we can do better in general. Since the rules for modal logic K are rules with
restrictions, and since the problem of deciding whether a formula is valid in K is known to be
Pspace-complete [Lad77], it is clear that the complexity of a generic decision procedure will
not be below Pspace. It is not known whether in general the Exptime complexity is optimal.
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On the other hand, if we restrict the rule format to shallow rules it is possible to bring the
generic bound down to the optimal complexity.
Theorem 2.7.8. Let R be a saturated and tractable set of shallow rules. Then the cut-free
derivability problem for R∗ is in Pspace. More precisely, it can be solved in space polynomial
in the circuit size of the input.
Proof. In a first step we note that since Weakening and Contraction are admissible we might
equivalently work with sequents based on sets instead of multisets and restrict modified
applications of rules in such a way that all the principal formulae are distinct. Then it can be
easily seen that for every set-sequent derivable in this system there is a derivation in which
on every branch every set-sequent occurs at most once. Furthermore, since every formula
occurring in the premisses of a rule is a subformula of a formula occurring in its conclusion,
only set-sequents built from subformulae of a set-sequent can occur in its derivation. Now
backwards proof search for this system is implemented on an alternating Turing machine as
follows: the machine existentially guesses the last applied rule, then universally guesses its
premisses (both of which only take polynomial space since the rule set is tractable) and checks
that the premisses have not been encountered before and are derivable. Due to the format
of the rules when passing from conclusion to premisses either the set-sequent is extended by
at least one formula or the maximal complexity of formulae is diminished by at least one.
Since both the number of formulae in the set-sequents and their maximal complexity are
bounded by the number of subformulae of the end-sequent and thus the circuit-size of the
input sequent, the branches in the computation tree have length polynomial in the latter value.
Thus the procedure runs in alternating polynomial time, which is equivalent to polynomial
space [CKS81].
Then as above we have:
Corollary 2.7.9. Let R be a saturated and tractable set of shallow rules. Then the derivability
problem for R is in Pspace. 
In particular, this yields uniform decision procedures of optimal complexity for a wide
variety of standard modal logics and intuitionistic propositional logic.
Example 2.7.10. 1. As we have seen above the rule sets G[cim] are saturated and tractable.
Thus the derivability problems for these rule sets are in Pspace.
2. Similarly, the rule sets RK and RKT are saturated and tractable. Thus the derivability
problems for GcRK and GcRKT are in Pspace.
Example 2.7.11. We can use this generic decision procedure to solve the derivability problem
for a number of extensions of constructive modal logic CMK (see e.g. [Wij90, BdPR01]). The
rules and rule sets for the logics CMK and CMKT are given in Table 2.6. While these are not
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Kn :={(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C∅)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ q
K♦n :={(p1, . . . , pn, q ⇒ r; C∅)}/p1, . . . ,pn,♦q ⇒ ♦r
RT :={(p⇒ ; Cid)/p⇒
RT♦ :={(⇒ p; Cid)/ ⇒ ♦p
RCMK := {Kn | n ≥ 0} ∪ {K♦n | n ≥ 0}
RCMKT :=RCMK ∪ {RT, RT♦}
Table 2.6: The rule sets for some constructive modal logics
yet principal-cut closed (albeit principal-cut deriving, see Remark 2.4.18), by Lemma 2.4.5 we
may simply add the missing cuts between rules Kn and RT resp. RT♦ and K♦n to the rule
set. This gives the additional rules
Tn := {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ ; Cid)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒
T♦n := {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; Cid)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ ♦q
and the rule set R′CMKT := RCMK ∪ {Tn | n ≥ 1} ∪ {T♦n | n ≥ 0}. It is clear that a
sequent is derivable in GiRCMKT[CutCon] iff it is derivable in GiR′CMKT[CutCon]. Furthermore,
it can be seen that the rule sets RCMK and R′CMKT are saturated and tractable, and thus by
Corollary 2.7.9 derivability in each of the systems GiRCMKCutConW and GiRCMKTCutConW
is decidable in Pspace.
We will make extensive use of the generic decidability results when we construct complexity
optimal sequent calculi for a number of conditional logics in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.8 Notes
The Rule Format. The format of rules with context restrictions is an extension of the format
of one-step rules considered e.g. in [PS08, PS10]. The additional feature of rules with context
restrictions, the ability to copy the whole or part of the context into the premisses, allows to
capture not only standard propositional rules but also rules for modal logics axiomatised by
axioms of modal rank greater than one, as we will see in the next chapter. The intermediate
format of shallow rules was introduced in [LP11] and the present format has been published
in [LP13a].
The notion of a context restriction is inspired by the more general notion of a context relation
introduced in [AL11]. In contrast to context restrictions, which only restrict the context
but do not change it, context relations are arbitrary (finite) binary relations between signed
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formulae, interpreted by allowing the context formulae to change from premiss to conclusion
according to the relation. This not only allows adding modalities to context formulae in the
conclusion, thus e.g. interpreting the boxed formulae on the left hand side of the conclusion
of the Kn-rules as context formulae, or stripping the context formulae of modalities, thus
capturing e.g. the rule for symmetry given in Example 2.3.7 (5), but also moving context
formulae from one side of the sequent to the other. While obviously context restrictions can
be seen as severely restricted context relations, the additional expressive power of the latter
would be counterbalanced by the need for increasingly complex extensions of the syntactic
criteria for cut elimination given in Section 2.4. Moreover, the rule format considered in
[AL11], that of basic rules allows arbitrary sequents as the principal formulae. While this
has the advantage of capturing the structural rules as well, it has the disadvantage that it
also allows trivially cut-free sequent calculi where for each theorem of a logic there is a rule
whose principal formulae simply state this theorem on the right hand side. While this is not
a problem for the construction of semantics from a rule set as introduced in [AL11], for our
syntactical investigations into cut elimination and also for the questions considered in the
next chapter this is clearly not desirable. Of course again every rule with context restrictions
can be seen to be a rule with context relations, which makes all the rule sets considered here
amenable to the semantic methods based on basic rules. It would be very interesting to see
whether the semantic criteria for cut admissibility given in [AL11] and our syntactic criteria
for cut elimination are related in some way. Also of course we would like to extend the notion
of context restriction towards the notion of context relation in order to be able to capture
more logics.
The main difference to the other rule formats studied in the literature is that our rule format
allows for several principal formulae, while usually only one principal formula is introduced.
However, if we want to stay in the classical sequent framework and not introduce new structural
connectives, and if we take the context to be unchanging, then introducing several principal
formulae is essential for capturing modal logics, since otherwise already modal logicK would
be problematic. One line of research in this direction is based on the notion of a canonical
rule, which in its basic form [AL01] in our terminology essentially is a shallow rule with
restrictions Cid whose principal formulae contain exactly one formula (the rules in the original
form are context-independent while our rules are context-sharing in the sense of [TS00]).
Extensions of this format to quantifiers and labelled calculi have subsequently been considered
in [ZA06, AZ08, ZA12]. The (asymmetric) simple calculi investigated in [CT06b] and the
(symmetric) standard calculi from [CT06a] also only allow one principal formula per rule,
but allow for more differentiations in the context. This is necessary since, in contrast to the
calculi considered here, the calculi investigated in these works do not need to contain all the
structural rules. The rules for cut suitable calculi considered in [Ras07] are slightly more
general in that they also allow restrictions of (parts of) the context to formulae with a specific
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main connective and cardinality restrictions, thus rendering the format suitable for capturing
e.g. intuitionistic S4. But even here we only have one principal formula. The rule formats in
[CT06a] and [Ras07] also allow for the treatment of quantifiers.
Criteria for Cut Elimination. Our notion of a principal-cut closed rule set is based on
the notion of a resolution closed rule set in [SP09] and the notion of a cut absorbing rule set
in [PS10]. The technique of variable elimination given in Definition 2.4.1 and the method
of proving that cuts between rules are sound (Lemma 2.4.5) are similar to the method of
cutting applied to quasiequations in the construction of completed structural rules given
in [CGT08, CST09, CGT12]. The operations of cut between rules and (right- resp. left-)
contraction of a rule can be seen as admissible rules in a calculus for admissible rules in the
spirit of [IM09].
Our proof for cut elimination (Theorem 2.4.16) is based on the proof in [SP09, PS08, PS10]
for sequent systems based on one-step rules. A first extension to shallow rules using the
multicut rule was stated in [LP11], where unfortunately the necessary condition of contraction-
closure was omitted. The generalisation to right- or left-contraction closed rule sets is based
on the proof in [vP01]. Where the latter proof relied on invertibility of the propositional rules
we make use of context-cut closure and mixed-cut closure of the rule set.
In the literature there exist a number of results stating sufficient and in some cases also
necessary conditions for different variants of cut elimination or cut admissibility. In contrast
to semantically motivated criteria which are based on providing a generic semantics for logics
given by sequent calculi of a specific format [AL09, AL11, BLZ12] we are mainly interested in
syntactical criteria. The prime example for this kind of criteria are Belnap’s conditions C1 to
C8 ensuring cut elimination for display logic [Bel82]. Condition C8 roughly corresponds to our
condition of principal-cut closure. Similar criteria for consecution calculi are given in [Res00].
The calculi considered in these works introduce additional structural connectives. Considering
the standard sequent format without any additional structure the criterion of principal-cut
closure for calculi allowing more than one principal formula was formulated in [ PS08, PS10].
But since in contrast to the one-step rules considered there our rules might copy the whole or
parts of the context, we need the criteria of context-cut closure and mixed-cut closure as well.
The criteria in [PS09, PS11] also demand that the logical rules absorb the structural rules
and inversions of the propositional rules. This way the structural rules are admissible and the
propositional rules invertible, a fact which the proof of cut elimination presented there relies
on. Since the rule format in [Ras07] allows for context-independent rules and since the calculi
considered there might not contain all the structural rules, the criteria for cut elimination in
this work are considerably more fine grained and involved. Condition C9 roughly corresponds
to our condition of principal-cut closure (for rules with one principal formula). The conditions
of mixed-cut closure and context-cut closure are split into several cases. This work also
includes an analysis of the complexity of cut elimination. A sufficient and necessary condition
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for cut admissibility for canonical calculi was considered in [AL01, ZA06] under the name of
coherence. This demands that whenever cut can be applied to the conclusions of two canonical
rules, then their premisses must be propositionally inconsistent, and in this setting amounts
to principal-cut closure of the rule set.
Stronger notions of cut elimination such as reductive cut elimination [CT06b], modular cut
elimination [CT06a] or strong cut elimination [AZ08] are based on the idea that whenever a
sequent is derivable from a set S of sequents, in the case of [CT06a] with particular properties,
then it must be cut-free derivable from the S [CT06a] or derivable using cuts only on formulae
from S. Necessary and sufficient conditions for these notions of cut elimination in the
frameworks of canonical rules, simple rules or standard calculi have been established in the
above cited works and are all similar to the coherence condition of [AL01]. In [CT06b, CT06a]
the corresponding condition, reducibility, also takes into account different format of the
context in the rules considered there. Furthermore, this format also dictates the condition of
(weak) substitutivity, which ensures that cuts with context formulae can be permuted into the
premisses of a rule.
Contraction. The method of copying the (relevant) principal formulae into the conclusions
of a rule to ensure admissibility of Contraction seems to have been introduced by Kleene for
the construction of the G3-systems for propositional logic [Kle52]. As a general method in the
construction of cut-free sequent calculi it has been used e.g. in [NvP01, Neg05], where also the
idea of a contraction-closed rule set seems to have been explicitly formulated for the first time
as the closure condition. Our notion of contraction-closed rule sets is based on [SP09, PS10].
Decidability. Our condition on tractability of the rule sets is an extension of the notion of a
pspace-tractable rule set in [SP09], where a generic Pspace-decision procedure for modal logics
given by one-step rules based on backwards proof search was given. This generic procedure
also has been implemented [CMPS09]. Theorem 2.7.8 on decidability for shallow rule sets in
Pspace was originally published in [LP11] with a slightly different proof using histories in the
spirit of [HSZ96] to prevent multiple applications of the same rule with restriction Cid in the
backwards proof search algorithm. We will see in the next chapter that logics axiomatised
by non-iterative axioms are closely connected to shallow rules. A generic semantic method
along with semantic criteria ensuring decidability in Pspace for such non-iterative modal
logics has been given in [SP08]. Decidability for every logic axiomatised by finitely many
non-iterative axioms has also been shown in [Lew74] using semantical methods. While not
explicitly stated this proof seems to suggest a 3Exptime upper bound for such logics. For
normal modal logics this result was strengthened in [tC05] to a NExptime upper bound for
logics defined by shallow formulae, where in such a formula every occurrence of a propositional
variable is in the scope of at most one modality. It is not clear whether either of these bounds
is tight. In particular, the author is not aware of any finitely axiomatised non-iterative logics
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with complexity above Pspace. Since moreover standard proofs for Exptime-hardness e.g.
via reductions from some form of tiling problem [BdRV01] or acceptance problem for Turing
machines seem to rely on nested modalities, this raises the question whether nested axioms
are essential for Exptime-hardness.
Problem 2.8.1. Is there an Exptime-hard finitely axiomatised non-iterative logic?
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3 Axioms versus Rules
In the preceding chapter we have defined a fairly general format of sequent rules and seen
criteria on sets of rules of this format which are sufficient to ensure that the sequent calculus
given by the set of rules allows for a syntactic proof of cut elimination or can be used in a
generic decision procedure. Now we take a closer look at Question 1.1.4 from the Introduction,
that is we would like to know for which kinds of modal logics there can be a sound and
complete sequent system consisting of rules with context restrictions. For this purpose as
mentioned we will take the modal logics to be given by a set of axioms for a Hilbert system.
Thus we would like to know which axioms can be captured by our rule format, i.e. have
corresponding rules with restrictions, and moreover which axioms can not be captured.
For this purpose in Section 3.2 we will first syntactically characterise the class of translatable
axioms and give a purely syntactic and automatic translation of axioms of this class into
so-called proto rules, that is rules with restrictions where the number of context formulae is
fixed. This is then used to show that ω-sets for translatable axioms, i.e., sets of axioms which
are generated in a particular way by a single translatable axiom, are equivalent to a single
rule with restrictions. Furthermore, under certain additional restrictions, namely normality
of the context formulae this generated set of axioms is equivalent to the single generating
axiom, and thus the latter can be translated into a rule with restrictions instead of a proto
rule. Since the translation is automatic we can take it as a convenient starting point if we try
to construct a cut-free sequent system for a modal logic given by a set of axioms in the spirit
of Question 1.1.3.
Of course the translation from axioms to rules gives only sufficient conditions for an axiom
to be equivalent to a rule with restrictions. Naturally, we would like to know whether these
criteria are necessary as well. To address this point we will consider in Section 3.3 a translation
from rules with restrictions back to axioms (or sets of axioms) of our format. This will establish
necessity of the criteria and thus the following strict correspondence: an axiom for a Hilbert
system can be captured by rules with restrictions if and only if it is axiomatically equivalent to
a set of ω-sets for translatable axioms. Restrictions of the rule format to one-step or shallow
rules yield suitably restricted classes of axioms. As a graphical guide to the translations, the
main results are given schematically in Figure 3.1, where arrows indicate translations and are
annotated with the corresponding theorems. Dashed arrows indicate that the translations
presuppose normal context formulae resp. restrictions. For both directions the main work lies
in the translation between translatable clauses and proto rules.
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translatable
clauses
proto rules
ω-sets of
translatable
clauses
rules
Theorem 3.2.14
Theorem 3.3.16
Theorem 3.2.24
Theorem 3.3.16
Theorem 3.3.14
Theorem 3.2.30
Figure 3.1: The main translations schematically. Dashed lines presuppose normality of the
context formulae / restrictions.
In Section 3.4 finally we will make use of this correspondence to show limitative results
concerning the expressivity of the different rule formats under consideration. Apart from
formally establishing that the three formats of rules have different expressive power this will
also show that certain standard modal logics cannot be captured by one-step or shallow rules.
It should be noted, however, that the translations make use of the cut rule, and therefore
might be a bit blunt if we are interested in limitative results for cut-free sequent systems.
In particular, for logics such as S5, for which there are complete (with Cut) calculi given by
rules with restrictions, we will not be able to use the translation to show that they cannot be
captured by a cut-free system given by rules with restrictions. Nonetheless, we will see that if
we consider sequent calculi given by a mixed-cut closed set of rules with restrictions, then we
can use the translation to show limitative results regarding S5 and a number of other standard
modal logics. The assumption of mixed-cut closure seems to be reasonably mild. In particular,
if we are interested in rule sets for which cut elimination can be shown in the standard way,
mixed-cut closure, i.e. the ability to permute cuts where the cut formula is contextual in one
rule into the premisses of this rule, seems to be fundamental. Of course the limitative results
themselves are independent of a specific technique for proving cut elimination and thus also
preclude e.g. semantic proofs of cut admissibility in such systems.
3.1 Hilbert Axioms and Sequent Rules
Let us first recall the definition and some basic properties of Hilbert systems.
Definition 3.1.1. For a set A ⊆ F(Λ) of formulae we take the (classical resp. intuitionistic
resp. minimal ) Hilbert system H[cim]A to include the formulae in A and axioms for the
propositional base logic and to be closed under the rule of uniform substitution US, modus
ponens MP and the congruence rules Cong♥ for all modalities ♥ ∈ Λ as given in Table 3.1, see
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`H[cim]A A1 ↔ B1 . . . `H[cim]A An ↔ Bn
`H[cim]A ♥(A1, . . . , An)↔ ♥(B1, . . . , Bn)
Cong♥
`H[cim]A A `H[cim]A A→ B
`H[cim]A B MP
`H[cim]A A1 → B1 . . . `H[cim]A An → Bn
`H[cim]A ♥(A1, . . . , An)→ ♥(B1, . . . , Bn)
Mon♥
`H[cim]A A
`H[cim]A Aσ US
Table 3.1: The derivation rules for Hilbert systems
also [HC96, p.222]. For axiomatisations of the propositional base logics see e.g. [TS00, p.51].
We write `H[cim]A A if the formula A is in H[cim]A and say that A is derivable in the Hilbert
system H[cim]A.
It is clear that Hilbert systems are logics in the sense of Definition 2.1.5. The main difference
is that Hilbert systems also are closed under the congruence rules and explicitly mention an
axiomatisation. Instead of working directly with Hilbert systems we will work with sequent
systems for propositional logic with the rules of congruence and additional “axioms” given by
a sequent consisting of only one formula:
Definition 3.1.2. For a set R of sequent rules and a set A ⊆ F(Λ) of formulae we write
R+A for the sequent system consisting of the rules in R together with the ground sequents
⇒ A for every A ∈ A. Ground sequents are treated as zero-premiss rules. In particular all
their substitution instances are derivable.
Proposition 3.1.3 (cim). Let A ⊆ F(Λ) be a set of axioms. Then for every sequent Γ⇒ ∆
we have `G[cim]CongWCutCon+A Γ⇒ ∆ iff `H[cim]A
∧
Γ→ ∨∆.
Proof. The proof is a simple extension of the standard proof for equivalence of sequent systems
and Hilbert system for propositional logic [Gen35, Joh37, TS00, NvP01]. For the congruence
rules in the Hilbert system we have counterparts in the sequent system, and since an axiom
A ∈ A for the Hilbert system corresponds directly to a sequent ⇒ A the additional axioms
do not create any problems.
In view of the previous Proposition in the following we will concentrate on sequent systems
with ground sequents consisting of a single formula on the right hand side instead of axioms
for a Hilbert system. The following definition allows us to compare rules and axioms. In order
to allow for a background theory we consider the notion of equivalence over a set of rules,
where the latter of course might be empty.
Definition 3.1.4. Let R be a set of rules with context restrictions and assume we have
fixed a propositional base logic. A set RA of rules is equivalent over R to a set A of axioms
if every rule in RA is a derivable rule in G[cim]RCutConW + A and every axiom in A is
derivable in G[cim]RCutConWRA. In case RA = {R} and A = {A} we also say that the rule
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R is equivalent to the axiom A. Similarly, two sets R1,R2 of rules are equivalent over R, if
every rule in R1 is a derivable rule in G[cim]RCutConWR2 and vice versa. Finally, two sets
A1,A2 of axioms are (axiomatically) equivalent over R if every axiom in A1 is derivable in
G[cim]RCutConW +A2 and vice versa.
This allows us to phrase the main question for this chapter more formally:
Question 3.1.5. Sets of axioms of which syntactical form are equivalent to sets of rules with
context restrictions?
In order to have some tools at our disposal we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1.6. For the rest of this chapter we assume that the logics are extensions of
intuitionistic or classical propositional logic.
3.2 From Axioms to Rules
Before stating the formal definition of the class of translatable axioms let us have a brief
look at the general idea for the translation from axioms to rules with restrictions. The main
idea here is to consider axioms which are particular substitution instances of axioms without
iterated modalities. In a first step then the underlying non-iterative axiom is translated into a
rule. Then both in the premisses and the conclusion the variables of the non-iterative axiom
are substituted according to the original axiom. Under certain circumstances these formulae
behave as context formulae for the resulting sequent rule. Let us have a look at an example.
Example 3.2.1. We take ♥ and s to be unary modalities for a modal logic based on
intuitionistic propositional logic and we stipulate that the rule set R describing the background
theory includes rules ensuring normality of s and monotony and “seriality” of ♥:
R = { {(p, q ⇒ r; C∅)}/ s p, s q ⇒ s r, {(⇒ p; C∅)}/ ⇒ s p, {(p⇒ ; C∅)}/♥p⇒ , Mon♥ } .
In the classical notation these rules are given by:
r, q ⇒ r
Γ, s p, s q ⇒ s r,∆
⇒ p
Γ⇒ s p,∆
p⇒
Γ,♥p⇒ ∆
p⇒ q
Γ,♥p⇒ ♥q,∆ Mon♥
Suppose we would like to translate the axiom ♥(s p→ ♥q)→ (s p→ ♥q) into a rule equivalent
to it over R. The axiom can be seen as a substitution instance of the non-iterative axiom
♥(r → s)→ (r → s) under the substitution σ with σ(r) = s p and σ(s) = ♥p. Translating the
latter we first get the ground sequent ⇒ ♥(r → s)→ (r → s), and resolving propositional
logic on the top level of the formula then yields ♥(r → s), r ⇒ s. Since our rule format does
not allow nested connectives in the conclusion we now introduce a fresh variable t for the
formula r → s and premisses t⇒ (r → s) and (r → s)⇒ t which ensure that t and r → s are
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equivalent. As we will see due to the monotonicity of ♥ we actually only need the premiss
t⇒ (r → s), which gives us
t⇒ r → s
♥t, r ⇒ s .
Now resolving the propositional connective in the premiss and substituting the original formulae
s p for r and ♥q for s gives us
t, s p⇒ ♥q
♥t, s p⇒ ♥q .
Finally, using the facts that the modality s is normal and that the modality ♥ is serial we
may turn the variables p and q above into the context restriction C := 〈{s p}, {♥q}〉, giving
the rule {(s⇒ ; C)}/♥s⇒ .
There are some peculiarities to the procedure described above. The first is that all the
propositional logic occurring on the top level of the formula or under the modalities must be
resolvable, that is the respective rules for the propositional connectives must be invertible.
While for classical propositional logic as the underlying propositional logic this is always the
case, for intuitionistic propositional logic we need to be more careful. The second is that
we can only turn the formulae s p and ♥q above into context restrictions, because all their
occurrences are on the same side of the sequents in the premisses and the conclusion, and
because they occur exactly once in the conclusion and at least once in the premisses. In order
to express these requirements formally we introduce the notion of a resolvable formula, where
we furthermore make the subformulae occurring only negatively or positively explicit in the
sets C` resp. Cr:
Definition 3.2.2 (ci). Let C`, C and Cr be sets of formulae. We simultaneously define the
sets Frc(C`, C, Cr) of classically right resolvable formulae and F`c(C`, C, Cr) of classically left
resolvable formulae for the triple (C`, C, Cr) as well as their intuitionistic versions Fr i(C`, C, Cr)
and F`i(C`, C, Cr) by the following grammar, where for Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) the starting variable
is P
[ci]
r and for F`[ci](C`, C, Cr) it is P [ci]` .
P [ci]r ::= P
[c]
r ∨ P [c]r | P [ci]r ∧ P [ci]r | P [ci]` → P [ci]r | Ar | B | ⊥ | > where Ar ∈ Cr, B ∈ C
P
[ci]
` ::= P
[ci]
` ∨ P [ci]` | P [ci]` ∧ P [ci]` | P [c]r → P [c]` | A` | B | ⊥ | > where A` ∈ C`, B ∈ C .
Remark 3.2.3. It is obvious from the definition that if a formula is left (or right) resolvable for
(C` ∪ {A}, C, Cr ∪ {B}), then it is also left (resp. right) resolvable for (C`, C ∪ {A}, Cr ∪ {B})
and for (C` ∪ {A}, C ∪ {B}, Cr).
Example 3.2.4. 1. The formula ♥p ∧ ((♥p ∨ q)→ r) is intuitionistically and classically
right resolvable for ({q}, {♥p}, {r}). Furthermore, it is classically left resolvable for
({r}, {♥p}, {q}) but it is not intuitionistically left resolvable for any triple.
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2. Both p ∨ q and (p → q) → ⊥ are classically right resolvable for (∅, ∅, {p, q}) resp.
({q}, ∅, {p}). Both formulae are not intuitionistically right resolvable for any triple.
Intuitively for a formula A in Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) the sequent ⇒ A can be broken up or resolved
using invertibility of the propositional rules in such a way that in the resulting set of sequents
formulae in C` (resp. Cr) occur only on the left hand side (resp. right hand side), whereas
formulae in C might occur on both sides. We capture this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.5 (ci). Let C`, C and Cr be sets of formulae and let Γ ⇒ ∆ be a sequent such
that every formula in Γ is in F`[ci](C`, C, Cr) and every formula in ∆ is in Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr).
Then there is a set S = {Γi ⇒ ∆i | i ∈ I} of sequents such that
1. S `G[ci]CutConW Γ⇒ ∆
2. Γ⇒ ∆ `G[ci]CutConW Γi ⇒ ∆i for every i ∈ I
3. for every i ∈ I: every formula in Γi is in C` ∪ C
4. for every i ∈ I: every formula in ∆i is in Cr ∪ C.
Proof. The proof is by simultaneous induction on the structure of the formulae in F`[ci](C`, C, Cr)
and Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) and essentially works by inverting the propositional rules using the rules
in G[ci]CutCon until we arrive at a set of sequents with the properties stated above.
As an example for the induction step in the classical case, suppose we have a sequent
Γ, A ⇒ ∆ such that A ∈ F`c(C`, C, Cr) with A = A1 → A2 for A1 ∈ Frc(C`, C, Cr) and
A2 ∈ F`c(C`, C, Cr), and such that Supp (Γ) ⊆ F`c(C`, C, Cr) and Supp (∆) ⊆ Frc(C`, C, Cr).
Then Γ, A ⇒ ∆ is equivalent to the two sequents Γ ⇒ A1,∆ and Γ, A2 ⇒ ∆ as seen by an
application of →L in the one direction and the derivations
A1 ⇒ A1, A2 A
⇒ A1, A1 → A2
→R
Γ, A1 → A2 ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ A1,∆ Cut
A1, A2 ⇒ A2 A
A2 ⇒ A1 → A2
→R
Γ, A1 → A2 ⇒ ∆
Γ, A2 ⇒ ∆ Cut
in the other direction. The cases for the other binary boolean connectives are analogous. In
case A is ⊥ we use the rule ⊥L and Weakening.
In the intuitionistic case the definition of right resp. left resolvable formulae ensures that we
do not need to invert the problematic rules ∨R or →L. The remaining cases are analogous
to the classical situation. The only slightly interesting case is that of a sequent Γ ⇒ A with
Supp (Γ) ⊆ F`i(C`, C, Cr) and A = A1 → A2. In this case we have
Γ⇒ A→ B
B,A⇒ B A A⇒ A A
A→ B,A⇒ B →L
Γ, A⇒ B Cut
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and on the other hand the sequent Γ⇒ A→ B follows directly from Γ, A⇒ B using →R.
The set of sequents guaranteed by the previous lemma need not be unique. E.g., if for a
formula A we have ⊥ → A ∈ Cr and A ∈ Cr, then the sequent ⇒ ⊥ → A already is in the
form stated in the lemma, but it is also equivalent to the sequent ⊥ ⇒ A. However, this will
not be problematic. Using the previous Lemma it is then possible to break up formulae in
Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) and to turn them into a normal form:
Definition 3.2.6 (ci). For a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ with Supp (Γ) ⊆ F`[ci](C`, C, Cr) and Supp (∆) ⊆
Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) a set of sequents resulting from its deconstruction according to Lemma 3.2.5
is called a (C`, C, Cr)-normal form of Γ ⇒ ∆. A (C`, C, Cr)-normal form of a formula
A ∈ Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) is a (C`, C, Cr)-normal form of the sequent ⇒ A.
To compute a (C`, C, Cr)-normal form of a formula A from Fr [ci](C`, C, Cr) it is thus enough
to attempt backwards proof search using the propositional rules for the sequent ⇒ A until
the sequents at the leafs of the derivation have only formulae from C` ∪ C on their left hand
side and only formulae from Cr ∪ C on their right hand side, and then take the set of the
sequents at the leafs of the derivation.
Example 3.2.7. 1. If we attempt backwards proof search using the rules in G[cim] for the
formula ♥p ∧ ((♥p ∨ q)→ r) from Example 3.2.4,1 we get the following:
⇒ ♥p
♥p⇒ r q ⇒ r
♥p ∨ q ⇒ r ∨L
⇒ (♥p ∨ q)→ r →R
⇒ ♥p ∧ ((♥p ∨ q)→ r) ∧R
The formula ♥p occurs both on the left and on the right hand side of the sequents ⇒ ♥p
and ♥p, q ⇒ r at the leafs of the attempted derivation, whereas q and r occur only on
the left (resp. right) hand side. This gives a classical and intuitionistic ({q}, {♥p}, {r})-
normal form { ⇒ ♥p, ♥p⇒ r, q ⇒ r} for the formula ♥p ∧ ((♥p ∨ q)→ r).
2. For the formula (p→ q)→ ⊥ we get the classical derivation
q ⇒ ⊥ ⇒ p,⊥
p→ q ⇒ ⊥ →L
⇒ (p→ q)→ ⊥ →R
and thus a classical ({q}, ∅, {p})-normal form {q ⇒ ⊥, ⇒ p,⊥} for (p→ q)→ ⊥.
Remark 3.2.8. If A is a (classically or intuitionistically) right resolvable propositional formula
for (∅,Var, ∅), then by permutability of the propositional rules its (∅,Var, ∅)-normal form
is unique. Moreover, Definition 3.2.6 yields the regular normal form of A in the sense of
[NvP01, p.128] if we consider the conjunction of the trace formulae of the sequents in its
(∅,Var, ∅)-normal form.
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The notion of right or left resolvable formulae now enables us to formally define a class of
translatable formulae. For the sake of readability we restrict ourselves to unary and monotone
modalities, i.e., we assume presence of the rules in Mon := {Mon♥ | ♥ ∈ Λ}.
Definition 3.2.9 (ci). Suppose that Λ is a set of monotone and unary modalities. Let C` and
Cr be sets of formulae with variables in W` and Wr respectively, and let V be a set of variables
such that for all formulae A,B ∈ C` ∪ Cr we have var (A) ∩ var (B) = ∅ and var (A) ∩ V = ∅.
The set of intuitionistically (resp. classically) translatable clauses with context formulae in
(C`, Cr) and variables in V is given by the following grammar (with initial variable S
[ci])
S[ci] ::= L[ci] → R[ci]
L[ci] ::= L[ci] ∧ L[ci] | ♥Pr | A` | p | ⊥ | > where ♥ ∈ Λ, Pr ∈ Fr [ci](C`, V, Cr), A` ∈ C`, p ∈ V
R[ci] ::= R[c] ∨R[c] | ♥P` | Ar | p | ⊥ | > where ♥ ∈ Λ, P` ∈ F`[ci](C`, V, Cr), Ar ∈ Cr, p ∈ V
together with the global restriction that every formula in C` ∪ Cr occurs at most once on the
top level of the clause (i.e. not in the scope of a modality), and occurs on the top level if and
only if it occurs under a modality. We also call the formulae in C` ∪ Cr the context formulae
of such a clause. A clause is intuitionistically (resp. classically) translatable if there is a triple
(C`, V, Cr) such that the clause is intuitionistically (resp. classically) translatable with context
formulae in (C`, Cr) and variables in V .
In other words, a classically translatable clause with context formulae in (C`, Cr) and
variables in V is simply a clause
∧n
i=1Ai →
∨m
j=1Bj where for i ≤ n we have Ai ∈
Λ(Fr [c](C`, V, Cr)) ∪ C` ∪ V ∪ {⊥,>} and for j ≤ m we have Bj ∈ Λ(F`[c](C`, V, Cr)) ∪
Cr ∪ V ∪ {⊥,>} satisfying the conditions on occurrences of formulae in C` ∪ Cr. In the
intuitionistic case the situation is similar with m ∈ {0, 1}. Thus a translatable clause is
essentially a non-iterative formula where some of the variables have been substituted with
arbitrary modal formulae which appear positively (resp. negatively) on the top level of the
formula if and only if they appear in the same polarity under a modality.
Example 3.2.10. 1. The axiom (4) = s→ s is an intuitionistically and classically
translatable clause with context formulae in ({s}, ∅).
2. The axiom (5) = ♦s→ ♦s is an intuitionistically and classically translatable clause
with context formulae in ({♦s}, ∅). The version (5) = ¬s → ¬s is a classically
translatable clause where the context formulae can be taken to be in ({¬s}, ∅) or in
(∅, {s}).
3. The axiom (T) = s → s is an intuitionistically and classically translatable clause
where the context formulae can be taken to be either in (∅, ∅) or in (∅, {s}).
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4. The axiom (IK2) = (s→ t)∧♦s→ ♦t is an intuitionistically and classically translatable
clause with context formulae in (∅, ∅).
5. The axiom (IK4) = ♦(p ∨ q)→ ♦p ∨ ♦q is a classically translatable clause with context
formulae (∅, ∅). It is not an intuitionistically translatable clause.
6. The axiom (B) = p→ ¬¬p is neither a classically nor an intuitionistically translatable
clause, since the variable p occurs both on the top level of the formula (and thus would
need to be a context formula or a variable in V ) and under two modalities (and thus
would need to be a proper subformula of a context formula).
7. The axiom (L) = (p → p) → p is neither a classically nor an intuitionistically
translatable clause, since the variable p occurs under two modalities and thus cannot be
a variable in V , and moreover the formulae p→ p and p do not occur on the top level
of the formula and thus cannot be context formulae.
Remark 3.2.11. For the sake of readability we only considered unary and monotone modalities.
It is not too difficult to generalise Definition 3.2.9 to n-ary and not necessarily monotone
modalities, though. Let us say that for a rule set R and i ≤ n an n-ary modality ♥ is monotone
in the i-th argument for R if the rule
Mon♥,i := {(pi ⇒ qi; C∅)} ∪ {(pj ⇒ qj ; C∅), (qj ⇒ pj ; C∅) | j ≤ n, j 6= i} /
♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn)
is derivable in R. Similarly, we say that ♥ is antitone in the i-th argument for R if the rule
Ant♥,i := {(qi ⇒ pi; C∅)} ∪ {(pj ⇒ qj ; C∅), (qj ⇒ pj ; C∅) | j ≤ n, j 6= i} /
♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn)
is derivable in R. Then in the definition of a translatable clause for the variable L[ci] we simply
replace the entry ♥Pr by ♥(P1, . . . , Pn) where ♥ is an n-ary modality from Λ and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
we have: Pi ∈ Fr [ci](C`, V, Cr) if ♥ is monotone in the i-th argument forR; Pi ∈ F`[ci](C`, V, Cr)
if ♥ is antitone in the i-th argument forR; and Pi ∈ Fr [ci](C`, V, Cr)∩F`[ci](C`, V, Cr) otherwise.
For R[ci] the entry ♥P` is modified similarly.
The context formulae of a translatable clause will of course correspond to the context
formulae in the resulting rule. But since the number of context formulae in a translatable
clause is fixed, in the result of the translation we have a fixed number of context formulae as
well. We capture this in the notion of a proto rule for a rule with restrictions.
Definition 3.2.12. Given a rule with restrictions R = P/Σ⇒ Π a proto rule for R is a tuple
(R; Γ⇒ ∆) given by a context Γ⇒ ∆ ∈ S(F) such that
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1. no propositional variable occurs more than once in Γ⇒ ∆
2. no propositional variable occurs both in Γ⇒ ∆ and R
3. if Γ⇒ ∆ 6= ⇒ , then (Γ⇒ ∆) C 6= ⇒ for every restriction C of R.
We often leave the context implicit and write R̂ for a proto rule for R. An application of a
proto rule R̂ = (R; Γ⇒ ∆) is given by a substitution σ : Var→ F and a context Θ⇒ Ξ where
(Θ⇒ Ξ) C= ⇒ for every restriction C of R, and is the same as the application of R with
substitution σ and context Γσ,Θ⇒ ∆σ,Ξ according to Definition 2.3.3. Derivability using
proto rules and notions of equivalence are defined as expected.
Informally, the difference between rules and proto rules is that in proto rules the premisses
including the context are fixed up to substitution, while in rules also the number of the context
formulae in the premisses may vary. Clause 3 in the above definition ensures that the context
Γ ⇒ ∆ only contains context formulae which are copied into at least one of the premisses.
Together with the condition that none of the formulae in a context Θ⇒ Ξ for an application
of the proto rule are copied into the premiss this means that a proto rule for a rule really
specifies exactly the number of context formulae which are copied into the premisses. In the
notation of Lemma 2.4.4 a proto rule R̂ for a rule R = P/Σ⇒ Π given by a context Γ⇒ ∆
has premisses P(Γ⇒ ∆) and conclusion Γ,Σ⇒ Π,∆.
Example 3.2.13. 1. Consider the rule Kn = {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C∅)}/p1, . . . ,pn ⇒ q.
Since the only restriction occurring in it is C∅ = 〈∅, ∅〉, the only proto rule for Kn is given
by the empty context ⇒ . An application of this proto rule is given by a substitution
and an arbitrary context.
2. For the rule RT = {(p⇒ ; Cid)}/p⇒ proto rules are given by arbitrary contexts (sat-
isfying the conditions on the variables), since every such sequent satisfies the restriction
Cid. Applications for these proto rules are given by a substitution and the empty context.
Thus e.g. the proto rule given by the sequent q1, q2 ⇒ r has applications
A1, A2, B ⇒ C
A1, A2,B ⇒ C
for arbitrary formulae A1, A2, B,C.
3. Proto rules for the rule 40 = {(⇒ q; C4)}/ ⇒ q are given by sequentsA1, . . . ,An ⇒
for a fixed n ∈ N (satisfying the conditions on the variables). Applications of these
proto rules are given by a substitution and a context consisting on the left only of
formulae whose main connective is not . Thus e.g. the proto rules given by the contexts
p1,p2 ⇒ and ⇒ respectively have applications
A1,A2 ⇒ B
Γ,A1,A2 ⇒ B,∆ and
⇒ B
Γ⇒ B,∆
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respectively, where no formula in Γ has  as its main connective (and in the intuitionistic
case ∆ is empty).
Now the procedure sketched in the beginning of this section gives us a translation.
Theorem 3.2.14 (ci). Let Λ be a set of unary modalities. Every intuitionistically resp.
classically translatable clause A is equivalent over Mon to a proto rule. Moreover, there is an
automatic procedure that given an axiom produces such an equivalent proto rule.
For the sake of presentation in the context of the proof of this statement we will take a
more relaxed attitude concerning the notion of sequent rules and will take the premisses of
a rule to be sets of arbitrary sequents and the conclusion to be an arbitrary sequent. This
allows us e.g. as an intermediate step to move complex formulae from the conclusion into the
premisses, the result of which is not a rule with context restrictions. Of course the final result
will be a rule with context restrictions again. Connected notions such as applications of rules
or derivations are adjusted as expected. We will make use of the following two easy lemmata,
the first of which is also called the Ackermann Lemma in [CGT08] and allows us to move
propositional variables from the conclusion into the premisses.
Lemma 3.2.15 (Folklore)(ci). For n,m ≥ 0 and formulae A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm the follow-
ing two rules are equivalent:
P
A1, . . . , An,Γ⇒ ∆, B1, . . . , Bm
P ∪ {Σ⇒ Ai,Π | i ≤ n} ∪ {Σ, Bj ⇒ Π | j ≤ m}
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π
In the asymmetric setting for n > 0 we have Π = ∅ and for m > 0 we have ∆ = ∅.
Proof. Using Cut and the fact that sequents A1, . . . , An ⇒ B1, . . . Bm, Ai and A1, . . . , An, Bj ⇒
B1, . . . , Bm are derivable using the axiom rule for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The second lemma we will use states that we can modify the rules so that the principal
formulae consist only of modalised variables.
Lemma 3.2.16 (ci). For every unary monotone modality ♥ and formula D the rules
P
Γ,♥D ⇒ ∆ resp.
P
Γ⇒ ♥D,∆
are equivalent over Mon♥ to the rules
P ∪ {sD ⇒ D}
Γ,♥sD ⇒ ∆ resp.
P ∪ {D ⇒ sD}
Γ⇒ ♥sD,∆
respectively, where sD is a fresh propositional variable.
Proof. Using the monotonicity rule Mon♥ and Cut and the fact that the sequent D ⇒ D is
derivable using the axiom rule.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2.14. Suppose that A is a translatable clause with context formulae in
(C`, Cr) and variables in V . We assume that the variables in V are ordered in some way.
W.l.o.g. we furthermore assume that C` and Cr do not contain single variables (this can always
be achieved by transferring them into V , see Remark 3.2.3), and that every formula in C` and
Cr occurs in A. Then A is of the form∧
♥P`P`∈F`
♥P`P` ∧
∧
C∈C`
C ∧
∧
q∈Q`
q →
∨
♥PrPr∈Fr
♥PrPr ∨
∨
D∈Cr
D ∨
∨
r∈Qr
r
where the formulae P` are in Fr [ci](C`, V, Cr), the formulae Pr are in F`[ci](C`, V, Cr), and we
have Q` ⊆ V and Qr ⊆ V . The first step is to turn this into a ground sequent ⇒ A, which by
Lemma 3.2.5 is equivalent to the following (where we slightly abuse notation and write e.g. F`
for the multiset consisting of all the formulae in the set F`)
F`, C`, Q` ⇒ Fr, Cr, Qr .
Now using Lemma 3.2.16 we introduce fresh variables for the formulae P` resp. Pr occurring
under the modalities and premisses ensuring that the variables are equivalent to the original
formulae. This yields
{sP` ⇒ P` | ♥P`P` ∈ Q`} ∪ {Pr ⇒ sPr | ♥PrPr ∈ Qr}
{♥P`sP` | P` ∈ F`}, C`, Q` ⇒ {♥PrsPr | Pr ∈ Fr}, Cr, Qr .
Since the formulae P` (resp. Pr) are in Fr [ci](C`, V, Cr) (resp. F`[ci](C`, V, Cr)) we may now
equivalently replace these new premisses by (C`, V, Cr)-normal forms using Lemma 3.2.5. In
particular formulae in C` (resp. Cr) only occur on the left (resp. right) hand side of the
resulting premisses. Moreover, since by Definition 3.2.9 every formula in C` ∪ Cr occurs on
the top level of the axiom if and only if it occurs under a modality we get that every of these
formulae occurs in the conclusion of the rule if and only if it occurs in at least one premiss.
Let us call this set of premisses P. The next step is to use Lemma 3.2.15 to move all the
variables in Q` ∪Qr from the conclusion into the premisses. This yields
P ∪ {t` ⇒ q, tr | q ∈ Q`} ∪ {t`, r ⇒ tr | r ∈ Qr}
{♥P`sP` | P` ∈ F`}, C`, t` ⇒ {♥PrsPr | Pr ∈ Fr}, Cr, tr
where the new context is replaced with fresh propositional variables t` and tr. The final step
is to apply the obvious adaption of the process of variable elimination (Definition 2.4.1) to
the premisses to eliminate all variables in V from the premisses by performing all possible
cuts between premisses on these variables. We assume that this is done in the order given
by the ordering on V . This ensures that a variable occurs in the premisses only if it occurs
in the conclusion. The resulting rule is seen to be equivalent over Mon to the rule given
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above using the methods of the proof of Lemma 2.4.5. Moreover, using Weakening and the
rules in G[ci]CutCon, it is equivalent to a proto rule for the rule with restrictions where we
replace in every premiss all occurring context formulae, say C1, . . . , Cn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm, by the
corresponding context restriction 〈{C1, . . . , Cn}, {D1, . . . , Dm}〉, and similarly the variables
t`, tr by the restriction 〈{t`}, {tr}〉.
Example 3.2.17. Continuing Example 3.2.10 above we have
1. The intuitionistically and classically translatable clause p ∧ q → (p ∧ q) with
context formulae in (∅, ∅) and variables in {p, q} is transformed in a first step into
p,q ⇒ (p ∧ q). In the next step the formulae p, q and p ∧ q under the modalities
are replaced by fresh variables sp, sq and sp∧q and we introduce new premisses to obtain
sp ⇒ p sq ⇒ q p, q ⇒ sp∧q
sp,sq ⇒ sp∧q .
Since there are no variables in the conclusion, the next step can be omitted, leaving the
final step of variable elimination on the variables p and q. This gives the well-known rule
sp, sq ⇒ sp∧q
sp,sq ⇒ sp∧q K2 .
2. Similarly, the intuitionistically and classically translatable clause (IK2) = (p→ q) ∧
♦p→ ♦q is translated into the rule
sp→q, sp ⇒ sq
sp→q,♦sp ⇒ ♦sq .
3. The intuitionistically and classically translatable clause (4) = s→ s with context
formulae in ({s}, ∅) is first transformed into s⇒ s. Then the formula s under
the modality is replaced by a fresh variable ss to give
s⇒ ss
s⇒ ss ,
which as seen in Example 3.2.13 is a proto rule for the rule 40.
4. The classically translatable clause (5) = ¬s → ¬s with context formulae in
(∅, {s}) is similarly transformed into the proto rule
⇒ p,s
⇒ p,s
for the rule R45.
5. The intuitionistically and classically translatable clause (T) = s→ s with context
formulae in (∅, ∅) is first transformed into s⇒ s. Then the variable s on the right
80
3.2. FROM AXIOMS TO RULES
hand side is moved into the premisses using Lemma 3.2.15, which gives the proto rule
p`, s⇒ pr
p`,s⇒ pr
for the rule RT. If the context formulae are taken to be in (∅, {s}), then we obtain the
proto rule
p⇒ s
p⇒ s .
Remark 3.2.18. While we stated Theorem 3.2.14 only for unary and monotone modalities, it is
straightforwardly adapted to modalities of higher arities as follows. If a formula ♥(P1, . . . , Pn)
occurs on the left side of the implication in a clause A which is translatable according to
Remark 3.2.11, then we introduce fresh variables sP1 , . . . , sPn and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n premisses
sPi ⇒ Pi if ♥ is monotone in the ith argument
Pi ⇒ sPi if ♥ is antitone in the ith argument
sPi ⇒ Pi and Pi ⇒ sPi otherwise.
The modified definition of a translated clause then ensures that when we replace these new
premisses by (C`, V, Cr)-normal forms the context formulae behave in the correct way. In
particular, instead of the rule Mon we use the derivation of the rule Mon♥,i resp. Ant♥,i to
show that in case the modality is monotone resp. antitone in the i-th argument it is enough to
include only the sequent sPi ⇒ Pi resp. Pi ⇒ sPi in the premisses. Note that in order to do
this we need that the rule Mon♥,i resp. Ant♥,i is derivable and not just admissible in the rule
set. On the other hand this means that we do not need to explicitly assume that these rules
are in the base rule set.
Unfortunately, Theorem 3.2.14 only tells us which axioms we can translate into proto rules
for rules with restrictions. But of course we would like to know which axioms we can translate
into rules with restrictions themselves. The main idea here is that if the context formulae of a
rule with restrictions absorb conjunctions (resp. disjunctions) in the right way, then we can
restrict ourselves to proto rules where every context formula occurs exactly once.
Definition 3.2.19 (ci). A formula A with free variables p1, . . . , pn = ~p is intuitionistically
(resp. classically) left normal for a set R of rules if for every k ≥ 0 there are formulae
B1, . . . , Bn = ~B such that `G[ci]CutConR ⇒
∧k
i=1A
i ↔ Aσ ~B~p where Ai is the result of injectively
renaming the propositional variables p1, . . . , pn in A to fresh variables p
i
1, . . . , p
i
n and σ
~B
~p is
the substitution given by σ(pj) = Bj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and σ(x) = x for x /∈ ~p. A formula A
is classically right normal for R if for every k ≥ 0 there are formulae B1, . . . , Bn such that
`GcCutConR
∨k
i=1A
i ↔ Aσ ~B~p with Ai and σ
~B
~p as above (or equivalently if A→ ⊥ is left normal).
It is intuitionistically right normal for R if the above holds for k ∈ {0, 1} and Gi instead of
Gc. A context restriction 〈F1, F2〉 is (intuitionistically or classically) normal for R if every
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formula in F1 (resp. F2) is (intuitionistically or classically) left (resp. right) normal for R.
Example 3.2.20. The formula p is intuitionistically and classically left and right normal for
the set G[ci] of propositional rules and thus for every extension of G[ci]. The formula p is
intuitionistically and classically left normal for the rule set RK (and thus for all its extensions),
since `G[ci]RKCutCon
∧k
i=1pi ↔ 
∧k
i=1 pi for every k ≥ 0. It is not right normal for RK. In
the classical case furthermore the formula ¬p is right normal for RK.
If we have a rule where all the restrictions are normal and contain only finitely many
formulae, then intuitively we can absorb multiple instances of the same context formula into
one proto rule. This is made precise in the following definition and lemma.
Definition 3.2.21. A context restriction 〈F1, F2〉 is finite if both sets F1 and F2 are finite.
A rule with finite context restrictions is a rule in which every context restriction is finite.
Lemma and Definition 3.2.22 (ci). If R is a set of rules with context restrictions and R
is a rule whose context restrictions {C1, . . . , Cn} are all finite and normal for R, then the
set of proto rules for R is equivalent over G[ci]RCutCon to the canonical proto rule R̂ for R
given by the sequent Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 where for i ∈ {1, 2} we set Γi := {C | C ∈ Fi where 〈F1, F2〉 =
Cj for some j ≤ n}. Thus R itself is equivalent over R to R̂.
Proof. The proof of the first claim is straightforward using the definition of a normal restriction
and the rules in G[ci]RCutCon. The second statement follows easily from the definitions and
the first claim.
Example 3.2.23. 1. Since the only restriction occurring in the rule Kn is C∅, the canonical
proto rule for Kn is given by the empty context ⇒ .
2. The canonical proto rule for the rule RT is given by the context r ⇒ s and has the form
r, p⇒ s
r,p⇒ s .
3. The canonical proto rule for the rule R4 is given by the context r ⇒ and has the form
r ⇒ p
r ⇒ p .
Since the context formulae for a translatable clause directly correspond to the context
formulae of the corresponding proto rule, this gives us sufficient criteria for translatability of
an axiom into a rule with restrictions.
Theorem 3.2.24 (ci). Let R be a rule set and let A be a (intuitionistically or classically)
translatable clause with context formulae in (C`, Cr). If every formula in C` is left normal for
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R and every formula in Cr is right normal for R, then A is equivalent over R to a rule with
(finite) context restrictions.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.2.14 and the preceding Lemma using the fact that the
formulae on the left (resp. right) hand side of the context of the proto rule from the translation
are in C` (resp. Cr).
Example 3.2.25. 1. The context formula q is (intuitionistically and classically) left
normal for RK and thus translating the axiom (4) q → q using Theorem 3.2.24
yields the well-known rule R4 = {(⇒ p; 〈{p}, ∅〉)}/ ⇒ p. This rule is thus equivalent
to the axiom (4) over RK.
2. Similarly, since variables are both left and right normal for RK translating the axiom (T)
yields the standard rule RT = {(p⇒ ; Cid)}/p⇒ , which is equivalent to (T) over RK.
In view of the fact that propositional variables are both left and right normal for every rule
set including the propositional rules this immediately yields translation results for non-iterative
and rank-1 axioms.
Corollary 3.2.26 (ci). In the intuitionistic case every translatable clause with context formulae
in (∅, ∅) is equivalent over Mon to a shallow rule. If the clause is rank-1, then it is equivalent to
a one-step rule. In the classical case every non-iterative (resp. rank-1) clause is equivalent over
Mon to a shallow (resp. one-step) rule, and thus every non-iterative (resp. rank-1) formula is
equivalent to a finite set of shallow (resp. one-step) rules. 
Remark 3.2.27. Since in the case that there are no context formulae we do not need to control
which sides of the premisses the context formulae end up, the classical part of Corollary 3.2.26
stating that every non-iterative (resp. rank-1) formula whatsoever is translatable into an
equivalent finite set of shallow (resp. one-step) rules holds for non-monotone modalities as
well. In the intuitionistic case we still need to make sure that all the propositional connectives
are invertible.
While Theorem 3.2.24 gives us sufficient criteria for when a clause is translatable into a
single rule, the condition that all context formulae be normal is relatively strict. In particular
it precludes the treatment of examples such as the (classical) axiom (5) ¬p → ¬p.
Moreover, if we only allow normal context formulae in the clauses we cannot construct rules
with non-normal context restrictions by translation. On the other hand this can be done if
instead of single translatable clauses we consider sets of formulae which are generated by a
single translatable clause in a particular way.
Definition 3.2.28 (ci). Let A be a classically translatable clause with context formulae in
(C`, Cr) for C` = {C1, . . . , Cn} and Cr = {D1, . . . , Dm} and variables in V . The classical ω-set
for A is the set
{As1,...,sn,t1,...,tm | si ≥ 0, tj ≥ 0 for i ≤ n, j ≤ m} ,
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where the formulae As1,...,sn,t1,...,tm are constructed from A as follows: for k ≤ n every
occurrence of the context formula Ck in A is replaced by the formula
∧sk
i=1C
i
k, where again
Cik is constructed from Ck by renaming the variables ~p of Ck to fresh variables ~p
i; and for
k ≤ m every occurrence of the context formula Dk is replaced by the formula
∨tk
i=1D
i
k, where
again Dik is the result of substituting fresh variables for the variables in Dk. If A is an
intuitionistically translatable clause, then the intuitionistic ω-set for A is the set
{As1,...,sn,t1,...,tm | si ≥ 0, tj ∈ {0, 1} for i ≤ n, j ≤ m} ,
where the formulae As1,...,sn,t1,...,tm are constructed as in the classical case.
Note that in the intuitionistic case a translatable clause has at most one context formula
in Cr, and thus at most one formula different from ⊥ occurs in the disjunction on the right
hand side of the top-level implication in the formulae As1,...,sn,t1,...,tm . Moreover, since no two
formulae in C` ∪Cr share any variables with each other or with V , the ω-set for a translatable
clause is in fact unique. Thus once the context formulae are specified it makes sense to speak
of the ω-set for a translatable clause.
Example 3.2.29. 1. The (classical or intuitionistic) ω-set for the clause (4) s→ s
with context formulae in ({s}, ∅) is the set {∧ni=1si → ∧ni=1si | n ≥ 0}.
2. The classical ω-set for the clause (5) ¬q → ¬q with context formulae in (∅, {q})
is the set {¬∨mi=1qi → ¬∨mi=1qi | m ≥ 0}. If the context formulae are taken to be
({¬q}, ∅), then the ω-set is {∧ni=1 ¬qi → ∧ni=1 ¬qi | n ≥ 0}.
Intuitively every conjunction resp. disjunction for a context formula in a formula of an ω-set
corresponds to a fixed number of context formulae in a proto rule, and all the proto rules
corresponding to formulae in the ω-set together are equivalent to a rule with restrictions.
Theorem 3.2.30 (ci). Every ω-set for a translatable clause is equivalent over Mon to a rule
with (finite) context restrictions.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2.24 every formula As1,...,sn,t1,...,tm in the ω-set for a translatable clause
A with context formulae in ({C1, . . . , Cn}, {D1, . . . , Dm}) and variables in V is equivalent to
a proto rule given by the context
∧s1
i=1C
i
1, . . . ,
∧sn
i=1C
i
n ⇒
∨t1
i=1D
i
1, . . . ,
∨tm
i=1D
i
m. Using the
rules in G[ci]CutCon this is equivalent to the proto rule given by the context with C1k , . . . , C
sk
k
instead of
∧sk
i=1C
i
k resp. D
1
k, . . . , D
tk
k instead of
∨tk
i=1D
i
k. Note that for the latter case in the
intuitionistic setting we only need to deal with at most one formula Djk, where we use the
fact that empty disjunctions are defined as ⊥. Since all the proto rules come from axioms
which are generated by the same translatable clause they are proto rules for the same rule
with restrictions. Now the result follows immediately.
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The technique of translating ω-sets of axioms instead of single axioms now allows us to treat
examples like the axiom (5) as well.
Example 3.2.31. 1. Translating the ω-set {¬∨ni=1qi → ¬∨ni=1qi | n ≥ 0} for the
axiom (5) ¬q → ¬q using Theorem 3.2.30 yields first the set of proto rules for the
rule R = {(⇒ p; 〈∅, {p}〉)}/ ⇒ p given by the sequents ⇒ q1, . . . ,qn for n ≥ 0.
Together, all these proto rules are are equivalent to the rule R itself.
2. By classical propositional reasoning and the axioms of K adding both axioms (4) q` →
q` and (5) ¬qr → ¬qr is equivalent to adding the set
n∧
i=1
qi` ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
qjr → (
n∧
i=1
qi` ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
qjr) | m,n ≥ 0

of axioms, which is an ω-set for the classically translatable clause q` ∧ ¬qr →
(q` ∧ ¬qr). Using the method of Theorem 3.2.30 this set translates into the
standard rule R45 = {( ⇒ p; C45)}/ ⇒ p with restriction C45 = 〈{p}, {p}〉 from
Table 2.4. Thus the two axioms (4) and (5) together are equivalent over RK to the
rule R45.
Corollary 3.2.32 (ci). Let R be a set of rules with restrictions and let A be an axiom. If A
is equivalent over R to an ω-set for a translatable clause, then A is equivalent over R to a
rule with (finite) restrictions. 
Remark 3.2.33. We may also use the previous corollary to give a slightly different proof of
Theorem 3.2.24: Whenever the context formulae for a translatable clause are normal, then the
clause is equivalent to its ω-set. Now the corollary yields equivalence of the clause to a rule.
3.3 From Rules to Axioms
The results of the previous section raise the question whether the format of ω-sets for axioms
is really necessary. It turns out that for monotone modalities the format is both necessary and
sufficient in the sense that an axiom can be translated into a rule with finite restrictions if and
only if adding the axiom is equivalent to adding an ω-set. The restriction to rules with finite
context restrictions here is necessary if we aim for a single ω-set. On the other hand, using
the following lemma it is clear that an axiom is equivalent to a set of rules with restrictions if
and only if it is axiomatically equivalent to the union of a set of ω-sets.
Lemma 3.3.1 (ci). Every rule with restrictions is equivalent to a set of rules with finite
restrictions.
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Proof. Let R be a rule with restrictions {〈F i1, F i2〉 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The rules in the rule set RR
are then constructed by replacing for each restriction the components F i1 and F
i
2 by finite
subsets Gi1 ⊆ F i1 and Gi2 ⊆ F i2. Then for every application of the rule R there is a rule in
RR whose context restrictions include all the relevant formulae, and for the other direction
every application of a rule inRR is simulated by Weakening of some of the premisses and an
application of the rule R.
Thus in the following we will concentrate on rules with finite restrictions. We show the
correspondence to ω-sets for such rules by translating them back into ω-sets of axioms.
The main idea for this is to turn the premisses and the conclusion of a proto rule into
formulae, and then construct the axiom out of the formula corresponding to the conclusion by
suitably incorporating the premisses. The latter step is accomplished following [Sch07] using a
suitably adjusted notion of a projective formula [Ghi99] and making use of a carefully chosen
substitution witnessing the projectivity of the formula corresponding to the premisses of the
proto rule. For the purpose of constructing this substitution we would like the premisses of
the original rule to be of a specific form.
Definition 3.3.2 (ci). A rule P/Σ⇒ Π is in standard form if
1. no variable occurs both on the left hand side of a premiss and on the right hand side of
a (possibly different) premiss
2. whenever ( ⇒ p; C∅) ∈ P then there is no premiss (Γ ⇒ p,∆; C) ∈ P with C 6= C∅ or
Γ ∪∆ 6= ∅
3. there is no premiss (⇒ ; C) ∈ P for any restriction C
4. in the intuitionistic case, there is a formula D such that the right component of every
restriction occurring in P is ∅ or {D}.
Fortunately, for monotone modalities every rule with finite restrictions can be manipulated
in such a way that it becomes a rule in standard form (or a finite set of such rules in the
intuitionistic case). This is shown in the following lemmata. We first consider Property 4 for
the intuitionistic setting.
Lemma 3.3.3 (i). Every rule with finite restrictions is equivalent over Mon to a finite set of
rules with restrictions satisfying Property 4 of Definition 3.3.2 above.
Proof. Suppose R = P/Σ⇒ pi. If pi 6= ∅, then no application of R has context formulae on the
right hand side of its conclusion, and w.l.o.g. the right component of every restriction occurring
in P is empty. So suppose that pi = ∅ and we have premisses P = {Γi ⇒ δi; 〈Fi, Gi〉 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Since the Gi are finite, the set
⋃n
i=1Gi is finite as well. W.l.o.g. we assume that for all
A,B ∈ ⋃ni=1Gi with A 6= B we have var (A) ∩ var (B) = ∅. This can always be achieved using
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injective renamings. We would like to construct formulae C1, . . . , Cm from the formulae in⋃n
i=1Gi such that we can replace the rule R by m rules R1, . . . , Rm where the right components
of restrictions of rule Rj are either ∅ or {Cj}. The idea is to construct all possible “minimal”
formulae satisfying a given subset of the restrictions. For this we make use of (syntactic)
unification [EFT94, EFT96]. Remember that a unifier for a set {B1, . . . , Bk} of formulae is a
substitution σ such that B1σ = · · · = Bkσ. If a unifier for a set of formulae exists, then we
call the set unifiable. A most general unifier for a set S of formulae is a unifier mguS such
that for every other unifier σ of S there is a substitution τ with σ = τ ◦mguS . If such a most
general unifier exists, then in fact it is unique, so we also speak of the most general unifier. A
straightforward application of the standard algorithm for syntactic unification as given e.g.
in [EFT94, EFT96] shows that whenever a set of formulae is unifiable, then there is a most
general unifier. Now for every non-empty unifiable set S ⊆ ⋃ni=1Gi define CS := BmguS
where B ∈ S arbitrary. Furthermore for such an S define the premisses PS by
PS := {(Γi ⇒ δi; 〈Fi, {CS}〉) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S ∩Gi 6= ∅}∪ {(Γi ⇒ δi; 〈Fi, ∅〉) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S ∩Gi = ∅}
and define the rule RS by RS := PS/Σ ⇒ pi. We claim that then the original rule R is
equivalent to the set {RS | S ⊆
⋃n
i=1Gi, S unifiable}. To see why this is the case first
consider an application of the rule R with context Θ⇒ A. If A is not a substitution instance
of any formula in
⋃n
i=1Gi, then we may replace the application by an application of the rule
RS for an arbitrary unifiable S ⊆
⋃n
i=1Gi. Otherwise let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be the set of indices i
such that A is a substitution instance of a formula in Gi and for each i ∈ I choose one such
formula Bi ∈ Gi. Then for every i ∈ I the formula A is also a substitution instance of the
formula Bimgu{Bi|i∈I} and thus the application of R can be replaced by an application of
the rule R{Bi|i∈I}. For the other direction suppose that S ⊆
⋃n
i=1Gi is unifiable and consider
an application of the rule RS given by the substitution σ and the context Θ⇒ A. If A is a
substitution instance of the formula CS , then by definition of CS for every Gi with Gi ∩ S 6= ∅
there is a formula B ∈ Gi such that A is a substitution instance of B. Moreover, for every
premiss (Γj ⇒ ; 〈Fj , Gj〉) with Gj ∩ S = ∅ we have a derivation of Γjσ,Θ Fj⇒ from which
using W we can easily derive the sequent Γjσ,Θ Fj⇒ A Gj . Thus we may replace the
application of RS by an application of R. Finally, the set {RS | S ⊆
⋃n
i=1Gi, S unifiable} is
a finite set of rules, since all restrictions of R were finite.
Lemma 3.3.4 (ci). Every non-trivial rule with finite restrictions is equivalent over Mon to
a finite set of rules with finite restrictions in standard form. If the rule was shallow (resp.
one-step), then so are the equivalent rules in standard form.
Proof. We show how to equivalently transform an arbitrary rule into a rule satisfying properties
1-4 in Definition 3.3.2 characterising the standard form. Suppose we have a rule R = P/Σ⇒ Π.
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If we are in the intuitionistic setting, we first take care of property 4 using Lemma 3.3.3 and
then consider each rule from the resulting finite set separately. The remaining procedure is the
same in both the intuitionistic and the classical case. The next step is to make the rule satisfy
the first property. This is done by using the fact that all our rule sets include the rules Mon
and replacing the rule by the cut between this rule and all possible rules Mon♥ according to
Definition 2.4.1. In the resulting rule no variable occurs in the premisses both on the left hand
side of a sequent and on the right hand side of a sequent, and Lemma 2.4.5 ensures that this
rule is equivalent over Mon to the original rule. Note that in the intuitionistic case this does
not destroy property 4 since all non-empty right components of context restrictions occurring
in the premisses are the same. For the second property suppose that there are premisses
(⇒ p; C∅) and (Γ⇒ p,∆; C) in P, where Γ ∪∆ 6= ∅ or C 6= C∅. Then instances of the latter
are derived by Weakening from instances of (⇒ p; C∅) and thus the premiss (Γ⇒ p,∆; C) can
be omitted. Finally, if we have a premiss (⇒ ; C), then the rule is subsumed by Weakening
and therefore trivial.
For the rest of this section we assume w.l.o.g. that for monotone modalities all rules with
finite restrictions are in standard form. While our goal is to translate such rules into axioms,
the varying number of context formulae makes it hard to translate rules directly. For this
reason again we first consider proto rules. Given a proto rule the first step is to turn its
premisses and conclusion into formulae.
Definition 3.3.5 (ci). Let R = P/Σ ⇒ Π be a rule and R̂ a proto rule for R given by the
context Γ⇒ ∆. The formulae Prem
R̂
and Concl
R̂
are defined by
Prem
R̂
:=
∧
(Θ⇒Ξ;〈F1;F2〉)∈P
(∧
Γ F1 ∧
∧
Θ→
∨
∆ F2 ∨
∨
Ξ
)
Concl
R̂
:=
∧
Γ ∧
∧
Σ→
∨
∆ ∨
∨
Π .
where as usual we take empty conjunctions to be > and empty disjunctions to be ⊥. Note that
in the intuitionistic case since the sequents are asymmetric the disjunctions in the succedent
of the implications contain at most one formula other than ⊥.
Then by propositional reasoning it is clear that the premisses of a proto rule R̂ (resp. its
conclusion) are derivable if and only if the sequent ⇒ Prem
R̂
(resp. ⇒ Concl
R̂
) is derivable.
Example 3.3.6. 1. The proto rule for the rule R4 given by the context p1,p2 ⇒ is
R̂4 =
p1,p2 ⇒ p
p1,p2 ⇒ p
and gives Prem
R̂4
= p1 ∧p2 ∧ > → ⊥∨ p and ConclR̂4 = p1 ∧p2 ∧ > → ⊥∨p.
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2. The proto rule for the rule RT given by the context p1, p2 ⇒ is
R̂T =
p1, p2, p⇒
p1, p2,p⇒
and gives the formulae Prem
R̂T
= p1∧p2∧p→ ⊥∨⊥ and ConclR̂T = p1∧p2∧p→ ⊥∨⊥.
3. The proto rule for the rule R45 given by the context p1 ⇒ q1 is
R̂45 =
p1 ⇒ p,q1
p1 ⇒ p,q1
and gives Prem
R̂45
= p1 ∧ > → q1 ∨ p and ConclR̂45 = p1 ∧ > → q1 ∨p.
For capturing the information given in the premisses and injecting it into the formula Concl
R̂
we follow [Sch07] and make use of slightly adapted notions from the theory of projective
formulae, see e.g. [Ghi99].
Definition 3.3.7 (ci). A formula A ∈ F(Λ) is projective if there is a substitution σ :
Var → F(Λ) such that `G[ci]MonCutConW ⇒ Aσ and such that for all p ∈ var (A) we have
`G[ci]MonCutConW A⇒ p↔ pσ. Such a substitution witnesses projectivity of A.
It is now standard to show the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.8 (ci). If A ∈ F(Λ) is a formula and σ : Var→ F(Λ) is a substitution witnessing
projectivity of A, then for every formula B with var (B) ⊆ var (A) we have `G[ci]MonCutConW
A⇒ B ↔ Bσ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the formula B using the monotonicity rules.
Given a proto rule R̂ once we have a substitution witnessing the projectivity of the formula
Prem
R̂
we are done using the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.9 (ci). If R̂ is a proto rule and σ a substitution witnessing projectivity of Prem
R̂
,
then the axiom Concl
R̂
σ is equivalent to R̂ over MonR for every rule set R.
Proof. Let R̂ be a proto rule with premisses Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γn ⇒ ∆n and conclusion Σ⇒ Π,
and let σ be a substitution witnessing projectivity of Prem
R̂
. We first show that the proto
rule R̂ is a derivable rule using the ground sequent ⇒ Concl
R̂
σ. By the fact that σ witnesses
projectivity of Prem
R̂
we know that there is a derivation D in G[ci]MonCutConWR of the
sequent Prem
R̂
⇒ Concl
R̂
σ → Concl
R̂
, and furthermore the sequent ⇒ Concl
R̂
σ is a ground
sequent and thus derivable. But then we may replace the proto rule R̂ by the following
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derivation:
⇒ Concl
R̂
σ
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 . . . Γn ⇒ ∆n
⇒ Prem
R̂
G[ci]W
D....
Prem
R̂
⇒ Concl
R̂
σ → Concl
R̂
⇒ Concl
R̂
σ → Concl
R̂
Cut
Concl
R̂
σ ⇒ Concl
R̂
G[ci]Cut
⇒ Concl
R̂
Cut
Σ⇒ Π G[ci]Cut
This derivation is easily modified to accommodate the additional substitution and context in
an application of the proto rule R̂.
For the other direction we need to derive the sequent Concl
R̂
σ using R̂. By projectivity we
have `G[ci]MonCutConR ⇒ PremR̂σ. Now resolving the propositional connectives using G[ci]Cut
yields the sequents Γiσ ⇒ ∆iσ, and applying the proto rule R̂ and propositional rules gives
`G[ci]MonCutConWR ⇒ ConclR̂σ.
In particular in the intuitionistic case it is not entirely clear that we can always construct
such a substitution. Fortunately, the premisses of rules in standard form have a distinct shape
which ensures that this is possible. We first consider the (easier) classical case.
Definition 3.3.10 (c). Let R = P/Σ⇒ Π be a rule in standard form and R̂ a proto rule for
R given by Γ⇒ ∆. Define the substitution θc
R̂
by
θc
R̂
(p) :=

> : (⇒ p; C∅) ∈ P
Prem
R̂
→ p : (Θ⇒ p,Ξ; C) ∈ P for some Θ⇒ Ξ and C with Θ ∪ Ξ 6= ∅ or C 6= C∅
Prem
R̂
∧ p : (Θ, p⇒ Ξ; C) ∈ P for some Θ⇒ Ξ
p : otherwise.
The substitution θ
R̂
is well-defined, since in a rule in standard form no variable occurs
both on the left side of a premiss and on the right side of a premiss, and if it occurs on the
right side, then it occurs either only in a premiss of the form given in the first case or only in
premisses of the form given in the second case.
Lemma 3.3.11 (c). If R̂ is a proto rule for a rule R in standard form, then the substitution
θc
R̂
witnesses projectivity of Prem
R̂
.
Proof. Suppose that the proto rule R̂ for the rule R = P/Σ⇒ Π is given by the context Γ⇒ ∆.
It is easy to see that for every variable p ∈ var (Prem
R̂
)
we have `GcMonCutConW PremR̂ ⇒ p↔
pθc
R̂
. To see that `GcMonCutConW ⇒ PremR̂θcR̂ consider a premiss (Θ⇒ Ξ; 〈F1, F2〉) from P and
the corresponding clause (
∧
Γ F1 ∧
∧
Θ→ ∨∆ F2 ∨∨Ξ)θcR̂ from PremR̂θcR̂. If the premiss
has the form ( ⇒ p; C∅), then this clause only consists of the formula > which is trivially
derivable. Otherwise, since the substitution θc
R̂
is the identity on context formulae this clause
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is the same as
∧
Γ F1 ∧
∧
Θθc
R̂
→ ∨∆ F2 ∨∨ΞθcR̂. Now if Θ 6= ∅, then this is equivalent to∧
Γ F1 ∧PremR̂ ∧Θ→
∨
∆ F2 ∨A, where A is either ⊥ if Ξ is empty, or equivalent to
∨
Ξ
or Prem
R̂
→ ∨Ξ if Ξ 6= ∅. Since ∧Γ F1 ∧∧Θ → ∨∆ F2 ∨∨Ξ is a clause in PremR̂ it is
easy to see that in both cases the clause is derivable. On the other hand, if Θ = ∅, then the
clause is equivalent to
∧
Γ F1→
∨
∆ F2 ∨(PremR̂ →
∨
Ξ), which again is easily seen to be
derivable using the fact that Prem
R̂
contains the clause
∧
Γ F1→
∨
∆ F2 ∨
∨
Ξ.
While the substitution defined above in principle also works in the intuitionistic case, we
would like the formula Concl
R̂
θR to be a translatable clause in the sense of Definition 3.2.9
as well. But this means that in the intuitionistic setting we cannot substitute the formula
Prem
R̂
→ p for variables p occurring under a modality on the right hand side of the principal
formulae, since it is not intuitionistically left resolvable. This problem can be fixed using the
following substitution θi
R̂
instead.
Definition 3.3.12 (i). For a rule R = P/Σ⇒ pi in standard form and a proto rule R̂ for R
given by the context Γ⇒ δ define the substitution θi
R̂
by
θi
R̂
(p) :=

∨
(⇒p;〈F1,F2〉)∈P
∧
Γ F1 ∨p : (Θ⇒ p; 〈F1, F2〉) ∈ P for some Θ and 〈F1, F2〉 6= C∅
Prem
R̂
∧ p : (Θ, p⇒ ξ; C) ∈ P for some Θ⇒ ξ and C
p : otherwise.
Note that in the previous Definition if there is a premiss (⇒ p; C∅) in P, then the formula
θi
R̂
(p) is equivalent to >, and if there is a premiss (Θ ⇒ p; C) but no premiss ( ⇒ p; C′) in P,
then θi
R̂
(p) is equivalent to p.
Lemma 3.3.13 (i). If R̂ is a proto rule for a rule R in standard form, then the substitution
θi
R̂
witnesses projectivity of Prem
R̂
.
Proof. Similar to the classical case: Again, let the proto rule R̂ for the rule R = P/Σ ⇒ pi
be given by the context Γ⇒ δ. Again, standard intuitionistic propositional reasoning gives
`GiMonCutConW PremR̂ ⇒ p ↔ pθiR̂. To show that `GiMonCutConW PremR̂θ
i
R̂
consider a premiss
(Θ⇒ ξ; 〈F1, F2〉) and the corresponding clause
∧
Γ F1 ∧
∧
Θθi
R̂
→ δ F2 ∨ξθiR̂ from PremR̂θ
i
R̂
.
The case for premisses (⇒ p; C∅) is dealt with as in the classical case. Otherwise, if Θ 6= ∅,
this is equivalent to either
∧
Γ F1 ∧PremR̂ ∧
∧
Θ→ δ F2 ∨⊥ or
∧
Γ F1 ∧PremR̂ ∧
∧
Θ→
⊥ ∨∨(⇒ξ;〈G1,G2〉)∈P ∧Γ G1 ∨ξ, depending on whether ξ or δ is empty. But both of these
are intuitionistically derivable, since the clause
∧
Γ F1 ∧
∧
Θ → δ F2 ∨ξ occurs in PremR̂.
Finally, if Θ = ∅, then since the rule was in standard form δ must be empty and the clause is
equivalent to
∧
Γ F1→
∨
(⇒ξ;〈G1,G2〉)∈P
∧
Γ G1 ∨ξ, which is easily seen to be derivable.
Putting all the pieces together we obtain an automatic translation of proto rules into
translatable clauses for monotone modalities.
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Theorem 3.3.14 (ci). Every proto rule R̂ for a rule R in standard form given by a context Γ⇒
∆ is equivalent over Mon to a translatable clause with context formulae in (Supp (Γ) , Supp (∆)).
The translation is automatic.
Proof. Let R be a rule with restrictions in standard form and let R̂ be a proto rule for R given
by the context Γ⇒ ∆ and let V be the set of variables occurring in the rule R. By Lemmata
3.3.9 and 3.3.11 resp. 3.3.13 the axiom Concl
R̂
θ
[ci]
R̂
is equivalent over Mon to R̂. From the
definition of Concl
R̂
θ
[ci]
R̂
it is clear that the translation is automatic. To see that the formula
Concl
R̂
θ
[ci]
R̂
is a translatable clause with context formulae in (Supp (Γ) , Supp (∆)), for the sake
of presentation assume that all modalities are unary. The general case is analogous. It is
clear by construction that Concl
R̂
is of the form A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An → B1 ∨ · · · ∨ Bm, and that
the formulae in Γ occur only on the top level in the Ai, those in ∆ only in the Bi. Now
consider a variable p ∈ V occurring in a formula Ai = ♥p not in Γ. We need to check that
the formula θ
[ci]
R̂
(p) is in Fr(Supp (Γ) , V, Supp (∆)) ∪ V . If the variable p does not occur in
the premisses, then we have θ
[ci]
R̂
(p) = p ∈ V . Otherwise, since the rule was in standard
form the variable p occurs only on the left hand side of the premisses, and thus we have
θ
[ci]
R̂
(p) = Prem
R̂
∧ p. But by construction of Prem
R̂
it is clear that the formula Prem
R̂
∧ p
is in Fr [ci](Supp (Γ) , V, Supp (∆)). Similarly, if the variable p occurs in a formula Bi = ♥p
not in ∆, then if it does not occur in the premisses we have θ
[ci]
R̂
(p) = p ∈ V . Otherwise
it occurs only on the right hand side of the premisses. Thus we have θc
R̂
(p) = Prem
R̂
→ p
and θi
R̂
(p) =
∨
(⇒p;C)∈P
∧
Γ C ∨p. Again, both of these formulae are by construction in
F`c(Supp (Γ) , V, Supp (∆)) resp. F`i(Supp (Γ) , V, Supp (∆)). Thus the formula ConclR̂θ
[ci]
R̂
is a
translatable clause with context formulae in (Supp (Γ) ,Supp (∆)) and variables in V .
Example 3.3.15. Continuing Example 3.3.6 we have:
1. For the proto rule R̂4 for the rule R4 given by the context p1,p2 ⇒ we get the
substitution θi
R̂4
with θi
R̂4
(p) = p1 ∧p2 and θi
R̂4
(pi) = pi for i = 1, 2. Thus the proto
rule R̂4 is equivalent over Mon to the axiom
Concl
R̂4
θi
R̂4
= p1 ∧p2 ∧ > → ⊥∨(p1 ∧p2) .
2. For the proto rule R̂T for the rule RT given by the context p1, p2 ⇒ we get the
substitution θ
[ci]
R̂T
with θ
[ci]
R̂T
(p) = (p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p→ ⊥∨⊥) ∧ p and θ[ci]
R̂T
(pi) = pi for i = 1, 2.
Thus the proto rule R̂T is equivalent over Mon to the axiom
Concl
R̂T
θ
[ci]
R̂T
= p1 ∧ p2 ∧((p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p→ ⊥∨⊥) ∧ p)→ ⊥∨⊥ .
3. For the proto rule R̂45 for the rule R45 given by the context p1 ⇒ q1 we get the
substitution θc
R̂45
with θc
R̂45
(p) = (p1 ∧ > → q1 ∨ p) → p and θc
R̂45
(p1) = p1 and
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θc
R̂45
(q1) = q1. Thus the proto rule R̂45 is equivalent over Mon to the axiom
Concl
R̂45
θc
R̂45
= p1 ∧ > → q1 ∨((p1 ∧ > → q1 ∨ p)→ p) .
Theorem 3.3.14 shows that for monotone modalities translatable clauses correspond very
closely to proto rules for rules in normal form: every translatable clause is equivalent to a
proto rule for a rule in normal form and every such proto rule is equivalent to a translatable
clause. Thus from a point of view leaning more towards Hilbert systems it would be more
natural to consider sequent calculi given by sets of proto rules and to consider rules with
restrictions as particular sets of proto rules. Nevertheless, we are mainly interested in rules
with restrictions and their corresponding axioms. By considering the equivalent sets of proto
rules we obtain a correspondence here as well.
Theorem 3.3.16 (ci). Every rule R with finite restrictions in normal form is equivalent over
Mon to an ω-set for a translatable clause AR. If for two sets C` and Cr of formulae with
C` ∩ Cr = ∅ all context restrictions of R have the form 〈F1, F2〉 with F1 ⊆ C` and F2 ⊆ Cr,
then AR has context formulae in (C`, Cr). In case all context restrictions of R are normal for
a rule set R the rule R is equivalent over Mon to a single translatable clause AR. If R is a
shallow (resp. one-step) rule, then it is equivalent over Mon to a non-iterative (resp. rank-1)
translatable clause.
Proof. Let R = P/Σ⇒ Π be a rule with finite context restrictions. It is clear that the rule
R is equivalent to the set of proto rules for it. Furthermore by Theorem 3.3.14 every such
proto rule is equivalent over Mon to a translatable clause. We would like to show that the
set of all these clauses is axiomatically equivalent to an ω-set for a translatable clause. To
construct this clause, note that since the restrictions of R are finite, we may simply take all
formulae occurring in the restrictions as the context of a proto rule. More precisely, let R̂ be
the canonical proto rule for R, i.e. the proto rule for R given by the context Γ⇒ ∆, where
Γ = {C | C ∈ F1 for some 〈F1, F2〉 occurring in P}
∆ = {D | D ∈ F2 for some 〈F1, F2〉 occurring in P} .
Then by propositional reasoning the set of translations of proto rules for R̂ is axiomatically
equivalent to the ω-set for the translation A
R̂
of the canonical proto rule R̂. Since A
R̂
has
context formulae in (Supp (Γ) ,Supp (∆)) the claim about the context formulae follows. If all
restrictions occurring in R are normal for a rule set R, then by Lemma 3.2.22 the rule R is
equivalent over Mon to the proto rule R̂ and thus also to the translatable clause A
R̂
. This
also holds for shallow or one-step rules, since the restrictions for such rules are always normal.
Moreover, in these cases the resulting axioms are easily seen to be equivalent to non-iterative
resp. rank-1 axioms.
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Example 3.3.17. 1. Using the method of the previous Theorem the set of axioms intu-
itionistically equivalent to the rule R4 is the ω-set for the translation of the canonical
proto rule R̂4 for the rule R4 given by the context p1 ⇒ . This set has the form{
n∧
i=1
pi ∧ > → ⊥∨
n∧
i=1
pi | n ≥ 0
}
.
By normality of p1 for RK this is equivalent over RK to the translation p1 ∧ > →
⊥∨p1 of R̂4, which again is equivalent to the axiom (4) p1 → p1.
2. Similarly, rule RT is classically equivalent to the ω-set
n∧
i=1
pi ∧((
n∧
i=1
pi ∧ p→
m∨
j=1
qj ∨ ⊥) ∧ p)→
m∨
j=1
qj ∨ ⊥ | n,m ≥ 0

for the translation of the canonical proto rule R̂T for the rule RT given by the context
p1 ⇒ q1. In the intuitionistic case the index m ranges only over 0, 1. By normality of
propositional variables this is equivalent over RK to the translation p1 ∧((p1 ∧ p→
q1 ∨⊥) ∧ p)→ q1 ∨⊥ of R̂T, and by propositional reasoning and monotonicity of  this
is axiomatically equivalent to the axiom (T) s→ s.
3. Finally, rule R45 is classically equivalent to the ω-set
n∧
i=1
pi ∧ > →
m∨
j=1
qj ∨((
n∧
i=1
pi ∧ > →
m∨
j=1
qj ∨ p)→ p) | n,m ≥ 0

for the translation of the canonical proto rule R̂45 for the rule R45 given by the context
p1 ⇒ q1. Since the formula q1 is not right normal we cannot use Theorem 3.3.16 to
turn this into a single axiom. But by propositional reasoning this set is axiomatically
equivalent to the set consisting of axioms
n∧
i=1
pi → 
 n∧
i=1
pi ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
qj
 ∨ p
 ∨ m∨
j=1
qj
for n,m ≥ 0. By monotonicity of  and propositional reasoning this set is moreover
axiomatically equivalent to the set
n∧
i=1
pi → 
 n∧
i=1
pi ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
qj
 ∨ m∨
j=1
qj | n,m ≥ 0
 ,
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which by normality of  and propositional reasoning is axiomatically equivalent to{
n∧
i=1
pi → 
n∧
i=1
pi | n ≥ 0
}
∪
¬
m∨
j=1
qj → ¬
m∨
j=1
qj | m ≥ 0
 .
Here the first set is the ω-set for the axiom (4) p1 → p1 and by normality of 
axiomatically equivalent to it. The second set is the ω-set for the axiom (5) ¬q1 →
¬q1. In this particular case we are lucky and by normality of  and propositional
reasoning this set is equivalent to {∧mj=1 ¬qj → ∧mj=1¬qj | m ≥ 0}, which is
axiomatically equivalent to the single axiom (5).
The results of this section together with those of the previous section allow us to characterise
for monotone modalities the class of axioms which are equivalent to rules with restrictions
purely in the Hilbert style setting.
Theorem 3.3.18 (ci). For monotone modalities an axiom for a Hilbert style system is
1. equivalent to a set of rules with restrictions iff axiomatically equivalent to the union of a
set of ω-sets for translatable clauses
2. equivalent to a finite set of rules with finite restrictions iff axiomatically equivalent to
the union of a finite set of ω-sets for translatable clauses
3. equivalent to a finite set of rules with finite normal restrictions iff axiomatically equivalent
to a finite set of translatable clauses with normal context formulae
4. equivalent to a finite set of shallow rules iff equivalent to a finite set of non-iterative
translatable clauses (in the classical case: iff equivalent to a non-iterative axiom)
5. equivalent to a finite set of one-step rules iff equivalent to a finite set of rank-1 translatable
clauses (in the classical case: iff equivalent to a rank-1 axiom).
Proof. Using the translations in Section 3.2 and Theorem 3.3.16 and the facts that by
Lemma 3.3.4 every non-trivial rule with finite restrictions is equivalent to a finite set of rules
in normal form and that by Lemma 3.3.1 every rule with restrictions is equivalent to a set of
rules with finite restrictions.
The correspondences are shown diagrammatically in Table 3.2.
3.4 Applications: Limitative Results
The correspondence results of the previous two sections can be applied in at least two ways.
One possibility is to use the translation from axioms into rules to construct new sequent
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set of ω-sets for translatable clauses ! set of rules with restrictions
ω-set for a translatable clause ! rule with finite restrictions in
normal form
translatable clause with normal
context formulae
! rule with finite normal restrictions
in normal form
translatable clause ! proto rule for a rule with
restrictions in normal form
non-iterative translatable clause ! shallow rule
rank-1 translatable clause ! one-step rule
Table 3.2: The corresponding classes of axioms and rules
calculi for modal logics given axiomatically in the spirit of Question 1.1.3. Of course this
possibility hinges on methods to make the resulting sequent calculus cut-free. We will explore
this issue further in the following chapters, where we will also see the translation in action
for other than the standard examples. The second possibility is to follow Question 1.1.4 and
show limitative results about which kinds of modal logics can be given a sound and complete
sequent system with rules of a specific format. Such limitative results show on the one hand
how much additional machinery beyond Gentzen’s original rule format is necessary to capture
a specific logic. On the other hand these results might also help in constructing sequent calculi
for new modal logics, since they can be used to decide which kinds of calculi to search for. We
will now see some results in this spirit, beginning with limitative results about the expressive
strength of the different rule formats. It should be noted that since the translations make
heavy use of the cut rule, the results limit the expressive strength of systems with the cut
rule. Of course we may always add the cut rule to a cut-free system, and then apply the
results to the new system. Here we only consider the classical setting. We will make use of
the following standard notions for normal modal logics based on classical propositional logic,
see e.g. [BdRV01].
Definition 3.4.1 (c). A Kripke frame is a tuple F = (W,R) consisting of a non-empty set W
of worlds and binary accessibility relation R ⊆W ×W on the set of worlds. A Kripke model
(F, σ) is a Kripke frame F together with a valuation σ : W → P(Var). The model (F, σ) then
is based on the frame F. We also write F for F({∧,∨,→,⊥,}). If F = (W,R) and (F, σ) is
a Kripke model, then satisfaction for a formula A ∈ F at a world w in this model is denoted
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by F, w, σ  A and is recursively defined by
F, w, σ  p iff p ∈ σ(w) for p ∈ Var
F, w, σ  A iff for all v ∈W with wRv we have F, v, σ  A
and the standard clauses for the boolean connectives. A formula A ∈ F is valid in a model
(F, σ) if F, w, σ  A for every world w of F. It is moreover valid in the frame F if it is valid in
every model based on the frame F. If a formula A is valid in a frame F we also write F  A.
For a set A of formulae we write F  A if F  A for every A ∈ A. Finally, a formula A is
satisfiable in a frame F = (W,R) if there are a world w ∈ W and a valuation σ such that
F, w, σ  A.
We graphically represent Kripke frames (W,R) in the standard way by drawing an arrow
from world w to world v if wRv holds. A little thought shows that a formula A is valid in a
frame F if and only if its negation ¬A is not satisfiable in F. In the following it will also be
convenient to use ♦A as an abbreviation for ¬¬A. We will be interested in classes of frames
which are defined by a set of modal formulae.
Definition 3.4.2 (c). Let F be a class of Kripke frames and let A ⊆ F be a set of modal
formulae. We say that A modally defines the class F if for every Kripke frame F we have
F ∈ F⇐⇒ F  A .
The class F is modally definable if it is modally defined by some set A of modal formulae.
Furthermore, we write LF for the set {A ∈ F | F  A for every F ∈ F} of modal formulae
valid in every frame of the class F. Given a set A of axioms and a class F of frames the Hilbert
system HcA is sound for the class F if HcA ⊆ LF and complete if LF ⊆ HcA.
We will make use of the following small lemma about alternative characterisations of modally
definable frame classes from Hilbert-axiomatisations, where we write HcK for the Hilbert
system given by the set {p ∧ q ↔ (p ∧ q), >} of axioms and HcKA for the system
given by these axioms together with the axioms in A. It is well-known that HcK is sound and
complete for the class of all frames [BdRV01].
Lemma 3.4.3 (c). Let F be a modally definable class of Kripke frames and A ⊆ F a set of
modal formulae. If HcKA is sound and complete for F, then A modally defines the class F.
Proof. Let F be modally defined by a set B of axioms. We need to show that for every frame
F we have F ∈ F⇔ F  A. So take an arbitrary frame F.
Suppose that F ∈ F. Since HcKA is sound for F we know that every formula derivable in
HcKA is valid in every frame in F, and thus also in F. But since the axioms A obviously are
derivable in HcKA we thus have F  A.
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Now suppose that F  A. Since HcKA is complete for F we know that every formula valid
in every frame in F is derivable in HcKA. Thus, since B modally defines F in particular every
formula in B is derivable in HcKA. But since F  A we also know that every formula derivable
in HcKA must be valid in F, and thus we get F  B. But B modally defines F, and thus we
have F ∈ F.
Remark 3.4.4. Note that the condition of modal definability of the class F in Lemma 3.4.3 is
crucial: it is well-known that the Hilbert-system HcK is sound and complete for the class of
irreflexive frames, a frame class which is not modally definable at all, see e.g. [HC96, p.176].
Using the previous Lemma it is possible to show that the Hilbert system generated by a set
A of axioms is not sound and complete for a modally definable class of Kripke frames - we
simply show that the set of axioms cannot possibly modally define the class of frames. For
convenience we capture the general idea in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.4.5 (c). Let F be a modally definable class of Kripke frames and let A ⊆ F be a
set of formulae. If there are two frames F1,F2 such that
1. F1 ∈ F and F2 /∈ F
2. for every formula A ∈ A we have F1  A⇔ F2  A,
then the logic HcKA is not sound and complete for F.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that HcKA is sound and complete for F. Then
by Lemma 3.4.3 we know that A modally defines F. But then by assumption 1 we have F1  A,
and thus by assumption 2 we also have F2  A in contradiction to the fact that F2 /∈ F.
Thus in order to show that sequent systems including only rules of a certain format are not
expressive enough to capture a particular axiom or modally definable logic it is enough to show
that translations of such rules are not strong enough to define the class of frames for this logic.
In the following we will make extensive use of this technique. The first goal is to show that the
containments for the classes of logics which can be captured by one-step rules, shallow rules
and rules with restrictions are proper. For this we will show the intuitively obvious results
that one-step rules are not strong enough to capture reflexivity of the accessibility relation,
and that shallow rules are not capable of capturing transitivity or symmetry.
Theorem 3.4.6 (c). There is no set of one-step rules equivalent over RK to the axiom
(T) p→ p.
Proof. We know that the axiom (T) p → p modally defines the class of Kripke frames
with a reflexive accessibility relation [BdRV01]. On the other hand by Theorem 3.3.16 we
know that the translations of one-step rules are rank-1 axioms. To see that no set of rank-1
axioms can be sound and complete for the class of transitive frames consider the two frames
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a a b
F1 F2
Figure 3.2: The two frames used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.6 (reflexivity).
a b c 1 2 3
4
F1 F2
Figure 3.3: The two frames used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.7 (transitivity)
F1 := ({a}, {(a, a)}) and F2 := ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, a)}) as shown in Figure 3.2. We will show
that for every rank-1 axiom A we have F1  A⇔ F2  A. The claim then follows immediately
from Lemma 3.4.5. So let A be a rank-1 formula. We show the contrapositions of the above
statement, that is we show that ¬A is satisfiable in F1 if and only if it is satisfiable in F2.
Obviously the negation of a rank-1 formula is rank-1 as well. Let σ1 be a valuation such
that (F1, a, σ1)  ¬A. Then for the valuation σ2 on F2 defined by σ2(a) = σ2(b) = σ1(a) we
obviously have (F2, a, σ2)  ¬A as well. For the other direction suppose that w.l.o.g. for a
world a and a valuation σ2 on F2 we have (F2, a, σ2)  ¬A. Then setting σ1(a) := σ2(b) and
using the fact that since ¬A is a rank-1 formula every propositional variable in ¬A occurs
under exactly one modality we obtain (F1, a, σ1)  ¬A as well.
Thus, since the axiom (T) is equivalent to a shallow rule (see Example 3.2.25), the class
of modal logics that can be captured by one-step rules is properly contained in the class of
modal logics that can be captured by shallow rules.
Theorem 3.4.7 (c). There is no set of shallow rules equivalent over RK to either of the
axioms (4) p→ p or (B) p→ ♦p.
Proof. We use the same technique as above, making use of the fact that by Theorem 3.3.16
translations of shallow rules are non-iterative formulae.
The axiom (4) p→ p modally defines the class of Kripke frames where the accessibility
relation is transitive [BdRV01]. Consider the two frames F1 := ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (a, c)})
and F2 := ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {(1, 2), (2, 3), (1, 4)}) as shown in Figure 3.3. Now suppose that A is a
non-iterative formula. Then ¬A is non-iterative as well. Again we show that ¬A is satisfiable
in F1 if and only if it is satisfiable in F2. Suppose we have a valuation σ2 on F2 and a world
w2 with (F1, w2, σ2)  ¬A. Define a valuation σ1 on F1 and a world w1 as follows:
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• if w2 = 1, then set σ1(a) := σ2(1), σ1(b) := σ2(2), σ1(c) := σ2(4) and set w1 := a
• if w2 = 2, then set σ1(b) := σ2(2), σ1(c) := σ2(3) and σ1(a) arbitrary, and set w1 := b
• if w2 ∈ {3, 4}, then set σ1(c) := σ2(w2) and σ1(a) and σ1(b) arbitrary, and set w1 := c.
Then it is not hard to see that (F1, σ1, w1)  ¬A. The other direction is analogous but easier.
Thus non-iterative axioms cannot define the class of transitive frames and we are done using
Lemma 3.4.5.
The proof for the axiom (B) p → ♦p is analogous using the two frames F1 := (N, succ)
and F2 := ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, a)}) and the fact that (B) modally defines the class of Kripke
frames where the accessibility relation is symmetric [BdRV01].
Since the axiom (4) is equivalent to a rule with restrictions (again see Example 3.2.25),
this establishes that the class of logics which can be captured by shallow rules is properly
contained in the class of logics which can be captured by rules with restrictions.
Corollary 3.4.8 (c). Let L1 (resp. L0−1 resp. L) be the class of logics for which there is a
sound and complete (with GcCut) sequent system given by a set of modal one-step rules (resp.
shallow rules resp. rules with restrictions). Then L1 $ L0−1 $ L. 
We can also use Lemma 3.4.3 in a slightly different way to establish impossibility results by
making use of the following result.
Definition 3.4.9. The first-order correspondence language is the first-oder language containing
equality and a binary relation symbol. A class F of frames is first-order definable if there is
a formula ϕ in the first-order correspondence language such that for every frame F we have
F ∈ F iff F |= ϕ when interpreted as a first-order structure. A modal formula A ∈ F is
elementary if the class F of frames modally defined by A is first-order definable.
Theorem 3.4.10 ([vB83, tC05])(c). Every non-iterative modal formula is elementary.
Corollary 3.4.11 (c). There is no set of shallow rules equivalent over RK to either of the
axioms (L) (p→ p)→ p or (Grz) ((p→ p)→ p)→ p.
Proof. The axiom (L) (p→ p)→ p modally defines the class of Kripke frames where the
accessibility relation is transitive and conversely well founded, and the axiom (Grz) ((p→
p)→ p)→ p modally defines the class of frames where the accessibility relation R is reflexive
and transitive and where there are no infinite paths x0Rx1Rx2R . . . with xi 6= xi+1 for every
i ≥ 0. Moreover, it is known that neither of these classes of frames is first-order definable
[BdRV01]. But if either of these classes were captured by a set of shallow rules, then by the
translation of Theorem 3.3.16 and by Lemma 3.4.3 it would be modally defined by a set of
non-iterative axioms, and therefore by Theorem 3.4.10 and the results in [ vB76] it would be
first-order definable. Thus there are no such rule sets.
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So far the results have only concerned the rather restrictive rule formats of one-step rules
and shallow rules. Unfortunately it is not clear whether the technique of Lemma 3.4.5 can be
applied to rules with restrictions in general - the format of a translatable axiom might be to
general for this. But we might try to impose some extra conditions on the rule sets in order to
suitably restrict the format of the resulting axioms. Since we are in general mainly interested
in finding cut-free sequent systems, it might be tempting to simply stipulate that the sequent
system generated by our rules be cut-free. But unfortunately this is slightly problematic,
since our translation makes essential use of the cut rule. So we need to impose some further
restrictions. Here we are going to consider the restriction that the rule set is mixed-cut closed
in the sense of Definition 2.4.11. As we have seen in Corollary 2.5.7 this condition entails a
more restricted format of the rules. We will see that this restricted format enables us to show
a number of limitative results.
The choice of the restriction to mixed-cut closed rule sets warrants some discussion. While
mixed-cut closure is a property of rule sets, this property is suggested by considering proofs
of syntactic cut elimination, and in particular proofs which are ’reasonably standard’. For
the latter it seems fair to assume that a ’reasonably standard’ proof proceeds in the spirit
of Gentzen’s original proof and makes essential use of a permutability-of-rules argument. In
particular, one of the main ingredients of such a proof seems to be the technique of permuting a
cut on a modal formula, which is principal in the last applied rule on one side and contextual in
the last applied rule on the other side, into the premisses of the latter rule. But stipulating that
it is always possible to do so amounts to stipulating that the set of modal rules is mixed-cut
closed. It seems that as far as only modal rules are concerned this permutation argument is
essential in virtually all proofs of cut elimination which rely on a modification of Gentzen’s
original proof. Moreover, in the context of standard calculi the closely related condition
of weak substitutivity has been shown to be necessary for a strong form of cut elimination
[CT06a, CT06b]. In case the cut formula is a propositional formula, the other main technique
is to use the Inversion Lemma for the propositional connectives. But this lemma also usually
relies on a permutation-of-rules argument, which amounts to stipulating Gc-invertibility in the
sense of Definition 2.5.3. Thus it seems natural to assume that a reasonably standard proof
for cut-elimination for a sequent system given by GcR makes use of mixed-cut closure of R
and either mixed-cut closure of GcR or Gc-invertibility for R. Now in view of Theorem 2.5.6
whenever we have a mixed-cut closed rule set R which is Gc-inverting we can find an equivalent
rule set R′ such that GcR′ is mixed-cut closed. Thus we might equivalently stipulate that our
rules including the propositional rules are mixed-cut closed.
It is important to note that even though the restriction to mixed-cut closed rule sets is
suggested by the standard (syntactical) technique for proving cut elimination, the results
themselves only rely on a property of the rule set. Thus they are independent of any particular
proof technique and preclude also e.g. semantical proofs of cut admissibility. In view of
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Theorem 2.5.6 we only state these results with respect to rule sets R where GcR is mixed-cut
closed, but the reader should bear in mind that they hold for rule sets whereR is mixed-cut
closed and Gc-permuting as well. The first step is to translate the restricted rule format from
Corollary 2.5.7 to the Hilbert-setting. Recall that a logic L has non-trivial modalities if for
every modality neither |=L ♥~p nor |=L ¬♥~p (see Theorem 2.5.6).
Lemma 3.4.12 (c). Let L be logic with non-trivial modalities and monotonicity, i.e. whenever
|=L pi → qi for i ≤ n, then |=L ♥(p1, . . . , pn) → ♥(q1, . . . , qn). If there is a set R of modal
rules (not necessarily including Cong or Mon) such that GcR is mixed-cut closed and GcRConW
is sound and complete for L, then L can be axiomatised in a Hilbert system by translatable
clauses with context formulae in (Λ(V1)∪V2,Λ(V3)∪V4) for V1, . . . , V4 ⊆ Var pairwise disjoint.
If L is a normal Λ-logic, then the context formulae can be taken to be in ({p1,p2}, {q1,q2}).
Proof. It is clear that if a logic satisfies monotonicity, then it also satisfies congruence. Now
suppose we have such a rule set R. Then by Corollary 2.5.7 w.l.o.g. every restriction occurring
in a rule in R contains only variables or modalised variables. Furthermore, by renaming the
variables we may assume w.l.o.g. that there are sets C`, Cr of formulae with C` ∩Cr such that
for every restriction 〈F1;F2〉 of R we have F1 ⊆ C` and F2 ⊆ Cr. Since L has monotonicity
the rules in Mon are sound and we may simply add them to the rule set. Doing this and
then bringing the rules into standard form as in Lemma 3.3.4 does not change the form of
the context formulae. Now translating the rules into equivalent axioms using Theorem 3.3.16
yields the result. The statement for normal modal logics follows immediately.
This again gives us a restricted format for the axioms which we can use in combination
with Lemma 3.4.5 to show impossibility results. In particular axioms of the form specified in
the Lemma have modal nesting depth at most two, and the modalised context formulae use
different variables from those appearing on the top level of the formula. The first property is
already enough to give us an impossibility result for the logic of 2-transitive frames.
Definition 3.4.13. A Kripke frame F = (F,R) is 2-transitive if F  p→ p.
It is not too hard to see that the class of 2-transitive frames is first order defined by the
formula
∀w∀x∀y∀z(wRx ∧ xRy ∧ yRz → ∃v(wRv ∧ vRz)) .
While the axiom p → p can easily be translated into the equivalent rule with
restrictions {(⇒ q; 〈{p}, ∅〉)}/ ⇒ q and thus is captured (with Cut) by a sequent system
of rules with restrictions, it cannot be characterised by modal axioms of rank 2, and thus it
cannot be captured by a mixed-cut closed set of rules with restrictions.
Theorem 3.4.14 (c). There is no rule set R (not necessarily containing Cong or Mon) such
that GcR is mixed-cut closed and such that GcRConW is sound and (cut-free) complete for
the logic of 2-transitive frames.
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Figure 3.4: The two frames used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.14 (2-transitivity).
Proof. We use Lemma 3.4.5 to show that modal axioms of rank 2 cannot axiomatise this logic.
The result then follows from Lemma 3.4.12.
So consider the two frames F1 = ({a1, a2, a3, a4, b}, {(a1, a2), (a2, a3), (a1, a4), (a3, b), (a4, b)})
and F2 = ({c1, c2, c3, c4, d, e}, {(c1, c2), (c2, c3), (c1, c4), (c3, d), (c4, e)}) as shown in Figure 3.4.
The frame F1 is 2-transitive, while the frame F2 is not. Now let A be a modal formula with
modal rank at most 2. Then clearly the formula ¬A has modal rank at most 2 as well. But if
there are a valuation σ2 on F2 and a world w2 such that F2, w2, σ2  ¬A, then we construct a
valuation σ1 on F1 and a world w1 as follows: if for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} we have w2 = ci, then set
w1 := ai; if w2 ∈ {d, e} set w1 := b. For i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} set σ1(ai) := σ2(ci). If w2 ∈ {c1, c4, d}
set σ1(b) := σ2(d), otherwise set σ1(b) := σ2(e). Then since ¬A has modal rank at most
2 it is not hard to see that F1, w1, σ1  ¬A as well. Similarly if for a valuation σ1 and
world w1 we have F1, w1, σ1  ¬A then we can construct a valuation σ2 and a world w2 with
F2, w2, σ2  ¬A. Thus we have F1  A iff F1  A and Lemma 3.4.5 yields the result.
The fact that translations of rules of this restricted form have modal rank 2 may already
suffice to show some limitative results, but the second property of such translations is quite
powerful as well: since in a rule with restrictions the variables occurring in a context formulae
only occur in this formula, intuitively the context formulae cannot interact with other context
formulae or the principal formulae. We use this to show that mixed-cut closed sets of rules
with context restrictions cannot capture symmetry of the accessibility relation.
Theorem 3.4.15 (c). There is no rule set R (not necessarily containing Cong or Mon) such
that GcR is mixed-cut closed and such that GcRConW is sound and (cut-free) complete for
the logic of symmetric frames.
Proof. Suppose that there is such a rule set. Then by Lemma 3.4.12 the logic of symmetric
frames can be axiomatised by a set A of translatable clauses with context formulae in
({p1,p2}, {q1,q2}). Thus in formulae from A the variables p2 and q2 occur only boxed and
every variable occurring under two layers of modalities is one of these two variables. Now
consider the two frames F1 := ({v, w}, {(v, w), (w, v)}) and F2 := (N, {(n, n+ 1) | n ∈ N}) as
shown in Figure 3.5. Clearly F1 is symmetric, while F2 is not. We show that axioms in A are
valid in F1 iff they are valid in F2. Suppose we have a formula A ∈ A. Then clearly for ¬A as
103
CHAPTER 3. AXIOMS VERSUS RULES
a b 0 1 2 3 . . .
F1 F2
Figure 3.5: The two frames used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.15 (symmetry).
well the variables in {p2, q2} only occur boxed and this set contains every variable occurring
under two layers of modalities. Now suppose that for a world w2 ∈ N and a valuation σ2 on
F2 we have F2, w2, σ2  ¬A. W.l.o.g. we have w2 = 0 and define a valuation σ1 on {a, b} by
σ1 {p2,q2} (a) := σ2 {p2,q2} (2)
σ1 var(A)r{p2,q2} (a) := σ2 var(A)r{p2,q2} (0)
σ1(b) := σ2(1)
Then for the variables p ∈ {p2, q2} we have (F1, a, σ1  p iff F2, 0, σ2  p) and (F1, b, σ1 
p iff F2, 1, σ2  p). Also for variables q ∈ var (A) r {p2, q2} we have (F1, a, σ1  q iff
F2, 0, σ2  q) and (F1, b, σ1  q iff F2, 1, σ2  q). Thus we have F1, a, σ1  ¬A. Analogously
if for a valuation σ1 we have F1, a, σ1  ¬A, then setting σ2(0) := σ2(2) := σ1(a) and
σ2(1) := σ1(b) we get F2, 0, σ2  ¬A. Thus axioms in A are valid in F1 iff they are valid in
F2 and an application of Lemma 3.4.5 together with the fact that the axiom (B) p → ♦p
modally defines the class of symmetric Kripke frames [BdRV01] yields a contradiction.
Unlike in the case of 2-transitivity there is no known sequent system consisting of rules
with restrictions which is sound and complete (with Cut) for the logic of symmetric frames. It
is not clear whether the technique of this section can be adapted to show that there cannot
be such a system. We encounter a similar situation in the case of the logic GL of transitive
Kripke frames with a conversely well-founded accessibility relation. It is well-known that
this class of frames is modally defined by the axiom (L) (p→ p)→ p and that its logic
is axiomatised by adding (L) to an axiomatisation for the standard modal logic K (see e.g.
[CZ97, BdRV01]). Again it is not clear whether this logic can be captured (using Cut) by
rules with restrictions, but we can show that it cannot be captured by a mixed-cut closed set
of rules with restrictions.
Theorem 3.4.16 (c). There is no rule set R (not necessarily containing Cong or Mon) such
that GcR is mixed-cut closed and such that GcRConW is sound and (cut-free) complete for
the logic GL.
Proof. Again, if there were such a rule set, then by Lemma 3.4.12 this logic could be axiomatised
by a set A of translatable clauses with context formulae in ({p1,p2}, {q1,q2}).
Consider the two transitive frames given by the infinite rooted trees with roots v resp.
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Figure 3.6: The two frames used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.16 (GL).
w in Figure 3.6 by setting xRy if x is on every path from the root to y and x 6= y. Since
every branch in F1 is finite the accessibility relation in F1 is conversely well-founded and
we have F1 |= GL. On the other hand, since F2 contains an infinite branch we have F2 6|=
GL. For i = 1, 2 and x ∈ Fi we write Fi[x] for the subframe of Fi generated by the set
{y | x lies on every path from the root to y}. Furthermore for n ∈ N we take fn to be the
canonical isomorphism F1[n]→ F2[n′]. Now let A be an axiom of the form given above. Then
¬A ≡ p1 ∧p2 ∧ P ∧
∧
i∈I
Ci ∧
∧
j∈J
♦¬Dj ∧ ♦¬q2 ∧ ¬q1
where for a set V of variables with p1, p2, q1, q2 /∈ V we have P ∈ Prop(V ) and Ci ∈
Frc({p1,p2}, V, {q1,q2}) and Dj ∈ F`c({p1,p2}, V, {q1,q2}). Strictly speaking the con-
text formulae p1,p2,¬q1,♦¬q2 need not appear in ¬A, but since this only makes the proof sim-
pler we assume that they do appear. Thus w.l.o.g. the Ci have the form p1∧p2∧P ′ → q1∨q2
and the ¬Dj have the form ¬(q1∧q2∧P ′′ → p1∨p2) ≡ q1∧q2∧P ′′∧¬p1∧♦¬p2 , where
P ′, P ′′ ∈ Prop(V ) and where again the formulae p1,p2, q1,q2 need not occur, but if they
occur, then they also occur on the top level of ¬A. Now suppose there are a valuation σ1 and
y ∈ F1 such that F1, σ1, y  ¬A.
If y 6= v, then there is a n ∈ N with y ∈ F1[n] and for z ∈ F2[n′] we set σ2(z) := σ1(f−1n (z)).
Then F2, σ2, fn(y)  ¬A.
If y = v, then for z ∈ F2 we set
σ2(z) :=

σ1(f
−1
n (z)) : z ∈ F2[n′]
{p2, q1, q2} ∪ (σ1(0) ∩ V ) : z ∈ F2[ω]
σ1(v) : z = w
Then for every z ∈ F2[ω] and for every i ∈ I we have F2, σ2, z  Ci iff F1, σ1, 0  Ci. Thus
for every such z we have F2, σ2, z 
∧
i∈I Ci and thus since ¬q2 and every ¬Dj are already
satisfied in a F2[n
′] we have F2, σ2, w  ¬A.
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For the other direction suppose there are a valuation σ2 and z ∈ F2 such that F2, σ2, z  ¬A.
If there is a n ∈ N with z ∈ F2[n′], then similar to above for y ∈ F1[n] we set σ1(y) := σ2(fn(y))
and obtain F1, σ1, f
−1
n (z)  ¬A.
If z ∈ F2[ω], then for j ∈ J let yDj and yq2 be the first points each in F[ω] satisfying ¬Dj
respectively ¬q2, and let m be the maximal distance of either of these from z. Note that in this
case none of the ¬Dj can contain the formula ♦¬p2, since then the formula p2 would need to
appear on the top level of ¬A as well and using transitivity we would have the contradiction
F2, z, σ2  p2∧♦¬p2 . Now it is enough to copy the valuations of points in the initial part F of
F2[z] of length m to points in F1[m+ 1] by using the canonical isomorphism f : F1[m+ 1]→ F
and setting σ1(y) := σ2(f(y)) for y ∈ F1[m+ 1]. This gives F1, σ1,m+ 1  ¬A.
If z = w, then similarly to the last case we take yDj and yq2 to be the first points each in
F2[ω] to satisfy a ¬Dj resp. ¬q2 which is not already satisfied in F2[n′] for any n ∈ N. Then
we copy the valuations of points in the initial part of F2[ω] of sufficient length to a branch
F1[m] of F1 where F2[m
′] is not the only branch witnessing any of the ¬Dj or ¬q2 and m is at
least the maximal distance from ω to any of the yDj , yq2 . For every y ∈ F1[n] with n 6= m we
set σ1(y) := σ2(fn(y)), and σ1(v) := σ2(w). Then every ¬Dj is witnessed in a F1[n] and thus
we have F1, σ1, v  ¬A.
Thus in total we get F1  A iff F2  A. Now Lemma 3.4.5 gives the result.
In some cases it is possible to use additional properties of the logics to further restrict the
format of the sequent rules and with this the format of the axioms. As an example we consider
the modal logic S5. This logic is particularly interesting, since even though it has a relatively
simple semantic characterisation as the modal logic of Kripke frames where the accessibility
relation is an equivalence relation [BdRV01] and even though as we have seen earlier it is
captured by a sequent system with Cut and rules with restrictions (Example 2.3.7), so far it
has eluded all efforts to construct a “standard” cut-free sequent system for it. Of course there
are cut-free sequent systems for S5 in extended sequent frameworks such as hypersequents
[Avr96, Pog08], nested sequents [Bru¨09] or labelled calculi [Neg05], but all of these require
additional machinery beyond the standard framework of two-sided sequents. The following
results might be seen as a step towards a formal explication why finding a “standard” cut-free
system is very hard in the least. As a first step since the formula p→ p must be derivable
in a cut-free sequent system for S5 we can strengthen the claim of Corollary 2.5.7.
Lemma 3.4.17 (c). Let R be a set of modal rules with restrictions (not necessarily including
Cong or Mon) such that GcRConW is sound and cut-free complete for S5 and such that GcR
is mixed-cut closed. Then w.l.o.g. for every restriction 〈F1, F2〉 of a rule in R we have
F1 ⊆ {p, p} and F2 ⊆ {p}.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.5.6 we first show that by mixed-cut closure ofGcR
whenever a rule has a restriction 〈F1, F2〉 such that p ∈ F1 (resp. p ∈ F2) for a variable p,
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then also p ∈ F2 (resp. p ∈ F1). For this again we apply the condition of mixed-cut closure
to the rule in question and one of the rules ∨R or ∧L depending on whether the variable p
was in F1 or F2. The next step is to show that there must be rules R1 = P1/Σ1 ⇒ Π1 and
R2 = P2/Σ2 ⇒ Π2 in R such that
1. p ∈ Σ1 and (⇒ p) C=⇒ p for a restriction C of R1
2. p in Σ2 and q ∈ Π2; or q ∈ Π2 and (p⇒ ) C= p⇒ for a restriction C of R2.
For the existence of R1 we proceed as follows. Since the formula p → p is valid in all
S5-frames, the sequent p ⇒ p must be derivable in GcRConW and by admissibility of
Weakening therefore also derivable in GcRCon. We now consider all possible derivations of this
sequent. Such a derivation must end with an application of a modal rule followed by a number
of applications of Con. And since rules with restrictions introduce a layer of modalities in
their principal formulae, in the last applied modal rule R the principal formulae must include
p⇒ . But then for a restriction C of R we must have (⇒ p) C=⇒ p, since otherwise the
sequent p⇒ would be derivable using essentially the same derivation. The latter can not
be the case, since the formula p→ ⊥ is not valid in all S5-frames. The existence of R2 is
shown as in the proof of Theorem 2.5.6 using the S5-valid formula p→ (p ∨ q).
Now we simplify the formulae in the context restrictions of rules in R in the familiar way:
if e.g. for a restriction 〈F1, F2〉 of a rule in R we have A ∨B ∈ F2 we use mixed-cut closure
of GcR and get that every sequent satisfying the context restriction of the rule ∨L must also
satisfy the restriction 〈F1, F2〉. Thus we have p ∈ F1 and p ∈ F2. The other propositional
connectives are analogous. If A ∈ F1, then mixed-cut closure with the rule R2 from above
gives p ∈ F1. Finally, if A ∈ F2, then mixed-cut closure with rule R1 from above gives
p ∈ F1. Thus w.l.o.g. we may replace R by an equivalent set R′ of rules where only formulae
of the desired format appear in the restrictions. Obviously this preserves mixed-cut closure of
the rule set.
The translations of rules of this format are not strong enough to capture the logic S5.
Theorem 3.4.18 (c). There is no set R of modal rules (not necessarily containing Mon
or Cong) such that GcR is mixed-cut closed and such that GcRConW is sound and cut-free
complete for S5.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 3.4.12 using the preceding Lemma 3.4.17 it is not too difficult to
see that if there is such a rule set, then S5 can be axiomatised in a Hilbert style system by
translatable clauses with context formulae in ({p, q}, {r}). The negations of such formulae
are equivalent to formulae of the form
q ∧p ∧ P ∧
n∧
i=1
Ai ∧
m∧
j=1
¬Bj ∧ ¬r
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where for a set V of variables with V ∩{p, q, r} = ∅ we have P ∈ Prop(V ) and for i ≤ n, j ≤ m
we have Ai ∈ Frc({p, q}, V, {r}) and Bj ∈ F`c({p, q}, V, {r}). Again, the formulae q,p
and ¬r need not appear in the formula, but then they may be replaced with > resp. >.
Importantly, the formula p (instead of >) appears in the Ai or Bj only if it also appears
on the top level.
Now consider the two frames F1 := (N,≤) and F2 := (N,N × N). Suppose we have a
translatable clause A with context formulae in ({p, q}, {r}). Then ¬A is equivalent to a
formula of the form given above. Suppose there is a world w in F2 and a valuation σ2 on F2
such that F2, σ2, w  ¬A. W.l.o.g. we have w = 0. But then defining the valuation σ1 by
setting σ1(n) := σ2(n) for every n ∈ N we get F1, σ1, 0  ¬A as follows: Since F2, σ2, 0  p we
have F2, σ2, n  p for every n ∈ N. Thus also F1, σ1, n  p for every n ∈ N and F1, σ1,m  p
for every m ∈ N. Moreover, for every m ∈ N and for every variable s ∈ V ∪ {q, r} we have
F1, σ1,m  s iff F2, σ2,m  s. But since every world m ∈ N is accessible from the world 0 in
F1 iff it is accessible from 0 in F2, and since the only formula in ¬A occurring under more
than one modality is p, we get F1, σ1, 0  ¬A as well. The other direction is similar. Thus in
total we have F1  A iff F2  A. Now again Lemma 3.4.5 gives the result.
Remark 3.4.19. As we have seen in Remark 2.6.6 in the presence of Contraction standard
variants of sequent calculi in which the principal formulae are copied into the premisses are
equivalent to sequent calculi given by rules with context restrictions as long as the underlying
rules are rules with context restrictions. Thus the limitative results of this section also extend
to these kinds of sequent calculi.
3.5 Notes
Axioms to rules. Our translation from axioms to rules is based on the results and methods
in [Sch07, SP09], where rank-1 axioms for modal logics based on classical propositional logic
are translated into one-step rules. An intermediate step, the adaption of this method to non-
iterative axioms based on classical propositional logic, was published in [LP11]. Subsequently,
the translation method was extended to cover non-iterative axioms for modal logics based on
intuitionistic propositional logic in [LP13a], which also contains a heuristic method for the
translation of nested axioms into rules with context restrictions. The full characterisation
of translatable axioms for modal logics based on classical propositional logic will appear in
[LP13b]. The characterisation, in particular the notion of a left- (resp. right-) resolvable
formula was inspired by the definition of the substructural hierarchy in [CGT08, CGT12].
Apart from the already mentioned results for rank-1 axioms in [Sch07, SP09] there seem
not to be many systematic investigations of translations from axioms into a particular format
of logical sequent rules in the standard sequent setting. While e.g. translations of axioms
for normal modal logics into rules of a (Hilbert-style) proof system are given in [BG13], the
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rule format considered there allows for arbitrary formulae occurring in the premisses and
conclusion of a rule. Such rules are then turned into reduced rules, i.e. rules where all formulae
occurring in the premisses or the conclusion are non-iterative, and where every variable occurs
in the scope of a modality.
Concerning extensions of the sequent framework perhaps the best understood connection is
that between modal (temporal) axioms and structural rules for extensions of modal (temporal)
display logic as exhibited in [Kra96]. There we find a translation from primitive axioms, i.e.
axioms of the form A→ B where the formulae A and B contain only propositional variables,
>,∨,∧ or the forward or backward looking temporal modalities ♦F ,♦P , and where A contains
each propositional variable at most once, into structural rules such that extending the standard
display calculus for temporal modal logic with these rules preserves Belnap’s conditions for cut
elimination. Moreover, every such structural rule ist translated back into a primitive axiom,
giving an exact characterisation of those axioms which can be treated in a modal (temporal)
display calculus. Also the recent work [CR13] extended methods used in the investigation of
substructural logics [CGT08, CGT12] to give systematic translations for a wide class of (not
necessarily modal) axioms into structural rules for a cut-free display calculus.
The line of research concerning automatic construction of cut-free labelled sequent calculi as
followed e.g. in [Neg05] is based on viewing normal modal logics as fragments of first order logic.
Modal axioms are first translated into corresponding frame properties expressed as geometric
implications in first-order logic, then the machinery developed in [NvP98, NvP01, Neg03]
is used to turn these first-order axioms into rules in the format of a regular rule scheme.
After closing under contractions the resulting sequent calculi are guaranteed to have cut
elimination. While this method is very general, it heavily relies on the correspondence of
modal axioms to first-order frame conditions and on the fact that the resulting formulae are
geometric implications. Thus it is not suitable e.g. for non-normal modal logics. The method
has subsequently been used to construct sequent calculi for multi-modal constructive modal
logics in [GGN12] and has recently been extended in [CMS13] to handle frame conditions
expressed by ∀∃-formulae as well.
Similarly, the recent work [Lah13] translates frame conditions for normal modal logics
expressed as n-simple first-order formulae into hypersequent rules, which extend a basic
hypersequent system for normal, transitive or symmetric frames. In the first two cases the
resulting calculus has strong cut admissibility, and in the latter case it can be shown to have
the subformula property. In either case the results yield decidability of the logic under scrutiny.
There also has been a fair amount of work on the problem of converting axioms for sub-
structural logics into structural rules for a sequent or hypersequent calculus [CGT08, CGT12,
CST09]. Here the axioms are decomposed using invertibility of some of the propositional rules
and then turned into structural (hyper-)sequent rules. In order to identify the class of axioms
which can be translated in such a way, the authors introduce the substructural hierarchy,
109
CHAPTER 3. AXIOMS VERSUS RULES
which inspired our Definition 3.2.2. In case the resulting rules satisfy an additional property,
that of acyclicity, they can be transformed into so-called analytic rules by a process involving
restructuring of the rules to confine the active parts to the left hand sides of the sequents,
and completion of the premisses – a process very similar to our process of variable elimination
(Definition 2.4.1). Using semantical methods it is then shown that the resulting calculi enjoy
a strong form of cut admissibility. These methods are extended in [CMS13] to construct a
hypersequent calculus for the intermediate logic Bd2. In contrast to the structural rules in
the above mentioned works the additional rule here introduces a logical connective.
In the context of paraconsistent logics [CLSZ13] gives an automatic translation from a
restricted class of Hilbert-style axioms into logical rules extending a standard sequent calculus
for positive propositional logic. The axiom format is chosen in such a way that the rules
resulting from the translation are amenable to the extraction of a semantics in terms of partial
non-deterministic matrices introduced in [BLZ12]. This semantics ensures decidability of the
logic in question and is used to check whether the resulting calculus is analytic. Furthermore,
in case the resulting calculus is not analytic, the semantics is used to construct a finite family
of cut-free calculi which are equivalent to the original calculus in the sense that every sequent
is derivable in the latter calculus iff it is derivable in every one of the calculi in the family.
Rules to axioms. The method of using a substitution witnessing projectivity of the formula
corresponding to the premisses of a rule to translate this rule into an equivalent Hilbert-style
axioms was used in [Sch07] to show that one-step rules are equivalent to rank-1 axioms. Our
extension of this method to cover the translation of rules with restrictions based on classical
propositional logic into axioms will be published in [LP13b].
There seem not to be too many investigations into explicit translations of sequent rules into
Hilbert-style axioms. One example is the procedure given in [Kra96] to translate structural
rules in a modal temporal display calculus satisfying Belnap’s conditions for cut elimination
into primitive axioms. The idea here is to first transfer all the active parts to one side of the
sequents using structural equivalences and then turn the resulting rule into an axiom using
Ackemann’s Lemma and the standard translation of the structural connectives into logical
connectives.
Limitative results. Limitative results for particular logics and particular formats of sequent
rules in the literature seem to be sparse. One example for this is the result presented in [Tiu06]
stating that deep inference is necessary to capture the logic BV , an extension of multiplicative
linear logic. Another example are the results in [BCar] giving sufficient conditions for when
a logic can not have an ∃-analytic calculus. The definition of an ∃-analytic calculus is very
broad and encompasses amongst cut-free sequent calculi also cut-free calculi in the framework
of display logic. Thus the method probably can not be adapted to show limitative results e.g.
about the logics S5 or GL, for which such systems do exist.
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Systems
Given a saturated and tractable set of rules with restrictions we can use the results from
Chapter 2 to show cut elimination and decidability. But in practice we are rarely given such a
saturated and tractable set of rules. For example if we start with a modal logic given as a finite
set of axioms for a Hilbert-style system and use the methods of Chapter 3 to convert these
into sequent rules, the resulting rule set in general is not saturated. Following Question 1.1.3
from the introduction this of course gives rise to the question how to construct saturated rule
sets starting from a (finite) set of rules, and whether it is possible to automate this process.
Following the idea of [PS08, PS09, PS10, PS11] the first step here is to make the rule
set principal-cut closed, that is to absorb cuts on principal formulae into the rule set, by
adding all possible cuts between rules. We will see in the next section how this can be done
in general by considering an appropriate representation of the resulting rules. Moreover,
a closer examination of the representations shows that the rules are even tractable in the
sense of Definition 2.7.3. Unfortunately the resulting rule sets need not be contraction closed
and mixed- and context-cut closed, and thus we do not always obtain cut elimination and
decidability. Nevertheless, by restricting the format of the rules we can show some positive
results, e.g. that it is always possible to construct a cut-free sequent system of our specific
format for logics axiomatised by non-iterative Horn clauses. We illustrate these techniques by
applications to Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability as well as to weak conditional logics.
Constructing principal-cut closed rule sets by hand using this method can be a daunting
prospect: we need to compute many cuts between rules, and for this we need to compute
many cuts between many premisses. Since this can be very tedious and moreover is prone to
errors we introduce in Section 4.2 a graphical tool to manipulate rules with restrictions and
to compute cuts between rules and contractions of rules. Not only can this tool be used to
manually construct cuts between rules, it also helps to spot patterns in the resulting rule set
and can be used to show that a rule set is contraction closed.
4.1 Principal-cut Closure via Cut Trees
When we are faced with the task of constructing a saturated rule set from a given set of rules,
the first step is to absorb cuts between principal formulae into the rule set. This idea probably
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was used many times in the construction of cut-free sequent systems, as suggested e.g. by
the rule set RK for the standard modal logic K and countless others. As a general method it
was put forward e.g. in [PS08, PS09, PS10, PS11]. With the notion of a cut between rules
and with Lemma 2.4.5 we now have tools at hand, which enable us to absorb cuts into the
rule set in a very systematic and purely syntactical way: since for rule sets including the
propositional rules by Lemma 2.4.5 cuts between rules are derivable rules, we may simply
saturate the rule set under the addition of cuts between rules. The resulting rule set then
will be principal-cut closed. Of course there is a price to be paid for this: the resulting rule
set in general will consist of infinitely many rules. This is not necessarily a problem if we
have a tractable representation of the rules, though. For example the set RK of rules for the
standard modal logic K is an infinite set of rules represented in a finite and tractable way.
In this section we will introduce the concept of a cut tree as a possibility to represent the
rules resulting from cutting a number of rules. We will see that under modest restrictions
on the rule set (which can be satisfied by performing a preprocessing step) cut trees of a
small size suffice to represent all possible cuts between rules from the rule set. This will give
us for every finite set of rules a tractable and principal-cut closed rule set equivalent to it.
Unfortunately the resulting rule sets do not necessarily satisfy the other criteria used to ensure
cut elimination and generic decidability, and it is not clear whether there is a generic way
to force these criteria. But if they are satisfied we automatically obtain cut elimination and
decidability results. Let us try to make this more precise.
Definition 4.1.1. Let R be set of rules with restrictions. Define the cut closure of R to be
the minimal (with respect to ⊆) set cc (R) of rules with restrictions such that R ⊆ cc (R) and
such that for every two rules R1, R2 from cc (R) we have cut(R1, R2,♥~p) ∈ cc (R).
Clearly the set cc (R) is principal-cut closed and can be constructed by successively adding
rules cut(R1, R2, A) for rules R1, R1 from R or already constructed.
Example 4.1.2. The rule sets for standard modal logics given in Example 2.4.9 can be seen
to be the cut closures of the rule sets given by translating the corresponding axioms:
1. The rule set RK = {Kn | n ≥ 0} is the cut closure of the rule set {K0,K1,K2}.
2. The rule set RK4 = RK ∪ {4n | n ≥ 0} is the cut closure of the rule set RK ∪ {R4}.
3. The rule set RKT = RK ∪ {Tn | n ≥ 1} is the cut closure of RK ∪ {RT}.
4. The rule set RS4 = RK4 ∪RKT is the cut closure of RK ∪ {R4, RT}.
In general the cut closure of a rule set will contain infinitely many rules, so we would like to
represent the rules from cc (R) in a different way. We do this by making their construction
from rules in R explicit.
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Definition 4.1.3. Let R be a set of rules and let Σ ⇒ Π be a sequent such that for all
formulae A,B ∈ Σ,Π we have var (A) ∩ var (B) = ∅. An R-cut tree with principal formulae
Σ ⇒ Π and leafs R1, . . . , Rn for R1, . . . , Rn ∈ R is a proof of Σ ⇒ Π from the principal
formulae of the Ri using only Cut such that no two cut formulae share a variable. The number
of nodes in a cut tree D is denoted by size (D), its depth by depth (D).
Note that in the definition of a cut tree we only allow applications of the cut rule, that
the cut formulae all are principal formulae of the rules at the leafs of the cut tree and that
no formula occurs twice as a cut formula. The restriction on the variables in the principal
formulae is necessary for turning cut trees into rules.
Example 4.1.4. For R := {K2,K3, RT} the following is an R-cut tree with principal formulae
r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒ and leafs K2,K3, RT:
(r1, r2 ⇒ s; C∅)
r1,r2 ⇒ s K2
(s, q1, q2 ⇒ t; C∅)
s,q1,q2 ⇒ t K3
r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒ t Cut
(t⇒ ; Cid)
t⇒ RT
r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒ Cut
where slightly abusing notation we add the rules at the leafs of the cut tree to the leafs of the
derivation.
Intuitively, a cut tree can be seen as (almost) a rule by taking the principal formulae of
the cut tree to be the principal formulae of the rule and by taking the premisses of the rules
forming the leafs of the cut tree as its premisses. Unfortunately these premisses contain
variables which do not occur in the principal formulae. But this can be taken care of using
the technique of variable elimination from Section 2.4. This yields the following notion.
Definition 4.1.5. Let R be a set of rules and let D be an R-cut tree. The rule r(D)
represented by D is defined inductively as follows. If depth (D) = 0, then r(D) is the leaf
of D. If depth (D) > 0, then for two R-cut trees D1 and D2 the cut tree D is of the formD1 D2
Σ⇒ Π Cut, where Σ ⇒ Π arises from the principal formulae of D1 and D2 by a cut on a
formula A. Then the rule r(D) is defined as the rule cut(r(D1), r(D2), A).
Example 4.1.6. For R := {K2,K3, RT} let D be the R-cut tree
(r1, r2 ⇒ s; C∅)
r1,r2 ⇒ s K2
(s, q1, q2 ⇒ t; C∅)
s,q1,q2 ⇒ t K3
r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒ t Cut
Then the rule represented by this cut tree is
r(D) = cut(K2,K3,s) = {(r1, r2, q1, q2 ⇒ t; C∅)}/q1,q2,r1,r2 ⇒ t
= K4 .
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Taking E to be the R-cut tree from Example 4.1.4, the rule represented by E thus is
r(E) = cut(r(D), RT,t) = {(r1, r2, q1, q2 ⇒ ; Cid)}/r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒
= T4 .
Intuitively we construct the rule represented by a cut tree by cutting the premisses in the
order given by the cuts of the cut tree. The equivalence of cut trees and cut closure is now
immediate.
Lemma 4.1.7. Let R be a set of rules. Then for every rule R we have that R ∈ cc (R) if and
only if R is represented by an R-cut tree.
Proof. By induction on the construction of rules in cc (R) resp. R-cut trees.
While cut trees thus give us representations of the rules in the cut closure of a rule set, they
are still not entirely what we are looking for. The problem is that the cut trees representing
a rule in general might be arbitrarily big and thus might not be suitable candidates for the
encodings of rules if we want to show tractability of the cut closure of a rule set. To show that
only relatively small cut trees suffice to represent every rule in the cut closure of a rule set we
first note that in a cut tree it is possible to change the order of the cuts without essentially
changing the represented rule. Recall from Definition 2.4.6 that a rule R1 subsumes a rule R2
if the two rules have the same principal formulae and if from the premisses of an application of
R2 we can derive the premisses of the corresponding application ofR1 using only Weakening
and Contraction.
Lemma 4.1.8. Let R be a set of rules, and let D1 and D2 be R-cut trees with the same
principal formulae Σ⇒ Π and the same leafs R1, . . . , Rn. Then the rule r(D1) subsumes the
rule r(D2) and vice versa.
Proof. Due to the restrictions on the cut formulae in a cut tree the two cut trees D1 and
D2 differ only in the order of the cuts. But then by Lemma 2.4.4 from the premisses of and
application of r(D2) we can derive all the premisses of the corresponding application of r(D1)
using only Weakening and Contraction and vice versa. Thus each rule subsumes the other.
This allows us to rearrange the cuts in a cut tree without essentially changing the represented
rule. The reason why we may in general have arbitrarily large cut trees representing a rule is
that if one of the premisses of an application of Cut consists of at most two formulae, then
the other premiss contains at least as many formulae as the conclusion of the cut. Thus the
number of formulae might increase as we move upwards along a branch in a cut tree. This
problem disappears if the rule set is closed under cuts with such problematic rules.
Definition 4.1.9. A rule with restrictions is small if its principal formulae contain at most
two formulae. A set R is small-cut closed if for every two rules R1, R2 from R such that at
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least one of R1, R2 is small we have cut(R1, R2,♥~p) ∈ R. The small-cut closure of R is the
minimal (with respect to ⊆) small-cut closed set scc (R) of rules such that R ⊆ scc (R).
Again it is clear that the small-cut closure of a rule set can be constructed by successively
adding all the missing rules. In the case of small-cut closure, however, starting from a finite
set of rules we only need to add finitely many new rules, which can be done in a preprocessing
step.
Example 4.1.10. The rule set R = {K2,K3, RT} from Examples 4.1.4 and 4.1.6 is not
small-cut closed, since the rule RT is small, but the rule cut(K2, RT,t) = {(q1, q2 ⇒
; C∅)}/q1,q2 ⇒ = T2 is not subsumed by any rule in R. The small-cut closure of this rule
set is the set
scc (R) = R∪ {cut(K2, RT,t), cut(K3, RT,t)}
= R∪ {T2,T3}
which by construction is small-cut closed.
For small-cut closed rule sets we may simply permute problematic cuts in a cut tree up to
the leafs using Lemma 4.1.8 and then replace them using the rules guaranteed by small-cut
closure. This gives a cut tree without the problematic cuts. But this also means that, provided
the cut tree itself has enough principal formulae, none of the rules at the leafs of the cut tree
has principal formulae containing less than three formulae. Remember from Definition 2.1.8
that the size of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is the number |Γ ⇒ ∆| = ∑A∈Γ Γ(A) +∑A∈∆ ∆(A) of
formulae occurring in it counting multiplicities.
Lemma 4.1.11. Let R be a set of rules. Then for every scc (R)-cut tree D with principal
formulae Σ⇒ Π there exists an scc (R)-cut tree E with principal formulae Σ⇒ Π and leafs
R1, . . . , Rn such that
1. if |Σ⇒ Π| ≤ 2, then depth (E) = 0 (and thus E consists of a single leaf R1 only)
2. if |Σ⇒ Π| > 2, then the principal formulae of each of the rules R1, . . . , Rn contain at
least 3 formulae
3. size (E) ≤ size (D) and the rules represented by D and E subsume each other.
Proof. By induction on the size of the cut tree. The base case is trivial. Suppose the size
of D is n+ 1, and that the premises of the lowermost cut are Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, A and A,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2.
Let D1 and D2 be the induced scc (R)-cut trees with principal formulae Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, A resp.
A,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2. Using the induction hypothesis we obtain scc (R)-cut trees E1 and E2 with
principal formulae Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, A and A,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2, which have the properties mentioned in the
Lemma. In particular for i = 1, 2 we have size (Ei) ≤ size (Di). If the principal formulae of both
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r(E1) and r(E2) contain at least three formulae each, then we are done. Otherwise, assume
that the principal formulae of r(E1) contain at most two formulae. Then E1 consists only of a
leaf R1 with principal formulae Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, A and the formula A occurs in the principal formulae
of exactly one leaf R2 of E2. By Lemma 4.1.8 we may permute the cut on A up to the leaf R2
in E2, resulting in a cut tree representing a rule equivalent to r(D). Since R is small-cut closed
we may now replace the two leafs R1 and R2 and the cut on A with the leaf cut(R1, R2, A).
Using the methods of Lemma 4.1.8 it is not too difficult to see that the rule represented by
this cut tree is still equivalent to the original rule. The constructed cut tree might not yet have
the properties specified in the Lemma, since the principal formulae of the leaf cut(R1, R2, A)
might consist of less than three formulae, but since the size of the constructed cut tree is now
smaller than the size of the original cut tree D, we may simply apply the induction hypothesis
again to obtain an scc (R)-cut tree E with the desired properties. The remaining case that
the principal formulae of r(E2) contain at most two formulae is analogous.
Example 4.1.12. Take R to be the rule set from the previous examples and scc (R) as given
in Example 4.1.10. In the R-cut tree E from Example 4.1.4 we may permute the problematic
cut on the formula t up to the leafs. This yields the cut tree F given by
(r1, r2 ⇒ s; C∅)
r1,r2 ⇒ s K2
(s, q1, q2 ⇒ t; C∅)
s,q1,q2 ⇒ t K3
(t⇒ ; Cid)
t⇒ RT
s,q1,q2 ⇒ t Cut
r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒ Cut
Lemma 4.1.8 ensures that the rules r(E) and r(F) are equivalent. Now using small-cut closure
of scc (R) this is turned into the scc (R)-cut tree
(r1, r2 ⇒ s; C∅)
r1,r2 ⇒ s K2
(s, q1, q2 ⇒ ; Cid)
s,q1,q2 ⇒ t cut(K3, RT,t)
r1,r2,q1,q2 ⇒ Cut
in which there are no more problematic cuts.
In the cut trees resulting from this procedure there are no cuts where a premiss contains at
most two formulae, and thus the size of the sequents always decreases when moving upwards
towards the leafs on a branch in the cut tree. This allows us to bound the size of the cut tree
in terms of the size of its principal formulae.
Corollary 4.1.13. Let R be a set of rules and let Σ ⇒ Π be a sequent with |Σ ⇒ Π| ≥ 3.
Then every rule in cc (R) with principal formulae Σ⇒ Π is equivalent to a rule represented
by an scc (R)-cut tree of size ≤ 2 · |Σ⇒ Π| − 5.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1.7 every rule R in cc (R) is represented by an R-cut tree, and thus by
Lemma 4.1.11 there is an equivalent rule which is represented by an R-cut tree with the
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(s, q1, q2 ⇒ t; C∅)
s,q1,q2 ⇒ t K3
(t⇒ ; Cid)
t⇒ RT
(r1, r2 ⇒ s; C∅)
r1,r2 ⇒ s K2
s t
Figure 4.1: The cut graph of the cut trees given in Examples 4.1.4 and 4.1.12.
properties specified in the lemma. In particular, if the principal formulae of R consist of at
least three formulae, then the leafs have principal formulae consisting of at least 3 formulae
each. An induction on the structure of such cut trees now shows the bound on the size.
While this bound on the size of the cut trees representing a rule with given principal formulae
already gives us a nice characterisation of the rules in the cut closure of a small-cut closed rule
set, ultimately we would like to use the generic results from Section 2.7 to show decidability
and complexity results for such rule sets. But for this we need the rule sets to be tractable, in
particular rule applications with a given conclusion must have small codes, and we must be
able to check reasonably fast whether a sequent is a premiss of such an application given by a
code. The first requirement is already met if we take the codes of rules to be the small cut
trees guaranteed by the previous corollary. Yet it is not entirely clear that we can recognise
the premisses of such a rule fast enough. In order to show that this is possible we also bound
the depth of the cut trees. For this we represent the cut trees in a slightly different way.
Definition 4.1.14. Let R be a rule set and let D be an R-cut tree with principal formulae
Σ⇒ Π and leafs R1, . . . , Rn. The cut graph for D is the graph whose nodes are the leafs of D,
and where two nodes Ri, Rj are connected by an edge if and only if a formula occurs in the
principal formulae of both Ri and Rj .
Now a formula occurs in the principal formulae of two different leafs of a cut tree if and
only if it is the cut formula for a cut in the cut tree. Hence two nodes in the cut graph for a
cut tree are connected by an edge if and only if in the cut tree there is a cut on a formula
occurring in the corresponding leafs of the cut tree. Thus cut graphs capture the “essence” of
cut trees: the structure of the cuts modulo rearrangement.
Example 4.1.15. The cut graph for the cut tree E given in Example 4.1.4 is the graph given
in Figure 4.1. Here the edges are labelled with the corresponding cut formulae. The cut tree
E can be constructed from the graph by taking the cut corresponding to the edge labelled
with the formula t as the lowermost cut. If instead we take the cut corresponding to the
edge labelled with s as the lowermost cut we obtain the cut tree D given in Example 4.1.12.
Since two disjoint generated subtrees of a cut tree can only be joined by at most one cut,
cut graphs do not contain cycles and thus can be taken to be (undirected and rooted) trees
if we take an arbitrary node as the root (see e.g. [Die06] for more details on these notions).
Using the following adaption of the 2-3-Lemma from [ISH65] we can show that in a cut graph
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we can always find an edge which divides the cut graph into two graphs of (very) roughly the
same size. Here for a rooted tree T and a node x in T we denote the subtree of T generated
by the set of nodes y for which x lies on every path from the root to y and which has x as the
root by Tx, and the number of nodes in T by |T |. The children of a node x in a rooted tree are
the nodes y such that x is the immediate predecessor of y on every path from the root to y.
Lemma 4.1.16. Let k ∈ N and T be a rooted tree, such that k + 1 < |T | and each node has
at most k children. Then there is a node x in T , such that
⌈
1
k+2 · |T |
⌉
≤ |Tx| ≤
⌊
k+1
k+2 · |T |
⌋
.
Proof. We construct a series (x0, x1, . . . , xd) of nodes in T , such that x0 is the root, and xd is
a leaf in the following way. Let x0 be the root. For i ≥ 0 and xi not a leaf let xi+1 be a child of
xi, such that |Txi+1 | is maximal. Since xi has at most k children we have |Txi | ≤ k · |Txi+1 |+ 1.
Now let
i0 := min
{
i ∈ {0, . . . , d} | |Txi | <
1
k + 2
· |T |
}
.
Since Tx0 = T clearly we have i0 > 0. Then xi0−1 is the desired node. Indeed we have
|Txi0−1 | ≤ k · |Txi0 |+ 1 < k ·
1
k + 2
|T |+ 1 ≤ k
k + 2
|T |+ 1
k + 2
|T |
which yields the upper bound. The lower bound follows by minimality of i0.
Since an edge in a cut graph corresponds to a cut in the underlying cut tree, this enables us
to rearrange the cuts in the latter and so find an equivalent balanced cut tree with bounded
depth.
Lemma 4.1.17. Let R be a set of rules such that the principal formulae of every rule in R
contain at most k formulae, and let Σ⇒ Π be a sequent with |Σ⇒ Π| ≥ 3. Then every rule in
cc (R) with principal formulae Σ⇒ Π is subsumed by a rule represented by an scc (R)-cut tree
of size at most 2 · |Σ⇒ Π| − 5 and depth at most ck · log2 |Σ⇒ Π|+ k for ck := (log2 k+2k+1)−1.
Proof. Let R be a rule in R. We show how to construct a cut tree E with the desired
properties. By Corollary 4.1.13 we know that the rule R is equivalent to a rule represented by
an scc (R)-cut tree D with principal formulae Σ⇒ Π and size at most 2 · |Σ⇒ Π| − 5. Thus
the cut tree D has at most |Σ ⇒ Π| − 2 leafs, and the cut graph G for D has at most that
many nodes. Furthermore, since the principal formulae of every rule in R contain at most k
formulae and since cuts with small rules do not increase the number of principal formulae of a
rule, the principal formulae of every rule in scc (R) contain at most k formulae as well. Thus,
taking an arbitrary node in G as the root, every node in G has at most k children. This means
that we may apply Lemma 4.1.16 to find a node x of G such that⌈
1
k + 2
· |G|
⌉
≤ |Gx| ≤
⌊
k + 1
k + 2
· |G|
⌋
.
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Then writing G r Gx for the rooted subtree of G generated by the complement of the set of
nodes of Gx in G we also have |G r Gx| ≤
⌊
k+1
k+2 · |G|
⌋
. The new cut tree E (with principal
formulae Σ⇒ Π) is now constructed by taking as the lowermost cut the cut in D corresponding
to the (unique) edge connecting Gx and G r Gx. For the next level of cuts we repeat the
process for the cut graphs Gx and G r Gx. Continuing upwards in this fashion after at most
log k+2
k+1
(|Σ⇒ Π| − 2) steps we arrive at a sub-graph with at most k + 1 nodes, which we insert
into E in the form of a sub-derivation of depth at most k. Thus the cut tree E has depth at
most
log k+2
k+1
(|Σ⇒ Π| − 2) + k ≤
(
log2
k + 2
k + 1
)−1
· log2 |Σ⇒ Π|+ k .
By construction the size of E is the same as the size of D, and by Lemma 4.1.8 the represented
rules are equivalent.
Thus for finite small-cut closed rule sets we have small representations of all the rules in
their cut closure. But we even get a bit more. If we start with a finite set of rules, then
computing the small-cut closure of this rule set only adds finitely many new rules. Moreover,
this can be done in a preprocessing step, and thus only adds a constant time overhead to the
construction of the individual rules. This gives us a representation of the cut closure for every
finite set of rules.
Definition 4.1.18. Let R be a set of rules whose principal formulae contain at most k
formulae each. The rule set generated by R is the set Rp of rules represented by scc (R)-cut
trees with depth at most ck · log2 |Σ⇒ Π|+ k where Σ⇒ Π are their principal formulae and
ck = (log2
k+2
k+1)
−1 is the constant introduced in Lemma 4.1.17.
Theorem 4.1.19. Let R be a finite set of rules with G[cim] ⊆ R. Then the rule set Rp is
principal-cut closed, tractable and equivalent to R.
Proof. Since the rule set R contains the propositional rules, equivalence of R and scc (R)
follows by Lemma 2.4.5. SinceR is finite, we know that for some k the principal formulae of
every rule in R contain at most k formulae. Thus by Lemma 4.1.17 we have equivalence of
cc (R) and Rp. Equivalence of R and cc (R) follows from Lemma 2.4.5.
To see that Rp is principal-cut closed consider two rules R1, R2 from Rp. Since both of
these rules are represented by scc (R)-cut trees, the rule cut(R1, R2,♥~p) is also represented by
a scc (R)-cut tree, and again using Lemma 4.1.17 there is a rule represented by an scc (R)-cut
tree of bounded size and depth which subsumes the rule cut(R1, R2,♥~p).
To see that the rule set is tractable we take the encodings of applications of rules inRp to
be the small cut trees representing rules inRp together with a substitution of their principal
formulae and a context. Then given a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ and such an encoding of an application
of a rule in Rp we can check in space polynomial in |Γ ⇒ ∆| that the conclusion of the
application of the rule given by the encoding is Γ⇒ ∆. Furthermore, since the cut-trees have
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depth at most ck · log2 |Γ⇒ ∆|+k, each of the premises of the represented rules is constructed
by cutting at most
(
2`
)ck·log2 |Γ⇒∆|+k = |Γ⇒ ∆|`·ck · 2`·k many premises of rule applications
at the leaves, where ` is the maximal arity of modalities. Thus given a sequent we can check
whether it is a premiss of a rule application given by a small cut tree, a substitution of its
principal formulae and a context by guessing at most this number of premisses of rules at the
leafs of the cut tree, performing the cuts according to the cut tree, substituting the variables
and adding the context. Since the values of k, ck and ` only depend on the rule set and not
on the input, the check can be done in time polynomial in the size of the encoding of the
rule application. Therefore we can check whether a sequent is a premiss of the application in
nondeterministic polynomial time and thus in polynomial space (in the size of the encoding of
the rule application).
Ideally, we would like to use this representation of the cut closure to decide derivability
for logics given by finite sets of rules. Unfortunately, for this we also need the rule set to be
closed under contractions and context- and mixed-cuts. These are properties which are not
automatically guaranteed by the construction of the rules in Rp.
Corollary 4.1.20. Let R be a finite set of rules. If the rule set Rp is right- or left-contraction
closed, and mixed- and context-cut closed, then RpCon has cut elimination. If Rp is contraction
closed and mixed- and context-cut closed, then the derivability problem for R is in Exptime.
Proof. Cut elimination follows from Theorems 2.4.16 and 4.1.19, and the complexity bound
follows from Corollary 2.7.6.
It is not clear whether the rule set can be automatically modified to satisfy these additional
conditions. Since in contrast to principal-cut closure the properties of mixed- and context-cut
closure are not monotone in the sense that adding a rule might destroy these properties, it is
doubtful whether we can simply saturate the rule set as in the case of principal-cut closure.
For contraction closure we could simply add all the missing rules, but it is not clear how to
do this in a way that the resulting rule set is still tractable. Some of these obstacles can be
evaded by restricting the rule format to that of shallow rules. Since sets of shallow rules are
always mixed- and context-cut closed (Example 2.4.12), for these rule sets we only need to
require contraction closure. In case we have contraction closure, then by Theorem 2.7.8 we
obtain an even lower complexity bound.
Corollary 4.1.21. Let R be a finite set of shallow rules. If the rule set Rp is contraction
closed, then RpCon has cut elimination and the derivability problem for R is in Pspace. 
Finally, if the principal formulae of the rules in a rule set contain at most one formula on
the right hand side, then the rule set is trivially right-contraction closed. Thus for such rule
sets we automatically obtain an equivalent cut-free sequent system. We can also characterise
the corresponding class of axioms for Hilbert-style systems.
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Definition 4.1.22. A formula is a Horn clause if it is of the form
∧n
i=1Bi → C for n ≥ 0
and formulae B1, . . . , Bn, C.
Theorem 4.1.23. Let R be a finite set of shallow rules where the right hand sides of the
principal formulae of each rule contain at most one formula. Then RpCon has cut elimination.
Thus if A is a finite set of non-iterative translatable Horn clauses and if RA consists of the
translations of the axioms in A according to Section 3.1, then the sequent system given by
(G[cim]RA)pCon has cut elimination.
Proof. Cuts between shallow rules with at most one formula in the right hand side of the
principal formulae also are shallow rules and have at most one formula on the right hand
side of the principal formulae. Thus the generated rule set Rp is context- and mixed cut
closed (compare Example 2.4.12) and right-contraction closed (compare Example 2.4.14).
Hence by Theorems 2.4.16 and 4.1.19 it has cut elimination. Given a finite set of translatable
non-iterative Horn clauses, the translation from Section 3.2 gives an equivalent finite set of
shallow rules (compare Corollary 3.2.26). It is not hard to see that the right hand sides of the
principal formulae of these rules contain at most one formula.
Thus in particular we have cut-free sequent systems for every modal logic based on intu-
itionistic propositional logic and axiomatised by non-iterative translatable Horn clauses and
for every modal logic based on classical logic and axiomatised by non-iterative Horn clauses.
Example 4.1.24. 1. The rule set {K2}p is (classically and intuitionistically) equivalent to
the axiom p ∧q → r and G[ci]{K2}pCon has cut elimination.
2. We have seen in Example 3.2.17 that the axioms p ∧q → (p ∧ q) and (IK2) (p→
q) ∧ ♦p→ ♦q for constructive modal logic CK [Wij90, BdPR01] translate into the rules
K2 {(p1, p2 ⇒ q; C∅)}/p1,p2 ⇒ q
RIK2 {(p, q ⇒ r; C∅)}/p,♦q ⇒ ♦r
Furthermore, it is not hard to see that the axiom > translates into the rule K0 =
{( ⇒ p; C∅)}/ ⇒ p. Thus setting RCK := {K2, RIK2,K0} we have that the rule
set GiRpCMKCon is sound and complete for constructive modal logic CMK and has cut
elimination.
More examples are given by weak systems of conditional logics [Che75, Che80, Nut80,
OPS07, PS11]. Here we consider the logics in a purely syntactical way. Some stronger
conditional logics will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
Example 4.1.25 (c). Let Λ be the set of connectives containing in addition to the standard
boolean connectives the binary connective . We write this connective in infix notation and
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(CA) (p r) ∧ (q r)→ (p ∨ q r)
(CC) (p q) ∧ (p r)→ (p q ∧ r)
(CEM) (p q) ∨ (p ¬q)
(CM) (p (q ∧ r))→ (p q) ∧ (p r)
(CMon) (p q) ∧ (p r)→ ((p ∧ q) r)
(CN) p >
(CS) p ∧ q → (p q)
(CSO) (p q) ∧ (q p)→ ((p r)↔ (q r))
(CV) (p q) ∧ ¬(p ¬r)→ ((p ∧ r) q)
(ID) p p
(MP) (p q)→ (p→ q)
Table 4.1: Hilbert-style axiomatisations for conditional logics formulated using .
read the formula A B as “A conditionally implies B”. Consider the axioms for conditional
logics based on classical propositional logic given in Table 4.1. Since each of the axioms in
S := {(CA), (CC), (CM), (CMon), (CN), (CS), (CSO), (ID), (MP)}
is equivalent to finitely many non-iterative translatable Horn clauses, by the methods of
Chapter 3 for every set A of axioms with A ⊆ S we have a corresponding set RA of
translations of these axioms into rules. Thus for such a set A the sequent system given by the
rules RpA is equivalent to A and by Theorem 4.1.23 the sequent system given by GcRpACon
has cut elimination.
Of course now the question is how it is possible to check whether the cut closure of a rule
set is saturated. In particular, the rule set needs to be contraction closed. The following
lemma allows us to restrict the check to rules of a specific form. Remember from Lemma 2.4.4
that for a set P of premisses and a sequent Θ⇒ Ξ the set P(Θ⇒ Ξ) contains all sequents
Θ F1 ,Σ⇒ Π,Ξ F2 for premisses (Σ⇒ Π; 〈F1, F2〉) in P.
Lemma 4.1.26. Let P1 and P2 be sets of premisses, and let Θ⇒ Ξ be a sequent. If every
sequent in P2(Θ⇒ Ξ) is derivable from P1(Θ⇒ Ξ) using only ConW, then for every variable
p every sequent in (P2 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ) is derivable from (P1 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ) using only ConW.
Proof. Take a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ from (P2 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ). We look at the possible cases.
If Γ⇒ ∆ ∈ P2(Θ⇒ Ξ), then p does not occur in Γ⇒ ∆. Moreover, since the sequent is
derivable from P1(Θ⇒ Ξ) using only ConW there is a sequent Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ from P1(Θ⇒ Ξ) with
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Supp (Γ′) ⊆ Supp (Γ) and Supp (∆′) ⊆ Supp (∆). Thus p does not occur in Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ either and
we have Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ ∈ (P1 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ). Thus Γ⇒ ∆ follows from (P1 	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ) using only
ConW.
Otherwise we have Γ ⇒ ∆ = Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ Π1,Π2 where the sequents Σ1 ⇒ Π1, p and
p,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 are in (P2 	 p)(Θ ⇒ Ξ). Thus we have sequents Σ′1 ⇒ Π′1 and Σ′2 ⇒ Π′2 in
P1(Θ⇒ Ξ) with
Supp
(
Σ′1
) ⊆ Supp (Σ1) Supp (Π′1) ⊆ Supp (Π1, p)
Supp
(
Σ′2
) ⊆ Supp (p,Σ2) Supp (Π′2) ⊆ Supp (Π2) .
But then at least one of the three sequents
Σ′1 ⇒ Π′1 Σ′2 ⇒ Π′2 Σ′1,Σ′2 ⇒ Π′1,Π′2
must be in (P1	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ), and thus the sequent Γ⇒ ∆ follows from (P1	 p)(Θ⇒ Ξ) using
only ConW.
Using this lemma we can show that it is enough to only consider contractions along a path
in a cut graph.
Definition 4.1.27. Let R be a set of rules. A rule from cc (R) is called a path rule, if it is
represented by a cut tree whose cut graph is a path.
Example 4.1.28. The rules represented by the cut trees given in Examples 4.1.4 and 4.1.12
are path rules, since the cut graph for these cut trees (shown in Figure 4.1) is a path.
In particular, if R is a leaf of a cut tree witnessing that a rule is a path rule, then at most
two formulae of the principal formulae of R occur as cut formulae in the cut tree.
Theorem 4.1.29. Let R be a set of rules. Suppose that all contractions of path rules from
cc (R) are subsumed by rules in cc (R). Then cc (R) is contraction closed.
Proof. Let R be a rule in cc (R). We need to show that every contraction of R is subsumed
by a rule in cc (R). By Lemma 4.1.7 the rule R is represented by a cut tree D. Let G be
the cut graph for D. Consider the (left or right) contraction of R on the literals ♥~p and ♥~q.
These two literals occur in the principal formulae of exactly one leaf of D each. Let H be
the cut graph induced by the path connecting the two nodes of G corresponding to these two
leafs. Then imposing an arbitrary ordering on the cuts from H we obtain a cut tree E which
represents a path rule Q in cc (R). But since cc (R) is contraction closed for path rules, the
contraction of Q on ♥~p and ♥~q is subsumed by a rule S in cc (R). Let H′ be the cut graph
for the cut tree for the rule S. Then since the rule S has the same principal formulae as the
contraction of the rule Q, in the cut graph G we may replace the path H by H′, connecting
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the remaining parts of G to those nodes of H′ where the cut formula corresponding to the
according edge occurs in the principal formulae. Again, taking an arbitrary ordering of the
cuts we obtain a cut tree. Let T be the rule represented by this cut tree. Then the rule T has
the same principal formulae as the contraction of the ruleR on ♥~p and ♥~q, and by repeated
applications of Lemma 4.1.26 all the premisses of the latter are derivable from the premisses
of T using only ConW. Thus the contraction of R is subsumed by a rule in cc (R).
In particular, since rules with at most one formula in the principal formulae can not be used
in the construction of the path rules used in the proof of Theorem 4.1.29, such rules can be
added to a rule set without destroying contraction closure of the cut closure.
Corollary 4.1.30. Let R be a set of rules such that cc (R) is contraction closed. Then for
every rule R with principal formulae Σ ⇒ Π such that |Σ ⇒ Π| = 1 the set cc (RR) is
contraction closed.
Proof. Since the rule R has only one principal formula, nodes in a cut graph labelled with
R have degree one. Moreover, in the cut tree representing a rule Q no principal formulae
of Q occur in a leaf labelled with R. Thus when constructing the cut graph H in the proof
of Theorem 4.1.29 above, no node of H is labelled with R. Reasoning as above, contraction
closure of cc (RR) is now seen to depend only on contraction closure of cc (R).
This is an important result, since it means that in order to check whether the cut closure of
a rule set is contraction closed it is sufficient to check contraction closure of the cut closure
of the subset consisting of ’big’ rules, i.e. rules with at least three formulae in the principal
formulae. This also means that once we have established contraction closure of the cut closure
of a rule set we may add ’very small’ rules, i.e. rules whose principal formulae consist of only
one formula, for free. We can use this to uniformly establish contraction closure for some basic
systems of conditional logic and thus uniformly re-establish the decidability and complexity
results for these systems found in [Che75, OS01, OPS07, PS09, PS11].
Theorem 4.1.31 (c). Let A ⊆ {(CC), (CEM), (CM), (CN), (CS), (ID), (MP)} with (CM) ∈ A
and with (CN) ∈ A whenever (CEM) ∈ A. Then if RA is the set of rules consisting of the
translations of the axioms in A the rule set (RA)p is contraction closed. Moreover, the sequent
calculus given by Gc(RA)pCon has cut elimination and the derivability problem for this system
is in Pspace.
Proof. Translating the axiom (CM) of Table 4.1 into a rule using the methods of Section 3.2
(see in particular Remark 3.2.27) gives the rule
RCM {(p⇒ q; C∅), (q ⇒ p; C∅), (r ⇒ s; C∅)}/p r ⇒ q s
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which states monotonicity of in the second argument. Using this to translate the axioms
(CC), (CEM) and (CN) into rules we obtain the rules
RCC {(pi ⇒ pj ; C∅) | i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j} ∪ {(q, r ⇒ s; C∅)}/p1  q, p2  r ⇒ p3  s
RCEM {(p⇒ q; C∅), (q ⇒ p; C∅), (⇒ s, t; C∅)}/ ⇒ p s, q t
RCN {(⇒ q; C∅)}/ ⇒ p q .
Note that the rule RCN is the right contraction of RCEM. It is now not too difficult to see that
path rules (or indeed any rules) in cc ({RCM, RCC, RCEM, RCN}) have the form CKCEMn,m =
Pn,m/p1  q1, . . . , pn qn ⇒ pn+1  qn+1, . . . , pn+m qn+m for n ≥ 0,m ≥ 1 with
Pn,m := {(pi ⇒ pj ; C∅) | i, j ≤ n+m, i 6= j} ∪ {(q1, . . . , qn ⇒ qn+1, . . . , qn+m; C∅)}
and that path rules (or again any rules) in cc ({RCM, RCC}) have the form CKn := CKCEMn,1
for n ≥ 1, and thus that both of these rule sets are contraction closed (see also [Che80, PS08,
PS09, PS10, PS11]). Thus by Corollary 4.1.30 all extensions of these rule sets with rules
whose principal formulae contain at most one formula are contraction closed as well. This
gives contraction closure and cut elimination for the rule sets GcRpACon for all sets A as stated
in the theorem. The complexity result then follows from the results in Section 2.7.
4.2 Sequent Rules in Pictures
The results of the previous section show that it is possible to construct principal-cut closed and
tractable rule sets for many modal logics in an automatic way by considering a representation
of the rules in the cut closure of a rule set as cut trees. Unfortunately the construction does
not guarantee contraction closure or context- or mixed-cut closure of the resulting rule set. In
order to check whether e.g. contraction closure holds, it is sometimes advisable to explicitly
construct all the rules in the rule set, as done e.g. in the proof of Theorem 4.1.31. Moreover,
in some cases we might prefer an explicit representation of the rules to their representation in
terms of cut trees, e.g. if we would like to use the rules in a very efficient decision procedure.
Thus sometimes we still need to construct the principal-cut closure of a rule set by hand. One
of the standard methods for this is to saturate the rule set under the addition of cuts between
rules until a pattern in the form of the rules can be distinguished. As can be testified by anyone
who tried to do this for a reasonably complex logic, due to the sheer number of sequents which
need to be handled in each step, this can be a very laborious and error-prone process. This
holds especially if the modalities have arity greater than one or are not monotone.
To address this issue we now introduce a graphical tool to aid the manual handling of
rules, cuts between rules and contractions of rules. It should be noted that ’tool’ here is
meant in a theoretical sense and not in the sense of an implementation. The general idea is to
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represent sequents as doodles, that is as arrows with multiple heads and tails. Then performing
a cut between two sequents amounts to connecting heads and tails of arrows, and applying
Contraction is mirrored by identifying two heads or two tails. This presentation is extended
in a natural way to rules and the operations of cut between rules and contraction of a rule.
There are two major advantages to this presentation: The first is that as mentioned earlier
this presentation greatly reduces the amount of effort required for computing cuts between
rules. The second advantage is that it allows us to spot patterns in the construction of rules
more easily. Being able to do so is very important, since the principal-cut closure of a rule
set in general comprises infinitely many rules of many different shapes, and thus we need to
identify a suitably regular subset of rules which subsumes all the rules in the constructed set.
The examples in this section mainly serve illustrative purposes, and thus are relatively simple
examples such as the standard normal modal logics or the weak conditional logics considered
in the last section. The tool will be put to full use in the next chapter, where we will construct
new cut-free sequent calculi for stronger conditional logics. Let us start with the basic notion.
Definition 4.2.1. Let F be a set of formulae. A doodle over F is an arrow with multiple
heads and tails pointing to (resp. emerging from) formulae in F . A formula occurs positively in
a doodle if a head points to it, and negatively if a tail emerges from it. A doodle d represents
a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ if exactly the formulae in Γ occur negatively in d and exactly the formulae
in ∆ occur positively in d and if moreover the multiplicity of every formula in Γ is the number
of heads pointing to it in d and the multiplicity of every formula in ∆ is the number of tails
emerging from it in d.
It is clear that sequents and doodles are in one-to-one correspondence.
Fact 4.2.2. Every sequent is represented by exactly one doodle and every doodle represents
exactly one sequent.
Using this simple correspondence we represent sequents in a graphical way.
Example 4.2.3. The following is a doodle over the set {p, q ∧ r,s, t,s} of formulae.
p q ∧ r s t s
The formulae p, q ∧ r,s occur negatively in the doodle, the formulae t and s positively.
The sequent represented is p, q ∧ r,s⇒ t,s,s.
This allows us to formulate the graphical counterpart of a cut between sequents in an
intuitive way as the result of connecting heads and tails of doodles.
Definition 4.2.4. Let A be a formula and let d1 and d2 be doodles such that A occurs
positively in d1 and negatively in d2. Then the cut between d1 and d2 on A is the doodle
arising from d1 and d2 by connecting one head of d1 pointing to A to one tail of d2 emerging
from A.
126
4.2. SEQUENT RULES IN PICTURES
Example 4.2.5. Let d1 be the doodle from Example 4.2.3 and let d2 be the doodle representing
the sequent s, p⇒ u. Then the cut between d1 and d2 on s is constructed the following
way. We start with the two doodles d1 and d2 as given in (4.1) below.
p q ∧ r s t s s p u (4.1)
p q ∧ r s t s p u (4.2)
p q ∧ r s t s p u (4.3)
Now we identify the occurrences of the cut formula s and connect one head of d1 pointing
to this formula to one tail of d2 emerging from it as in (4.2). Finally we ’yank the wire’, which
gives the doodle shown in (4.3). In this case we still have a head pointing to the formula s.
If this is not the case we also omit the formula.
Again it is clear that performing cuts on sequents corresponds to performing cuts on doodles.
Fact 4.2.6. If the doodles d1 and d2 correspond to the sequents Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, A and A,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2,
then the cut between d1 and d2 on A corresponds to the sequent Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2.
Similarly, we have a graphical analogue to applying Contraction to a sequent.
Definition 4.2.7. Let d be a doodle with at least two positive (resp. negative) occurrences
of the formula A. The right contraction (resp. left contraction) of d on A is the doodle arising
from d by identifying two heads pointing to A (resp. two tails emerging from A). The maximal
contraction of a doodle d is the result of identifying for every formula A all heads pointing to
A and all tails emerging from A.
Example 4.2.8. Let d be the doodle given in (4.3) above. Then the left contraction ofd on
the formula p is the doodle
p q ∧ r s t s u
where the superfluous occurrence of the formula p has been omitted. This is also the maximal
contraction of d.
Fact 4.2.9. If a doodle d corresponds to the sequent Γ⇒ ∆, A,A, then the right contraction
of d on A corresponds to the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, A. If the doodle d corresponds to the sequent
B,B,Σ⇒ Π, then the left contraction of d on B corresponds to the sequent B,Σ⇒ Π. If the
doodle d corresponds to the sequent Θ⇒ Ξ, then the maximal contraction of d corresponds to
the sequent Supp (Θ)⇒ Supp (Ξ).
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In order to formulate the graphical analogue of cuts between rules we need a notion
corresponding to variable elimination for a set of premisses. Of course doodles correspond to
sequents instead of premisses, and thus the following definition should be read with variable
elimination for a set of sequents in mind. For technical reasons we furthermore maximally
contract the resulting doodles.
Definition 4.2.10. Let D be a finite set of doodles and let p be a variable. Then the
p-elimination of D is the set D 	 p of doodles containing all maximal contractions of cuts
between doodles d1 and d2 on p for d1, d2 ∈ D and all doodles from D in which p does not
occur.
Example 4.2.11. We construct the p-elimination of the four doodles given in (4.4) below:
p q ∧ r s t s utus (4.4)
p q ∧ r s t s utus (4.5)
q ∧ r s s utus (4.6)
In a first step we connect the head pointing to the formula p to the tails emerging from p in
all possible ways, giving the doodles in (4.5). Then we maximally contract all the doodles, in
this case identifying the two heads pointing to the formula t. Together with omitting the now
superfluous instances of the formulae p and t this gives the doodles in (4.6).
Remark 4.2.12. Note that a variable p might still occur in the p-elimination of a set of doodles,
e.g. if it had two heads of the same doodle pointing at it. In our case this will not be a
problem, since this will not occur in the doodles we consider. The definition could be extended
to demand multiple cuts completely removing the variable p in this case, but this would
necessitate a in this case needless complication to avoid pathological cases as for the set of
doodles representing the sequents Γ⇒ ∆, p, p and p, p,Σ⇒ Π.
The connection with the notion of variable elimination for a set of premisses is as follows.
Lemma 4.2.13. Let P be a set of premisses and let Γ ⇒ ∆ be a sequent which does not
contain any variables occurring in the premisses P and such that Supp (Γ) = Γ and Supp (∆) =
∆. If D is the set of doodles corresponding to the sequents in P(Γ ⇒ ∆), then for every
variable p occurring in P the set D 	 p is the set of doodles corresponding to the sequents in
(P 	 p)(Γ⇒ ∆).
Proof. We first show that every sequent in (P 	 p)(Γ ⇒ ∆) is represented by a doodle in
D	 p. Let (Σ⇒ Π; 〈F1, F2〉) be a premiss from P 	 p and consider the corresponding sequent
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Γ F1 ,Σ⇒ Π,∆ F2 from (P 	 p)(Γ⇒ ∆). If the sequent is in P(Γ⇒ ∆), then the variable p
does not occur in it. Furthermore, we have a doodle d ∈ D corresponding to the sequent. But
since p does not occur in the doodle d we have d ∈ (D	 p) as well. Suppose on the other hand
that there are premisses (Σ1 ⇒ Π1, p; 〈G1, G2〉) and (p,Σ2 ⇒ Π2; 〈H1, H2〉) in P such that
(Σ⇒ Π; 〈F1, F2〉) = (Supp (Σ1,Σ2)⇒ Supp (Π1,Π2) ; 〈G1 ∪H1, G2 ∪H2〉) .
Then in D we have two doodles d1 and d2 corresponding to the two sequents
Γ G1 ,Σ1 ⇒ Π1, p,∆ G2 and Γ H1 , p,Σ2 ⇒ Π2,∆ H2 .
Thus the cut between the doodles d1 and d2 on p corresponds to the sequent
Supp (Γ G1 ,Σ1,Γ H2 ,Σ2)⇒ Supp (Π1,∆ G2 ,Π2,∆ H2)
which since Supp (Γ) = Γ and Supp (∆) = ∆ and since the variables in Γ⇒ ∆ do not occur in
Σi ⇒ Πi for i = 1, 2 is the same as the sequent
Γ G1∪H1 ,Supp (Σ1,Σ2)⇒ Supp (Π1,Π2) ,∆ G2∪H2 = Γ F1 ,Σ⇒ Π,∆ F2 .
Thus every sequent in (P 	 p)(Γ⇒ ∆) is represented by a doodle in D	 p. Similarly, it is not
too difficult to see that every doodle in D 	 p represents a sequent in (P 	 p)(Γ⇒ ∆).
We would like to extend the graphical representation to rules as well. But since doodles
correspond to sequents instead of premisses, we can only represent the premisses instantiated
with a particular context. This gives correspondence not directly to rules, but to proto rules
instead.
Definition 4.2.14. Let V be a set of variables and let F be a set of formulae such that no
variable from V occurs in a formula in F . A rule doodle with context in F and principal
formulae in Λ(V ) is a pair (D, d) where D is a set of doodles over F ∪ V and d is a doodle
over F ∪ Λ(V ). The doodles in D are the premisses and the doodle d is the conclusion of the
rule doodle. A rule doodle (D, d) corresponds to a proto rule R̂ for a rule R = P/Σ⇒ Π given
by the context Γ ⇒ ∆ if D is the set of doodles corresponding to the sequents in P(Γ⇒ ∆)
and d is the doodle corresponding to the sequent Γ,Σ⇒ Π,∆.
In the following we will only consider rule doodles where the conclusion is compatible with
the premisses in the sense that in the conclusion there is a head pointing to a formula in
the set F of context formulae if and only if in at least one of the premisses there is a head
pointing to the same formula, and similarly for tails emerging from formulae in F . To make
the construction of the formulae in the conclusion explicit when drawing rule doodles we
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represent these formulae by their parse trees or in prefix notation. Also, in the first case we
often draw the conclusion of a rule doodle at the bottom and its premisses at the top.
Example 4.2.15. The following are three rule doodles with contexts in the sets ∅, {r} and
{r, s} respectively. Conclusions are drawn thicker at the bottom and premisses at the top.

p

q

r

p
r ∧
p q
r s
For the sake of presentation one of the premisses in the last rule doodle is drawn dashed.
The rule doodles represent the canonical proto rules for the rules K2, R4 and ∧R given by the
contexts ⇒ , r ⇒ and r ⇒ s respectively.
Even though the context in rule doodles is explicit and thus rule doodles correspond only
to proto rules instead of rules, it is clear that every rule with context restrictions can be
represented by a rule doodle by encoding the context restrictions in the context of the canonical
proto rule and thus in the context of the rule doodle:
Lemma and Definition 4.2.16. Let R = P/Σ⇒ Π be a rule with restrictions and let R̂ be
the canonical proto rule for R given by the context Γ⇒ ∆ where
Γ := {C | C ∈ F1 for some 〈F1, F2〉 occurring in P}
∆ := {D | D ∈ F2 for some 〈F1, F2〉 occurring in P} .
Then there is a unique rule doodle corresponding to R̂. We call this the rule doodle for R.
Proof. The doodle (D, d) is constructed by taking D to be the set of (unique) doodles
corresponding to the sequents in P(Γ⇒ ∆) and d to be the (unique) doodle corresponding to
the sequent Γ,Σ⇒ Π,∆.
The analogue of a cut between rules now takes the following form.
Definition 4.2.17. Let (D1, d1) and (D2, d2) be two rule doodles with contexts in F1 resp.
F2 and principal formulae in Λ(V1) resp. Λ(V2) such that no variable occurs in a formula in F1
and in V2 or in a formula in F2 and in V1 and such that a formula ♥~p occurs positively in d1
and negatively in d2. Then the cut between (D1, d1) and (D2, d2) on ♥~p is the rule doodle
(D, d) with D := (D1 ∪D2)	 ~p and where d is the maximal contraction of the cut between
the doodles d1 and d2 on ♥~p.
While this definition might seem a bit cumbersome, when viewed as a graphical operation
a cut between rule doodles is very intuitive: we first identify the two occurrences of the cut
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formula and then simply pairwise connect all heads pointing to a variable of this formula with
all tails emerging from it to construct the new premisses. Analogously connecting heads and
tails for the cut formula itself yields the new conclusion.
Example 4.2.18. 1. We first consider a cut between two rule doodles for the rule K2 in
the sense of Lemma 4.2.16. Identifying the two instances of the cut formula r the two
rule doodles are

p

q

r

s

t
Now computing the cut between the two rules amounts to connecting heads and tails at
the node labelled with r and at its parent, giving the rule doodle

p

q

s

t
where the superfluous occurrence of r has been omitted.
2. Consider a cut between the rules K2 and R4. Again identifying the two occurrences of
the cut formula we have the two rule doodles on the left below, and connecting heads
and tails at the node labelled with p and its parent node and omitting the superfluous
nodes we obtain the rule doodle on the right below, which is easily seen to be the rule
doodle for the rule 41.
r 
r

s

t
r 
s

t
3. A cut between the two rules ∧L and ∧R is constructed in a graphical way by first
considering the two rule doodles
sr ∧
p q
r s
Connecting heads and tails at the nodes labelled with p and q and at their parent node
gives the diagram on the left below and finally contracting duplicate heads and tails
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to maximally contract the premisses and omitting the superflous nodes gives the rule
doodle on the right below.
sr ∧
p q
r s r s
The latter is easily identified as the rule doodle for the rule Rid.
Indeed, this procedure captures the construction of cuts between (proto) rules:
Lemma 4.2.19. Let R1 = P1/Σ1 ⇒ Π1,♥~p and R2 = P2/♥~p,Σ2 ⇒ Π2 be two rules and
let Θ ⇒ Ξ be a sequent such that the sets var (Θ⇒ Ξ) , var (Σ1 ⇒ Π1) , var (Σ2 ⇒ Π2) are
pairwise disjoint. Furthermore, for i = 1, 2 let (Di, di) be the rule doodle corresponding
to the proto rule for Ri given by the context Θ ⇒ Ξ. Then the cut between (D1, d1) and
(D2, d2) on ♥~p corresponds to the proto rule for the rule cut(R1, R2,♥~p) given by the context
Supp (Θ)⇒ Supp (Ξ).
Proof. Since for i = 1, 2 the rule doodle (Di, di) corresponds to the proto rule for Ri given
by Θ⇒ Ξ, the set D1 ∪D2 of doodles is the set of doodles corresponding to the sequents in
P1(Θ⇒ Ξ) ∪ P2(Θ⇒ Ξ) = (P1 ∪ P2)(Θ⇒ Ξ). Maximally contracting heads pointing to and
tails emerging from formulae in Θ,Ξ yields a set D′ of doodles corresponding to the sequents
in (P1 ∪ P2)(Supp (Θ)⇒ Supp (Ξ)). Thus by repeated applications of Lemma 4.2.13 the set
D := D′	 ~p is the set of doodles corresponding to the sequents in ((P1 ∪P2)	 ~p)(Supp (Θ)⇒
Supp (Ξ)). On the other hand, it is clear that the maximal contraction of the cut between
the doodles d1 and d2 on ♥~p corresponds to the sequent Supp (Θ) ,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ Supp (Ξ) ,Π1,Π2.
Thus writing d for this doodle the rule doodle (D, d) corresponds to the proto rule for the rule
cut(R1, R2,♥~p) given by the context Supp (Θ)⇒ Supp (Ξ).
Thus in order to construct a cut between two rules we may use the graphical tool to
construct the cut between the two rule doodles for the two rules. While the resulting rule
doodle corresponds to a proto rule instead of a rule, this proto rule in fact is the canonical
proto rule for the cut between the two rules and is easily turned into a rule by turning all
formulae occurring both in the premisses and the conclusion into context restrictions in the
obvious way.
Example 4.2.20. Continuing Example 4.2.18 we have:
1. Repeated cuts between the rule doodles for the rule K2 yield the rule doodles

p1
. . . 
pn

q
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which are easily seen to be rule doodles for the rules in the set {RKn | n ≥ 2}. By
construction, this rule set is principal cut closed.
2. Cutting the rule doodle for the rules Kn+1 with the rule doodle for the rule R4 yields
the rule doodles
r 
p1
. . . 
pn

q
for n ≥ 1. A second cut with the rule doodle for the rule R4 at first adds another tail
emerging from the context formula r, which is then identified with the original tail.
This gives the rule set {4n | n ≥ 0} which again by construction is principal cut closed.
3. Since the cut between the two rule doodles for the rules ∧R and ∧L yields the rule doodle
for the identity rule (see Example 4.2.18,3), the rule set {∧R,∧L} is principal-cut closed
already. Continuing in this fashion for the remaining propositional rules it is not hard
to show that the rule sets G[cim] are principal-cut closed.
In a similar vein we also have a graphical analogue to the notion of a contraction of a rule.
Definition 4.2.21. Let (D, d) be a rule doodle such that the formulae ♥~p and ♥~q both occur
positively (resp. negatively) in d. The right (resp. left) contraction of (D, d) on ♥~p and ♥~q is
the rule doodle given by (D′, d′) where D′ is constructed from D by renaming every occurrence
of a variable in ~q by the corresponding variable in ~p and identifying duplicate heads and tails,
and where d′ is the doodle constructed from d by renaming ♥~q to ♥~p and identifying duplicate
heads (resp. tails).
It is clear that this captures the notion of contractions of rules.
Lemma 4.2.22. Let R be a rule such that the formulae ♥~p and ♥~q occur both positively (resp.
negatively) in the principal formulae of R. If the rule doodle (D, d) corresponds to the proto
rule for R given by the context Γ⇒ ∆, then the right (resp. left) contraction of (D, d) on ♥~p
and ♥~q corresponds to the proto rule for ConR(R,♥~p,♥~q) (resp. ConL(R,♥~p,♥~q)) given by
the context Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Straightforward from the definitions.
Thus the contraction of a rule doodle for a rule R is the rule doodle for the contraction
of R. This gives us a way of graphically constructing a principal-cut closed and contraction
closed rule set: we alternate between adding the rules corresponding to cuts between rule
doodles and contractions of rule doodles to the rule set. In the easier cases the principal-cut
closure of a rule set is almost contraction closed already.
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(A1) ¬C> (A3) EA→ A
(A2) EA ∧ EB → E(A ∧B) (A4) EA→ CA
(A5) ¬C⊥
AELG1 := {(A1), (A2), (A3), (A4)} AELG2 := A1 ∪ {(A5)}
Table 4.2: The Hilbert-style axiomatisation for Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability.
Example 4.2.23. The rule doodle for the rule Kn+1 is given below left. In order to construct
the left contraction of this rule doodle on pn and pn+1 we first rename the variable pn+1
to pn, which yields the rule doodle in the middle. Finally identifying the tails emerging from
pn resp. pn gives the rule doodle on the right.

p1
· · · 
pn

pn+1

q

p1
· · · 
pn

q

p1
· · · 
pn

q
The resulting rule doodle is obviously a rule doodle for the rule Kn. Thus if we want to
construct a principal-cut and contraction closed rule set starting only with the ruleK2, then
we first add all the cuts as in Example 4.2.20 and then add the missing contraction K1. It is
then easy to see that the resulting rule set is principal-cut closed as well as contraction closed.
The more interesting case is that where adding contractions of rules necessitates closing the
rule set under principal-cuts again. The stronger systems of conditional logics considered in
the next chapter provide such an involved example. First we apply the graphical method to
some less involved examples.
Example 4.2.24 (c). We consider Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability [Elg97] and follow
[GR05] for the notation and axiomatisation. For the sake of presentation we restrict the
framework to only one agent. The extension to multiple agents is straightforward. The logic of
agency and ability is based on classical propositional logic with two additional unary modalities
E and C, where EA is read as “the agent brings it about that A” and CA is read as “the
agent is capable of realising A”. The Hilbert-style axiomatisations AELG1 and AELG2 for the
two logics L1 and L2 considered in [GR05] are given in Table 4.2. Converting the axioms into
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rules using the methods of Chapter 3 gives the rules
RA1 := {(⇒ p; C∅)}/Cp⇒
RA2 := {(q ⇒ p1; C∅), (q ⇒ p2; C∅), (p1, p2 ⇒ q; C∅)}/Ep1,Ep2 ⇒ Eq
RA3 := {(p⇒ ; Cid)}/Ep⇒
RA4 := {(p⇒ q; C∅), (q ⇒ p; C∅)}/Ep⇒ Cq
RA5 := {(p⇒ ; C∅)}/Cp⇒
The rule doodles for these rules are shown below.
C
p
E
p1
E
p2
E
q
r E
p
s E
p
C
q
C
p
Similar as in the case of the rules Kn repeated cuts on the rule doodle for the rule RA2 yield
the rule doodles
E
p1
· · · E
pn
E
q
for n ≥ 2. Call the rules corresponding to these doodles REn . Note that these rules are not
yet contraction closed, since the left contraction of the rule RE2 , i.e., the rule RE1 , can not be
constructed this way. But since contractions of rules preserve soundness of the rule set we
may simply add RE1 to our rule set. Now the cut of the rule doodle for the rule REn with the
rule doodle representing the rule RA3 as shown on the left below yields the rule doodle shown
on the right below, where tautologous premisses, i.e. doodles including circles, are omitted.
E
p1
· · · E
pn
E
q
r s E
p1
· · · E
pn
r s
Call the rule corresponding to this rule doodle RcEn . Similarly, a cut between the rule doodle
for a rule REn and the one for the rule RA4 gives the rule doodle below left, and a cut between
the rule doodles for the rules RA1 and RA4 gives the one below middle.
E
p1
· · · E
pn
C
q
E
p
E
p
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REn = {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C∅)} ∪ {(q ⇒ pk; C∅) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}/Ep1, . . . ,Epn ⇒ Eq
RcEn = {(p1, . . . , pn; Cid)}/Ep1, . . . ,Epn ⇒
RECn = {(p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q; C∅)} ∪ {(q ⇒ pk; C∅) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}/Ep1, . . . ,Epn ⇒ Cq
RE+ = { ⇒ p; C∅)}/Ep⇒
RA1 = {(⇒ p; C∅)}/Cp⇒
RA5 = {(p⇒ C∅)}/Cp⇒
RELG1 := {RA1, RE+} ∪ {REn | n ≥ 1} ∪ {RcEn | n ≥ 1} ∪ {RECn | n ≥ 1}
RELG2 := R1 ∪ {RA5}
Table 4.3: The rules and rule sets for Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability
Call the corresponding rules RECn and RE+ respectively. Analogously for the missing cut
between the rules RA5 and REC1 we would obtain the additional rule doodle shown above right,
but the rule represented by this rule doodle is easily seen to be subsumed by the rule RcE1 .
All the constructed rules and the resulting rule sets RELG1 and RELG2 are given in Table 4.3.
An inspection of the corresponding rule doodles shows that both rule sets are principal-cut
and contraction closed. Thus since all the rules are shallow by the methods of Chapter 2 we
obtain cut elimination and decidability in polynomial space, reproving the semantically driven
result for L2 in [SP08] in a purely syntactic way.
Proposition 4.2.25 (c). Let RELG1 and RELG2 be as defined in Table 4.3. Then for i = 1, 2
the rule set RELGi is equivalent to the axioms AELGi, the sequent system given by GcRELGiCon
has cut elimination and its derivability problem is inPspace. Thus the logics L1 and L2 are
decidable in polynomial space.
Proof. Equivalence of the rules and the axioms follows by construction. Since principal-cut
closure and contraction closure is easily verified the cut elimination result thus follows from
Theorem 2.4.16 and the complexity result follows using the methods of Section 2.7.
Example 4.2.26 (c). In a way similar to the previous example it is also possible to explicitly
construct the rules for the weak conditional logics considered at the end of the previous section
in a graphical fashion. In this case it is more convenient to present the formulae in prefix
notation instead of as parse trees and to stack them on top of each other. Moreover, for the
sake of readability we indicate equivalence of a number of variables by shading all the variables
and since the names of the variables are not important we simply replace them with dots.
Thus e.g. instead of drawing the rule
{(p1 ⇒ p2; C∅), (p2 ⇒ p1; C∅), (q1 ⇒ q2; C∅)} /p1  q1 ⇒ p2  q2
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corresponding to the axiom (CM) as shown below left we draw it as shown on the right.

p1 q1

p2 q2
 . .
 . .
In this presentation the axiom (CC) is translated (in the presence of the rule corresponding
to (CM)) into the rule doodle shown below left. A cut between this rule doodle and the rule
doodle corresponding to the axiom (CEM) is performed as shown below middle and right.
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
Since all the shaded variables are equivalent, we may simply draw one doodle pointing to the
whole block of variables instead of multiple copies of the doodle pointing to each variable. Then
again by cutting and contracting rule doodles it is not difficult to construct the rule doodles
given in Table 4.4. In particular, note that axiom (ID) translates into the doodle for RCKCEMID0,1 ,
axiom (CS) into the one for RCKCEMCS0,1 and axiom (MP) into that for RCKCEMCS1,0 . For any set
A ⊆ {(CM), (CC), (CN), (ID), (CEM), (MP), (CS)} with (CM), (CC), (CN) ∈ A we then obtain
the corresponding rule set as given in Table 4.5, where we denote the set A by concatenating
the axioms and abbreviate CMCCCN to CK. In the graphical representation it is now very easy
to see that these rule sets are principal-cut and contraction closed. Then as above we obtain
cut elimination and complexity results for all the logics considered. In particular, this gives a
graphical reconstruction of the rules sets for weak systems of conditional logic presented in
[Che80, PS08, PS09, PS10, PS11].
Proposition 4.2.27 (c). Let A ⊆ {(CEM), (CS), (ID), (MP)} and let RCKA be the correspond-
ing rule set as defined in Table 4.5. Then RCKA is equivalent to the axioms {(CN), (CM), (CC)}∪
A, the sequent system given by GcRCKACon has cut elimination and the derivability problem
for GcRCKA is in Pspace. 
Remark 4.2.28. In the presence of the rules corresponding to the axioms (MP) and (CS) the
rules RCKCEMCSn,m for n+m > 1 are actually derivable rules. Thus we might also omit these
rules and use the method given in Remark 2.4.18 to show cut elimination. In fact, the rule
sets given in [PS09, PS11] have this form.
137
CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCTION OF CUT-FREE SEQUENT SYSTEMS
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
RCKCEMn,m
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
RCKCEMIDn,m
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
r
s
RCKCEMCSn,m
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
 . .
...
...
...
 . .
r
s
RCKCEMCSIDn,m
Table 4.4: The rules for the weak conditional logics in their graphical representation. To
economise on notation we always take n to be the number of negative and m to be
the number of positive literals in the principal formulae.
RCK :={RCKCEMn,m | n ≥ 0, m = 1}
RCKID :={RCKCEMIDn,m | n ≥ 0, m = 1}
RCKCEM :={RCKCEMn,m | n ≥ 0, m ≥ 1}
RCKIDCEM :={RCKCEMIDn,m | n ≥ 0, m ≥ 1}
RCKMP :=RCK ∪ {RCKCEMCSn,m | n ≥ 1, m = 0}
RCKIDMP :=RCKID ∪ {RCKCEMCS | n ≥ 1, m = 0}
RCKCEMMP :={RCKCEMCSn,m | n+m ≥ 1}
RCKIDCEMMP :={RCKCEMCSIDn,m | n+m ≥ 1}
RCKCS :={RCKCEMCSn,m | n ≥ 0, m = 1}
RCKIDCS :={RCKCEMCSIDn,m | n ≥ 0, m = 1}
RCKCEMCS :={RCKCEMCSn,m | n ≥ 0, m ≥ 1}
RCKIDCEMCS :={RCKCEMCSIDn,m | n ≥ 0, m ≥ 1}
RCKMPCS :={RCKCEMCSn,m | n+m ≥ 1, m = 0, 1}
RCKIDMPCS :={RCKCEMCSIDn,m | n+m ≥ 1, m = 0, 1}
RCKCEMMPCS :={RCKCEMCSn,m | n+m ≥ 1}
RCKIDCEMMPCS :={RCKCEMCSIDn,m | n+m ≥ 1}
Table 4.5: The rule sets for weak systems of conditional logic.
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Remark 4.2.29. Using these rule sets it is also easy to show that all the logics considered have
the Craig interpolation property (see Section 5.5). For the conditional logics axiomatised by
{(CM), (CC)} or by {(CM), (CC), (ID)} this was done in [PS08, PS10]. For most of the other
conditional logics this also follows from [PS09, PS11], but was not mentioned there.
4.3 Notes
Principal-cut closure via Cut Trees. The method of constructing a principal-cut closed
rule set by absorbing cuts between rules into the rule set most probably was used countless
times in the construction of cut-free sequent calculi. But as a systematic procedure it seems not
to have been mentioned until [PS08, PS09, PS10, PS11]. Most of our results about small cut
trees representing the rules of shallow rule sets for modal logics based on classical propositional
logic were originally published in [LP11]. The most pressing open question related to this
method is of course whether the resulting rule set can be made contraction closed in a generic
and tractable way.
Problem 4.3.1. Is it possible to use cut trees to automatically construct a tractable, principal-
cut closed and contraction closed set of rules from a finite set of shallow rules?
Combined with the translation from axioms to rules in the classical case this would ensure
Pspace-decidability for every logic axiomatised by a finite number of non-iterative axioms
and thus give a negative answer to the above mentioned Open Problem 2.8.1 and reduce
the complexity bounds from [Lew74, tC05]. Failing this it would also be very interesting
to characterise the class of non-iterative axioms for which the principal-cut closure of the
translations into rules is contraction closed. Unfortunately, already relatively simple axiom
sets seem to produce rules whose principal-cut closure is not contraction closed. One example
would be the rule set consisting of the axioms of conditional logic CK together with the axioms
(CN′) ⊥ p, (SDA) (p ∨ q r)→ (p r) and (CA) (p r) ∧ (q r)→ (p ∨ q r),
which is the basis of the conditional logic S considered in [Che75]. In particular the combination
of the axioms (CC) and (CA) seems to be problematic. While this presents a big obstacle to
the extension of the automatic method to e.g. stronger conditional logics such as the logic S of
[Bur81] considered e.g. in [SPH10] and under the name PCL in [GGOS09], it also highlights the
need for tools to manually construct cut and contraction closed rule sets in case an automatic
construction does fail.
Sequent Rules in Pictures The graphical representation of sequent rules developed out
of the construction of sequent calculi for the stronger systems of conditional logic considered
in the next chapter and is inspired by a talk by Bob Coecke on diagrammatical calculi (see
e.g. [Coe10]). The general idea was reported in [LP12a].
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There seem to be not too many comparable notions in the literature, the most closely related
concept possibly being that of a logical tomograph in [Arn08]. This work is based on work by
Hertz [Her22, Her23, Her29] and develops the idea of using directed hypergraphs to display
the structural relations between atoms in a derivation in classical propositional logic. Sequents
with complex formulae are first presented as directed hypergraphs with a root, a directed
hyperarc emerging from vertices labelled with the formulae in the antecedent and pointing to
the root, and a directed hyperarc emerging from the root and pointing to vertices labelled
with the formulae in the succedent. Then successively for each node labelled with a complex
formula new nodes labelled with its immediate subformulae are introduced along with new
directed hyperarcs depending on the main connective of the formula. Thus e.g. for a vertex v
labelled with the formula A ∧B which is pointed to by a hyperarc two new vertices vA and
vB are introduced along with two new directed hyperarcs emerging from v and pointing to
vA resp. vB. Continuing in this fashion the directed hypergraph is turned into the logical
tomograph of the sequent, where the external vertices are labelled with propositional variables.
Since maximal strands in this directed hypergraph then correspond to the sequents in the
normal form of the original sequent in the sense of our Definition 3.2.6, this construction can
be used to give a graphical decision procedure for classical propositional logic. The main
difference of this work to our graphical representation of sequent rules is that the latter is
primarily used in the construction of a set of sequent rules and not in the actual derivation of
a sequent. Of course it is possible to present derivations in a calculus given by rule doodles as
sequences of sets of doodles on the underlying set of (parse trees of) formulae, where a set of
doodles results from its predecessor in the sequence by an application of a rule doodle. In this
way e.g. applications of the propositional rules correspond to certain processes of ’bending
and identifying the wires’. But it is not yet clear whether apart from the novelty value this
would be of any use.
Concerning other graphical representations considered in proof theory such as proof nets
[Gir87] or atomic flows [GG08] the main difference is that the main focus of these methods lies
on the investigation of the structure of a whole derivation or on the reduction of unnecessary
“bureaucracy”, while our method focusses on single rules and serves the much less ambitious
goal of providing a tool for the construction of cut-free calculi.
Examples. The logic of agency and ability considered in Example 4.2.24 was originally
introduced in [Elg97]. Subsequently in [GR05] it was discovered that the originally proposed
axiomatisation is not complete with respect to the given semantics, which led to the introduction
of the axiom (A5). Our logic L1 consists of the original axioms, the logic L2 is the one including
the additional axiom. Decidability and Pspace-complexity results for the logic L2 were shown
in [SP08] by interpreting the semantics in a coalgebraic framework and making use of the
there developed generic semantical methods. No sequent calculi seem to have been considered
for this logic yet.
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Most of the sequent calculi for the weak systems of conditional logic considered in this
chapter were known before. For the calculus for the logic CK see e.g. [Che75, Che80]. This
calculus and the extension with the axiom (ID) were also considered in [PS08, PS10], where the
calculi are moreover used to show that the logics have the Craig interpolation property. Further
extensions of the systems with combinations of the axioms (ID), (MP), (CEM) were given in
[PS09, PS11], where also cut elimination for these systems was shown using a generic syntactic
proof. Calculi for extensions of CK including the axiom (CMon) can be found in [SPH10].
There are furthermore a number of results about labelled sequent calculi for these weak systems.
A calculus for CK together with a complexity bound has been given in [OS01], and systems
for extensions with the axioms (ID), (MP), (CEM), (CS) or the combinations (ID) + (MP) or
(ID) + (CEM) were introduced in [OPS07], see also [Poz10]. Finally, nested sequent calculi for
extensions of CK with combinations of the axioms {(ID), (MP), (CEM)} or with the axioms
(ID) and (CSO) are presented in [AOP12]. These calculi yield Pspace-decision procedures for
the logics in question.
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In this chapter we will put to use most of the techniques developed in the earlier chapters and
construct cut-free sequent calculi and generic decision procedures for a number of stronger
systems of conditional logic. The logics we are going to consider are the conditional logics
introduced in [Lew73a] which can be characterised in terms of sphere semantics. The general
interest in these logics stems from the program of giving a formal analysis of the concept
of a counterfactual implication, i.e. an implication whose antecedent may be false. One of
the classical examples for this type of implication (taken from [Lew73a]) is the statement “If
kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over”. This kind of implication is not really captured
by the standard truth-functional material implications, since otherwise due to the fact that the
antecedent is false the statement “if kangaroos had no tails, they would not topple over” would
need to be true as well, contrary to intuition. On the other hand, a counterfactual implication
intuitively should not be antitone in the first argument, since otherwise the statement “if
kangaroos had three legs and no tails, they would topple over” would be implied by the first
statement. Over the years a number of logics have been proposed to formally capture the
notion of counterfactual implication. For an overview see e.g. [NC01, AC09]. In this context
we are not going to try to decide which of these systems gives the ’right’ analysis of this notion,
but we will take this plethora of logics as a suitable testing ground for our generic methods.
While these logics can be seen as extensions of the weak conditional logics considered in the
previous chapter, we will take the comparative possibility operator instead of the (weak or
strong) counterfactual implication as the basic operator, since it allows for a simpler and more
elegant axiomatisation of conditional logics with sphere semantics. On the other hand since
this operator and the (weak or strong) counterfactual implication are interdefinable we retain
full expressivity.
After recalling the basic notions and systems of conditional logics with sphere semantics
in Section 5.1 we will start by using the translation from Chapter 3 to turn the axioms into
rules with context restrictions. From these we will then construct saturated sets of rules using
the doodling calculus from the previous chapter, which also give rise to decision procedures
for the logics at hand. The main piece of work is done in Section 5.2, where the system
for the basic logic V4 is developed. In Section 5.3 we consider extensions of the logic with
additional axioms. By translating the operators the resulting decision procedures also give
rise to decision procedures for the logics formulated in the counterfactual implication, which
using the circuit presentation of formulae moreover can be seen to be of the same complexity.
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Nevertheless, we are also interested in explicit sequent systems for these languages. Thus in
Section 5.4 we incorporate the translation between the comparative plausibility operator and
the strong counterfactual implication into the rules by adapting the method of cuts between
rules and explicitly construct saturated sequent systems for the logics in the language with the
latter operator, which again yields decision procedures of matching complexity. Unfortunately,
in the case of the weak counterfactual implication the translation is slightly more involved,
so as we will see later we cannot use the same method as applied in the case of the strong
counterfactual implication. Finally in Section 5.5 we will use the cut-free sequent calculi to
show interpolation results for almost all the logics.
5.1 Conditional Logics with Sphere Semantics
We briefly recapitulate the basic notions for conditional logics with sphere semantics from
[Lew73a]. The set language of conditional logic is given by the set Λcond of connectives
including apart from the standard boolean connectives the (binary) comparative plausibility
operator 4 and the (binary) weak and strong counterfactual implications  and . To
save notation we adopt the notational convention that the boolean connectives bind more
strongly than the new connectives. Thus we sometimes reduce e.g. the brackets in the formula
((A ∨B) 4 (C ∧D)) to (A ∨B 4 C ∧D). We read the comparative plausibility operator in a
formula A 4 B as “formula A is at least as plausible as formula B” and the counterfactual
implications in A B and A B as “if A were the case then so would B”. The logics
considered are based on Lewis’ sphere semantics:
Definition 5.1.1. Given a set I of worlds, a system of spheres over I is a family $ of subsets
of I which is closed under unions and nonempty intersections and which is nested, i.e. for
every two sets S1 and S2 from $ we have S1 ⊆ S2 or S2 ⊆ S1. A sphere model then is a triple
I = (I, ($i)i∈I , pi) consisting of a set I of worlds, for every world i ∈ I an associated system of
spheres over I and a valuation pi : Var → P(I). The valuation pi is extended to a valuationJ.K : F(Λcond)→ P(I) on formulae by taking the standard clauses for the boolean connectives
in classical propositional logic together with the clauses
JA 4 BK := {i ∈ I | for all spheres S ∈ $i ( if S ∩ JBK 6= ∅ then S ∩ JAK 6= ∅)}JA BK := {i ∈ I | for some sphere S ∈ $i (S ∩ JAK 6= ∅ and S ⊆ JA→ BK)}JA BK := JA BK ∪ {i ∈ I | ⋃
S∈$i
S ∩ JAK = ∅}
for the conditional operators.
Intuitively, a system of spheres gives a measure of comparative similarity, worlds in a smaller
sphere being more similar to the actual world than those occurring only in larger spheres.
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(A 4 B)↔ ¬(A ∨B ¬A)
↔ (A ∨B ¬(A ∨B)) ∨ ¬(A ∨B ¬A)
(A B)↔ ¬(A ∧ ¬B 4 A ∧B)
↔ ¬(A ¬A) ∧ (A B)
(A B)↔ (⊥ 4 A) ∨ ¬(A ∧ ¬B 4 A ∧B)
↔ ((A A)→ (A B)) .
Table 5.1: The equivalences between the conditional connectives
Then a formula A 4 B states intuitively that for every B-world there is an A world which is
at least as similar to the actual world. Similarly, a formula A B states intuitively that A
is considered possible from the point of view of the actual world and that theA-worlds most
similar to the actual world are B-worlds as well. The interpretation for a formula A B is
similar, the only difference being that it is considered true also in case that A is not considered
possible from the point of view of the actual world.
A closer analysis of the truth conditions of the different connectives shows that they are
interdefinable using the equivalences given in Table 5.1. Thus we may equivalently formulate
conditional logics using either of the three connectives. In the following we will take conditional
logics L to be Λcond-logics based on classical propositional logic in the sense of Definition 2.1.5
and for a given conditional connective ∗ ∈ {4,,} we will write L∗ for the ∗-fragment of
L. The logics we are going to consider are defined in terms of classes of sphere models:
Definition 5.1.2. Let I = (I, ($i)i∈I , pi) be a sphere model. We say that I is
• normal if for every world i ∈ I we have ⋃S∈$i S 6= ∅
• totally reflexive if for every world i ∈ I we have i ∈ ⋃S∈$i S
• weakly centered if it is normal and for every world i ∈ I and nonempty sphere S ∈ $i we
have i ∈ S
• centered if for every world i ∈ I we have {i} ∈ $i
• absolute if for every two worlds i, j ∈ I we have $i = $j .
As usual, a formula A is universally valid in a sphere model I = (I, ($i)i∈I , pi) if it holds in
every world of I, that is if we have JAK = I, and it is universally valid in a class C of sphere
models if it is universally valid in every sphere model in C. We say that a logic L is the logic
of a class C of sphere models if every formula is a theorem of L iff it is universally valid in C.
Then the logics V,VN,VT,VW,VC,VA and VNA are defined via
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CPR
` B → A
` A 4 B
(CPA) (A 4 A ∨B) ∨ (B 4 A ∨B)
(TR) (A 4 B) ∧ (B 4 C)→ (A 4 C)
(CO) (A 4 B) ∨ (B 4 A)
(N) ¬(⊥ 4 >)
(T) (⊥ 4 ¬A)→ A
(W) (⊥ 4 ¬A) ∨ ¬(¬A 4 >)→ A
(C) (A 4 >) ∧ (> 4 A)→ A
(A1) (A 4 B)→ (⊥ 4 ¬(A 4 B))
(A2) ¬(A 4 B)→ (⊥ 4 (A 4 B))
AV4 := {(CPR), (CPA), (TR), (CO)}
AVN4 :=AV4 ∪ {(N)} AVT4 :=AV4 ∪ {(T)} AVW4 :=AV4 ∪ {(W)}
AVC4 :=AV4 ∪ {(C)} AVA4 :=AV4 ∪ {(A1), (A2)} AVNA4 :=AV4 ∪ {(N), (A1), (A2)}
Table 5.2: Hilbert-style axiomatisations for strong conditional logics formulated using 4
• V is the logic of the class of sphere models
• VN is the logic of the class of normal sphere models
• VT is the logic of the class of totally reflexive sphere models
• VW is the logic of the class of weakly centered sphere models
• VC is the logic of the class of centered sphere models
• VA is the logic of the class of absolute sphere models
• VNA is the logic of the class of normal and absolute sphere models.
If L is one of these logics, then we also say that a formula A is L-valid if A is a theorem of L
and write |=L A.
These logics are known to have sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatisations, see
[Lew73a, Chapter 6]. The equivalent axioms using only the comparative plausibility operator
are given in Table 5.2. Using semantical methods it has been established in [ FH94] that the
validity problem is Pspace-complete for the logics V,VN,VT and VC and coNP-
complete for the logics VA and VNA. Since the required resources in these proofs are
bounded by the number of subformulae of the input formula, and since the translations given
in Table 5.1 increase the number of subformulae only by a constant amount, these complexity
results carry over to the other languages as well.
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5.2 The Conditional Logic V
We will now use the methods of Chapters 3 and 4 to construct saturated sets of rules with
restrictions first for the logic V4 and then for its extensions. Note that the Hilbert-style
axiomatisation of V4 as given in Table 5.2 contains the rule CPR as well as axioms. But a
straightforward extension of the argument for the equivalence of a Hilbert system given by
a set of axioms and the sequent system given by the corresponding set of ground sequents
shows that we can translate this rule directly into the sequent rule
CPR {(q ⇒ p; C∅)}/ ⇒ p 4 q
(alternatively we could first show that the rule CPR is equivalent to the axiom A 4 (A ∧B)
using propositional reasoning and congruence, and then translate this axiom into the rule
CPR). Translating the remaining axioms (CPA), (TR) and (CO) into rules using the methods
from Section 3.2 yields the rules
CPA {(qi ⇒ p1, p2; C∅) | i = 1, 2} ∪ {(pi ⇒ qi; C∅) | i, j = 1, 2}/ ⇒ (p1 4 q1), (p2 4 q2)
TR {(p1 ⇒ r; C∅), (r ⇒ p1; C∅), (q2 ⇒ s; C∅), (s⇒ q2; C∅), (q1 ⇒ p2; C∅), (p2 ⇒ q1; C∅)}/
(p1 4 q1), (p2 4 q2)⇒ (r 4 s)
CO {(p1 ⇒ q2; C∅), (q2 ⇒ p2; C∅), (p2 ⇒ q1; C∅), (q1 ⇒ p2; C∅)}/ ⇒ (p1 4 q1), (p2 4 q2)
Now we make use of the graphical representation of rules as given in the last chapter. For
the sake of readability here again we draw the rule doodles in the more economic way seen in
Example 4.2.26 by moving the main connective of the formulae to the side and stacking the
formulae on top of each other. E.g. instead of drawing the figure on the left below we draw
the one on the right.
4
p q
4
r s 4 r s
4 p q
The rules for conditional logic V4 then correspond to the rule doodles shown in Figure 5.1.
Starting from these rule doodles we now apply the operations of cut (between rule doodles)
and contraction (of rule doodles) until we arrive at a saturated rule set, discarding superfluous
rule doodles in the process. Note that since all the rules are one-step rules, the rule sets
will be automatically context- and mixed-cut closed, and thus we only need to construct
a principal-cut and contraction closed rule set. In order to further demonstrate the use of
doodles in the construction we consider the steps in detail.
We start by constructing the cut between CPR and TR on the lowermost literal of TR.
Omitting the names of variables and marking the variables on which cuts are performed by
146
5.2. THE CONDITIONAL LOGIC V
4 p q
CPR 4 p1 q1
4 p2 q2
CPA
4 p1 q1
4 p2 q2
4 r s
TR
4 p1 q1
4 p2 q2
CO
Figure 5.1: The rule doodles corresponding to the translations of the axioms for V4
the symbol ∗ we obtain
4 ∗ ∗
4 . .
4 . .
 
4 ∗ ∗
4 . .
4 . .
 
4 ∗ ∗
4 . .
4 . .
Now yanking the wires, omitting loops (i.e. tautologous premisses) and eliminating superfluous
nodes gives the simple rule shown below left. In a similar fashion performing the cut on the
other negative literal of TR we construct the rule in the middle below, and performing a cut
between these two rules yields the rule Mon4 shown on the right.
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
Mon4
This last rule is particularly useful, since it allows us to greatly simplify the rule set by
replacing each rule with its monotone version. This is done by performing cuts between Mon4
and the rules CPA,CO and TR, giving the rules CPAm,COm and TRm shown below.
4 . .
4 . .
CPAm
4 . .
4 . .
COm
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
TRm
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Since each of the original rules is subsumed by their monotone version we may simply omit the
original rules from the rule set. Similarly, the new rule COm is subsumed by the rule CPAm,
since missing heads of the premisses may be added by weakening. Thus we may omit the
former rule as well and continue with the rule set {CPR,Mon4,CPAm,TRm}. The next step
is to construct a cut between TRm and CPAm as shown on the left and middle below (again
we mark the variables on which cuts are performed by ∗), followed by a contraction on the
two positive literals of the resulting rule, giving the rule shown on the right. Let us write R1,1
for this rule.
4 . .
4 . .
4 * *
4 . .
 
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
 4 . .
4 . .
R1,1
Again, since the rule R1,1 subsumes the rule Mon4 we omit the latter rule from the rule set.
Now constructing cuts between TRm and the new rule R1,1 on the negative literals of TR
m
yields the rule on the left below, which we may draw equivalently as shown on the right and
which we call R2,1. Note that this rule subsumes the rule TR
m.
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
R2,1
Performing cuts between two instances of this rule and the rule CPAm as shown on the left
below (rotated) and contracting the two negative literals in the resulting rule gives the rule
R1,2 shown on the right below.
4
.
.
4
.
.
4
∗
∗
4
∗
∗
4
.
.
4
.
.
4 . .
4 . .
4 . .
R1,2
Now we are almost done. The two rules R2,1 and R1,2 will be the building blocks of our rule
set. It is now useful to visualise the rule doodles three dimensionally in a T-shape with the
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r1
s1
r2
s2
p1
q1
r1
s1
p1
q1
p2
q2
r1
s1
r2
s2
· · ·
· · ·
rn
sn
p1
q1
p2
q2
...
...
pm−1
qm−1
pm
qm
Figure 5.2: The rules for the logic V4 in graphical representation. The rules R1,2 and R2,1 are
shown on the left and the general rule Rm,n is shown on the right.
positive literals in the top bar and the negative literals in the stem of the T. Furthermore,
since this implicitly encodes the principal formulae, we omit the nodes labelled with 4 and
the corresponding doodle. Thus e.g. instead of drawing the figure on the left below we draw
the one on the right.
4
p2
q2
4
p1
q1
4
r
s
p1
q1
p2
q2
r
s
Then the rules R1,2 and R2,1 are drawn as shown on the left in Figure 5.2. Now repeatedly
cutting instances of the rule R1,2 yields for n ≥ 2 a rule R1,n with n positive literals and one
negative literal in the principal formulae. Similarly, cutting instances of R2,1 on the lowermost
negative literals yields for m ≥ 2 a rule Rm,1 with m negative literals and one positive literal
in the principal formulae. Now cutting these two rules on the negative literal of the former
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and the positive literal of the latter gives the rule Rm,n with m negative and n positive literals
in the principal formulae as shown in Figure 5.2 on the right. Here in order to enhance
readability we draw some doodles with a head pointing to another doodle instead of drawing
heads pointing to all the formulae occurring positively in the latter. The following definition
captures these rules in non-graphical notation.
Definition 5.2.1. For m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 the rule Rm,n is defined as the rule Pm,n/Σm ⇒ Πn
where
Pm,n := {(sk ⇒ q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rn; C∅) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}
∪ {(pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, r1, . . . , rn; C∅) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
Σm ⇒ Πn := (p1 4 q1), . . . , (pm 4 qm)⇒ (r1 4 s1), . . . , (rn 4 sn) .
Furthermore, define RV4 := {Rm,n | m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1}.
The rules in RV4 are sound for the logic V4 by construction, and since they subsume each
of the original rules we get completeness (with Cut) as well. This can also be seen directly.
Theorem 5.2.2 (c). The sequent calculus GcRV4CutCon is sound and complete for conditional
logic V4.
Proof. For soundness we show that if Σ⇒ Π is derivable in GcRV4CutCon, then the formula∧
Σ→ ∨Π is valid in all models of V4. As usual this follows from showing that whenever
for every premiss Γ⇒ ∆ of an application of a rule in GcRV4CutCon the formula
∧
Γ→ ∨∆
is valid in a model of V4, then so is the conclusion of this application. The proof for the
propositional rules as well as for Cut and Con is standard.
So suppose that for some m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 the last applied rule was Rm,n, with conclusion
(A1 4 B1), . . . , (Am 4 Bm)⇒ (C1 4 D1), . . . , (Cn 4 Dn) and premisses
{Dk ⇒ B1, . . . , Bm, C1, . . . , Cn | 1 ≤ k ≤ n} ∪ {Ak ⇒ B1, . . . , Bk−1, C1, . . . , Cn | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
Furthermore, suppose all the premisses are V4-valid. Let I = (I, ($i)i∈I , pi) be a sphere
model and take an arbitrary world i ∈ I. We need to show that the formula ∧mk=1(Ak 4
Bk) →
∨m
`=1(C` 4 D`) holds at i. So suppose i ∈ JAk 4 BkK for all k ≤ m and that for
a k ≤ n we have i /∈ JC` 4 D`K for all ` with 1 ≤ ` ≤ n and ` 6= k. If ⋃ $i ∩ JDkK = ∅,
then we have i ∈ JCk 4 DkK and are done. In particular, this is the case if ⋃ $i = ∅.
Otherwise, choose a sphere S ∈ $i and a world j ∈ S ∩ JDkK. Since the premisses of
the rule application are V4-valid, we have |=V4 Dk →
∨m
`=1B` ∨
∨n
`=1C`, which gives
j ∈ ⋃m`=1 JB`K ∪ ⋃n`=1 JC`K. Thus j ∈ ⋃n`=1 JC`K or j ∈ JB`K for some ` ≤ m. In the latter
case, since i ∈ JA` 4 B`K we find a j2 ∈ S ∩ JA`K, and since |=V4 A` → ∨`−1`′=1B`′ ∨∨n`′=1C`′
we find a world j2 ∈
⋃`−1
`′=1 JB`′K ∪ ⋃n`′=1 JC`′K. Continuing like this we find a world j′ ∈ I
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with j′ ∈ S ∩⋃n`=1 JC`K. Now if j′ /∈ JCkK, then there is a ` 6= k with j′ ∈ JC`K. But since
i /∈ JC` 4 D`K there is a sphere S′ ∈ $i with S′ $ S and S′ ∩ JD`K 6= ∅ and S′ ∩ JC`K = ∅. As
above we find a world j′′ ∈ S′∩⋃nt=1 JCtK = (S′∩⋃nt=1 JCtK)rJC`K. Repeating the argument we
finally obtain a sphere S′′ ∈ $i with ∅ 6= S′′∩
⋃n
`=1 JC`K = S′′∩ JCkK, and since by construction
S′′ ⊆ S we have i ∈ JCk 4 DkK. Thus the formula ∧mk=1(Ak 4 Bk)→ ∨m`=1(C` 4 D`) holds at
world i.
For completeness by the completeness result for HcAV4 in [Lew73a, Chapter 6] it suffices
to show that all axioms and rules ofHcAV4 are derivable in GcRV4CutCon. But this is easy:
rule CPR is derived using R0,1, axioms (CPA) and (CO) using rule R0,2 and axiom (TR) using
rule R2,1.
Furthermore, almost by construction we obtain saturation of the rule set.
Theorem 5.2.3 (c). The rule set GcRV4 is saturated.
Proof. The rules in GcRV4 are all shallow rules and thus automatically mixed- and context-cut
closed. Furthermore, since the rule set Gc is saturated (see Example 2.4.14) and since the rules
in RV4 mention only the conditional connectives, we only need to check principal-cut closure
and contraction closure for the rules inRV4 . For contraction closure it is fairly obvious from
the graphical representation of the rules that the right contraction of a rule Rm,n+1 and the
left contraction of a rule Rm+1,n are subsumed by the rule Rm,n. The main idea for showing
that the rule set RV4 is principal-cut closed is to show that cuts between the rules R2,1 and
R1,2 of the form as shown in Figure 5.3 top left and middle are subsumed by a cut of the form
shown on the top right. But this can be seen easily by weakening the appropriate premiss.
Since a rule Rm,n can be viewed as the result of performing cuts between m− 1 instances of
R2,1 and n− 1 instances of R1,2, we can use this to permute all the instances of R1,2 in a cut
between two rules Rm,n and Rk,` to the top. Moreover, cuts between two instances of the rule
R2,1 of the form shown in Figure 5.3 bottom left are similarly easily seen to be subsumed by
cuts of the form shown on the right. We use this to successively permute instances of R2,1
so that cuts are only performed on the lowest negative literal. Intuitively this amounts to
’straightening the stem of the T’. Since multiple cuts between the rules R2,1 and R1,2 of this
form are exactly the rules in RV4 , this shows that a cut between two rules Rm,n and Rk,` is
subsumed by the rule Rm+k−1,n+`−1.
It is worth noting that the proof of Theorem 5.2.3 also shows that the cut closure of a small
set of rules generating all the rules in RV4 is contraction closed.
Corollary 5.2.4 (c). Let R′V4 := {R0,1,R1,1,R2,1,R1,2}. Then GcR′V4CutCon is sound and
complete for V4 and the rule set cc
(
R′V4
)
is contraction closed.
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Figure 5.3: Straightening the rules in the proof of Theorem 5.2.3
Proof. Soundness and completeness for V4 follow from the proof of Theorem 5.2.2. Contraction
closure of the cut closure follows by bringing cuts between rules in the form corresponding to
rules in RV4 as in the proof of Theorem 5.2.3 and using contraction closure of RV4 .
Thus making use of either the generic cut elimination theorem and decision procedures from
Chapter 2 for RV4 or the results about small representations of rules in the cut closure of
R′V4 we have cut elimination and a complexity result for V4.
Corollary 5.2.5 (c). The rule set GcRV4Con has cut elimination and thus the validity problem
for V4 is in Pspace. More precisely, it is solvable in space polynomial in the circuit size of
the input.
Proof. Since the rule set is saturated, Theorem 2.4.16 yields cut elimination. Furthermore, it is
not hard to see that the rule set RV4 is tractable. Thus using Corollary 2.7.9 and the fact that
GcRV4CutCon is sound and complete for V4 we obtain the complexity result. Equivalently,
the latter result follows from Corollaries 4.1.21 and 5.2.4 using the representation of rules in
the cut closure of R′V4 as small cut trees.
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Remark 5.2.6. In the spirit of [Sch07] we may now also use the translation from rules to
axioms to give an alternative axiomatisation for the logic V4. Since the two rules R0,1 and
R2,2 generate all the rules in RV4 using cuts and contractions, it suffices to translate these
two rules into axioms. Instead of using the translation from Section 3.3 in this case due to the
relatively simple structure of the premisses it is easier to translate the rules directly. We do
this by identifying a variable q which occurs in only one premiss and substitute the variable
according to this premiss. For the rule R0,1 we have the premiss q ⇒ p and the conclusion
p 4 q, and it is clear that by substituting p ∧ r for q we force the implication p ∧ r → p of the
premiss and obtain the equivalent axiom (p ∧ r) p. For the rule R2,2 we apply the same
method and obtain the equivalent axiom
((r1∨r2)∧t1 4 q1)∧((r1∨r2)∧t2 4 q2)→ (r1 4 (r1∨r2∨q1∨q2)∧u1)∨(r2 4 (r1∨r2∨q1∨q2)∧u2) .
While the Hilbert-system given by these two axioms then is sound and complete for V4, the
original axiomatisation of course is slightly superior in terms of readability and intuitiveness.
5.3 Extensions of V
We now extend the results of the previous section to the extensions of the logic V mentioned in
Section 5.1. The logics VN,VT,VW,VC,VA and VNA arise by extending the axiomatisation
of V with additional axioms from
(N) ¬(⊥ 4 >) (C) ((A 4 >) ∧ (> 4 A))→ A
(T) (⊥ 4 ¬A)→ A (A1) (A 4 B)→ (⊥ 4 ¬(A 4 B))
(W) ((⊥ 4 ¬A) ∨ ¬(¬A 4 >))→ A (A2) ¬(A 4 B)→ (⊥ 4 (A 4 B))
in the way as given in Table 5.2, which we repeat here for convenience:
AVN4 :=AV4 ∪ {(N)} AVT4 :=AV4 ∪ {(T)} AVW4 :=AV4 ∪ {(W)}
AVC4 :=AV4 ∪ {(C)} AVA4 :=AV4 ∪ {(A1), (A2)} AVNA4 :=AV4 ∪ {(N), (A1), (A2)}
Note that apart from the axioms (A1) and (A2) all the axioms are non-iterative. The axioms
(N) and (T) are already translatable clauses in the sense of Definition 3.2.9 extended as by
Remark 3.2.11. Thus we can translate them immediately using the methods of Chapter 3.
This yields the two rules
RN := {(p⇒ ; C∅), (⇒ q; C∅)}/(p 4 q)⇒
RT := {(p⇒ ; C∅), (⇒ q; Cid}/(p 4 q)⇒ .
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RN := {(p⇒ ; C∅), (⇒ q; C∅)}/(p 4 q)⇒
RT := {(p⇒ ; C∅), (⇒ q; Cid}/(p 4 q)⇒ .
RW := {(⇒ p; Cid), (⇒ q; C∅)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q)
RC := {(p⇒ ; Cid), (⇒ q; C∅)}/(p 4 q)⇒ .
RA := {(p⇒ ; C∅), (q ⇒ ; CVA)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q)
Table 5.3: The translations of the additional axioms for extensions of V4
The axioms (W) and (C) can be simplified first. By propositional reasoning adding axiom (W)
is equivalent to adding axiom (T) and the translatable clause
(W′) ¬(¬A 4 >)→ A .
Furthermore, since using rule CPR the formula (> 4 A) is derivable in V for every formula A,
we may replace axiom (C) with the translatable clause
(C′) (A 4 >)→ A .
Translating these two axioms into rules then yields the rules
RW := {(⇒ p; Cid), (⇒ q; C∅)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q)
RC := {(p⇒ ; Cid), (⇒ q; C∅)}/(p 4 q)⇒ .
For the axioms (A1) and (A2) the translation is not quite as straightforward. But using
methods as in the case of the axioms for S5 we obtain the rule
RA := {(p⇒ ; C∅), (q ⇒ ; CVA)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q)
where CVA is the context restriction 〈{r 4 s}, {r 4 s}〉. The details of the construction are
given below. These newly constructed rules are summarised in Table 5.3. Then by construction
we obtain soundness and completeness of the sequent calculi with the cut rule.
Proposition 5.3.1 (c). The following calculi are sound and complete for the specified logics:
GcRV4RNCutCon for VN4 GcRV4RTCutCon for VT4
GcRV4RTRWCutCon for VW4 GcRV4RCCutCon for VC4
GcRV4RACutCon for VA4 GcRV4RNRACutCon for VNA4
Proof. From the completeness results in [Lew73a, Chapter 6], by first translating the axioms
given there into the language using only the comparative plausibility operator using the
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equivalences given in Table 5.1 we obtain soundness and completeness of the Hilbert-systems
as specified in Table 5.2. Then reasoning as above and using Corollary 3.2.26 we can show
that the constructed rules are equivalent to the axioms over RV4Mon4, where Mon4 {(p⇒
r; C∅), (s⇒ q; C∅)}/(p 4 q)⇒ (r 4 s) is the rule constructed on page 147. Since this rule is
subsumed by the rule R1,1 from RV4 , the constructed rules evidently are equivalent to the
axioms also over RV4 . This gives the result for the systems not including the rule RA.
For the systems including the rule RA we first show that adding both axioms (A1) and (A2)
is equivalent over RV4 to adding the ω-set
n∧
i=1
(ri 4 si) ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uj)→
⊥ 4 ¬ n∧
i=1
(ri 4 si) ∨
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uj)
 | n,m ≥ 0

for the axiom
(A) (r 4 s) ∧ ¬(t 4 u)→ (⊥ 4 ¬(r 4 s) ∨ (t 4 u)) .
For the one direction it is clear that both (A1) and (A2) are logically equivalent (modulo
injective renaming) to formulae in the ω-set. For the other direction, if we have axioms (A1)
and (A2), then we can derive for every i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m the formulae
(ri 4 si)→ (⊥ 4 ¬(ri 4 si)) and ¬(tj 4 uj)→ (⊥ 4 (tj 4 uj))
and thus also the formulae
n∧
i=1
(ri 4 si) ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uj)→ (⊥ 4 ¬(ri 4 si))
and
n∧
i=1
(ri 4 si) ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uj)→ (⊥ 4 (tj 4 uj)) .
Thus by propositional reasoning we can derive the formula
n∧
i=1
(ri 4 si) ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uj)→
n∧
i=1
(⊥ 4 ¬(ri 4 si)) ∧
m∧
j=1
(⊥ 4 (tj 4 uj)) .
On the other hand it is not too hard to see that in GcRV4 we can derive for all formulae
A,B1, . . . , Bk the equivalence
∧k
i=1(A 4 Bi) ↔ (A 4
∨k
i=1Bi), and thus we can derive the
formula
n∧
i=1
(ri 4 si) ∧ ¬
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uj)→
⊥ 4 n∨
i=1
¬(ri 4 si) ∨
m∨
j=1
(tj 4 uu)

which by standard propositional reasoning is equivalent to the formula (A)i,j in the ω-set for
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the axiom (A). Now by the translation of Chapter 3 the ω-set for the axiom (A) is translated
into the rule RA. Thus using Theorem 3.2.30 the latter is equivalent over RV4 to the ω set for
(A), and thus also to the two axioms (A1) and (A2).
Since all the additional rules contain at most one formula in their principal formulae, the re-
sults about the representations of the rules in the cut closure as small cut trees straightforwardly
yield decidability and complexity results.
Theorem 5.3.2 (c). The validity problem for each of the logics VN4,VT4,VW4,VC4 is in
Pspace. The validity problem for the logics VA4 and VNA4 is in Exptime.
Proof. The result for the logics without absoluteness follows directly since by Corollary 5.2.4
the rule set cc
(
R′V4
)
is contraction closed, and thus by Corollary 4.1.30 the cut closures
of extensions of R′V4 with rules from RN,RT,RW,RC are contraction closed (and therefore
saturated) as well. For the logics involving absoluteness Corollary 4.1.30 only yields contraction
closure of the cut closure of the sets R′V4 ∪{RA} resp. R′V4 ∪{RN,RA}. But in these cases since
the only restrictions occurring in the rules areC∅ and CVA, it is straightforward to check that
the cut closure is mixed- and context-cut closed as well. Now Lemma 4.1.7 and Corollary 4.1.21
resp. Corollary 4.1.20 yield the complexity bounds.
For the logics V4,VN4,VT4,VW4 and VC4 the Pspace-complexity result given in the
previous theorem resp. Corollary 5.2.5 is optimal. This can be seen by reduction from the
validity problem for the standard modal logics K,D or T, which are embedded into the logic
at hand using the translation ♦p↔ (p 4 >), see [Lew73a, Chapter 6].
While Theorem 5.3.2 gives us decision procedures and complexity bounds for the extensions
of V4 without having to explicitly construct cut-free sequent calculi, it is now not too difficult
to do so by simply computing cuts between rules in RV4 and the additional rules. Since a
cut between a rule Rm,n and the rule RN gives the rule Rm,0 in case n = 1 and is subsumed
by the rule Rm,n−1 in case n > 1, for the logic VN4 it suffices to add all the rules Rm,0 for
m ≥ 1 to the rule set. A cut between a rule Rm,n and the rule RT on the other hand deletes
all the heads pointing to the first argument of one positive literal of Rm,n and replaces the
tails emerging from its second argument by the context. Thus in case n > 1 this rule is again
subsumed by the rule Rm,n−1. In case n = 1 we need to add the constructed rule Tm to the
rule set. For VW4 and VC4 observe that a cut between the rule RW resp. RC and the rule
R1,1 yields the rules
RW2 := {(⇒ p; Cid)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q)
RC2 := {(p⇒ ; Cid), (⇒ q; Cid)}/(p 4 q)⇒
which subsume the rules RW and RC respectively. Cutting RW2 with Rm,n has the effect of
replacing the antecedent of one negative literal with the context in all premisses and deleting
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Σm ⇒ Πn := (p1 4 q1), . . . , (pm 4 qm)⇒ (r1 4 s1), . . . , (rn 4 sn)
Tm := PTm/Σm ⇒ Π0 where
PTm :=
{(pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1; C∅) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
∪ {(⇒ q1, . . . , qm; Cid)}
Wm,n := PWm,n/Σm ⇒ Πn where
PWm,n :=
{(pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, r1, . . . , rn; C∅) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
∪{(⇒ q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rm; Cid)}
Am,n := PAm,n/Σm ⇒ Πn where
PAm,n :=
{(sk ⇒ q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rn; CVA) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}
∪ {(pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, r1, . . . , rn; CVA) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
RW2 := {(⇒ p; Cid)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q)
RC2 := {(p⇒ ; Cid), (⇒ q; Cid)}/(p 4 q)⇒
RVN4 := {Rm,n | m+ n ≥ 1} RVC4 := RV4 ∪ {RW2,RC2}
RVT4 := RV4 ∪ {Tm | m ≥ 1} RVA4 := {Am,n | m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1}
RVW4 := RV4 ∪ {Wm,n | m+ n ≥ 1} RVNA4 := {Am,n | m+ n ≥ 1}
Table 5.4: The rules and rule sets for extensions of V4.
all doodles pointing to its succedent. For VC4 note that a cut between RC2 and R0,2 yields
the rule RW2. For VA4 similar to the case of VW4 a cut between a rule Rm,n and the rule RA
on the uppermost negative literal of the former in effect deletes this literal from the conclusion
and changes the context restriction in every premiss to CVA. The new rules for VT4,VW4 and
VA4 in non-graphical notation and the resulting rule sets are given in the following definition.
Definition 5.3.3. For m,n ∈ N the rules Tm,Wm,n,Am,n,RW2,RC2 as well as the rule sets
RL for L ∈ {VN4,VT4,VW4,VC4,VA4,VNA4} are defined as in Table 5.4.
Note that in the case of VC4 we arrived in a systematic and purely syntactic way at the
sequent system corresponding to the tableau system given in [Gen92]. Again all the rule sets
are sound for the respective logics by construction, but as the next lemma shows this can also
be seen directly.
Lemma 5.3.4 (c). Let L be a logic in {VN4,VT4,VW4,VC4,VA4,VNA4}. Then the
sequent system given by GcRLCon is sound for L.
Proof. Again we show soundness of the rule sets by showing that whenever all premisses of an
application of a rule from the rule set are valid in the corresponding class of sphere models,
then so is its conclusion. For the rules in RV4 see Theorem 5.2.2. The proofs for the additional
rules are all similar to the case for RV4 .
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For RVN4 : Assume that for m > 0 the premisses of an application of the rule Rm,0 are
VN4-valid. Then for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m we have |=VN4 Ak →
∨k−1
`=1 B` and moreover we
have |=VN4
∨m
`=1B`. Suppose that I is a normal sphere model, i.e., for every world i ∈ I we
have
⋃
$i 6= ∅, and take an arbitrary world i ∈ I. We need to show that i ∈ J¬∧m`=1(A` 4 B`)K.
Assume on the contrary that i ∈ JA` 4 B`K for every ` ≤ m and take a nonempty sphere
S ∈ $i. Since
∨m
`=1B` is VN4-valid, and since S is nonempty, there is a world i1 ∈ S with
i1 ∈
⋃m
`=1 JB`K and thus we find an index k1 such that i1 ∈ JBk1K. But since by assumption
i ∈ JAk1 4 Bk1K we find a world i2 ∈ S such that i2 ∈ JAk1K. On the other hand we have
|=VN4 Ak1 →
∨k1−1
`=1 B` and thus we obtain i2 ∈ JBk2K for an index k2 with k2 < k1. Continuing
like this after at most m steps we find a world j with j ∈ S ∩ JA1K in contradiction to the fact
that A1 → ⊥ is VN4-valid. Thus we have i /∈ JA` 4 B`K for some ` ≤ m.
For RVT4 : Suppose that the premisses of an application of the rule Tm are VT4-valid.
Then again for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m we have |=VT4 Ak →
∨k−1
`=1 B` and furthermore
|=VT4
∧
Γ→ ∨∆∨∨m`=1B`. Now let I be totally reflexive, i.e., for every world i ∈ I we have
i ∈ ⋃ $i. Then for any world i ∈ I we have i ∈ J∧Γ→ ∨∆K or i ∈ J∨m`=1B`K. In the former
case we also have i ∈ J∧Γ ∧∧m`=1(A` 4 B`)→ ∨∆K and are done. In the latter case since I
is totally reflexive we can choose a sphere S ∈ $i with i ∈ S. Now the same proof as in the
case for VN4 above shows that for some ` ≤ m we have i /∈ JA` 4 B`K.
For RVW4 : If for some m,n ≥ 0 the premisses of an application of the rule Wm,n are valid,
we have
|=VW4
∧
Γ→
m∨
k=1
Bk ∨
n∨
k=1
Ck ∨
∨
∆
and furthermore for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m we have
|=VW4 Ak →
k−1∨
`=1
B` ∨
n∨
`=1
C` .
Now suppose that the sphere model I is weakly centered, i.e., for every world i ∈ I there is a
sphere S ∈ $i with S 6= ∅ and for every sphere S ∈ $i with S 6= ∅ we have i ∈ S. Now take an
arbitrary world i ∈ I. Again we need to show that
i ∈
t∧
Γ ∧
m∧
k=1
(Ak 4 Bk)→
n∨
k=1
(Ck 4 Dk) ∨
∨
∆
|
.
By assumption we have i ∈ J∧Γ→ ∨mk=1Bk ∨∨nk=1Ck ∨∨∆K. Then we have either i /∈⋃m
`=1 JB`K ∪ ⋃n`=1 JC`K and are done since then i ∈ J∧Γ→ ∨∆K; or we have i ∈ JC`K for
some ` with 1 ≤ ` ≤ n and are done since the world i is contained in every non-empty
sphere S ∈ $i and hence i ∈ JCk 4 DkK; or we have i ∈ JBkK for some k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
In the latter case we fix such a k and use the fact that I is weakly centered to choose
a non-empty sphere S ∈ $i. Then i ∈ S. Again, for the sake of contradiction assume
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that i /∈ J∧mk=1(Ak 4 Bk)→ ∨nk=1(Ck 4 Dk)K. Then in particular for every k ≤ m we have
i ∈ JAk 4 BkK and for every k ≤ n we have i /∈ JCk 4 DkK. Then since i ∈ JBkK there is a
world i1 ∈ S∩JAkK. Since |=VW4 Ak → ∨k−1`=1 B`∨∨n`=1C` we have i1 ∈ ⋃k−1`=1 JB`K∪⋃n`=1 JC`K.
Repeating the argument at most k times yields a world j ∈ S ∩⋃n`=1 JC`K. Choose k1 with
j ∈ JCk1K. Since by assumption i /∈ JCk1 4 Dk1K, there is a sphere S′ $ S with S′ ∩ JCk1K = ∅
and S′ ∩ JDk1K 6= ∅. Since I is weakly centered again we have i ∈ S′. Now repeating the whole
argument with the sphere S′ instead of S gives a sphere S′′ $ S′ with S′′∩ (JCk1K∪ JCk2K) = ∅.
Continuing like this after at most n repetitions we arrive at a sphere S′′′ with S ∩ JCkK = ∅ for
every k ≤ n. But now a final iteration of the first part of the argument yields S′′′∩⋃n`=1 JC`K 6= ∅,
a contradiction.
For RVC4 : Since every centered sphere model is also normal, and since the rule RW2 is the
same as the rule W1,0, we have soundness of the rule RW2 as above. For rule RC2 suppose
on the other hand that |=VC4
∧
Γ ∧A→ ∨∆ and |=VC4 ∧Γ→ B ∨∨∆. Then since I is a
centered sphere model for all i ∈ I we have {i} ∈ $i, and for i ∈ I obviously {i} is the smallest
sphere in $i. We need to show that i ∈ J∧Γ ∧ (A 4 B)→ ∆K. If i ∈ J∧Γ⇒ ∨∆K, then
i ∈ J∧Γ ∧ (A 4 B)→ ∨∆K as well and we are done. Otherwise since |=VC4 ∧Γ ∧A⇒ ∨∆
and |=VC4
∧
Γ→ B ∨∨∆ we have i /∈ JAK and i ∈ JBK. But then since {i} is the smallest
sphere in $i we have i /∈ JA 4 BK and thus i ∈ J∧Γ ∧ (A 4 B)→ ∨∆K.
For RVA4 : This case again is analogous to the case of RV4 , making use of the easy fact
that if in a sphere model for two worlds i, j we have $i = $j , then for every formula (A 4 B)
we have i ∈ JA 4 BK if and only if j ∈ JA 4 BK. In more detail, assume that the premisses
of an application of Am,n for m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1 are valid, i.e., suppose that for every k with
1 ≤ k ≤ n we have
|=VA4
c∧
`=1
(E` 4 F`) ∧Dk →
m∨
`=1
B` ∨
n∨
`=1
C` ∨
d∨
`=1
(G` 4 H`)
and that for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m we have
|=VA4
c∧
`=1
(E` 4 F`) ∧Ak →
k−1∨
`=1
B` ∨
n∨
`=1
C` ∨
d∨
`=1
(G` 4 H`) .
Furthermore, let I be an absolute sphere model, i.e., for every two worlds i, j from I we have
$i = $j . Take an arbitrary world i from I. We need to show that
i ∈
t
c∧
`=1
(E` 4 F`) ∧
m∧
`=1
(A` 4 B`)→
n∨
`=1
(C` 4 D`) ∨
d∨
`=1
(G` 4 H`)
|
.
So assume that i ∈ J∧c`=1(E` 4 F`) ∧∧m`=1(A` 4 B`)K, that i /∈ JG` 4 H`K for every ` with
1 ≤ ` ≤ d and that for a k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have i /∈ JC` 4 D`K for every ` with
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1 ≤ ` ≤ n and ` 6= k. Then if ⋃ $i ∩ JDkK = ∅ we are done. In particular this holds in case⋃
$i = ∅. Otherwise, choose a world j ∈
⋃
$i ∩ JDkK. Using validity of ∧c`=1(Ei 4 Fi)∧Dk →∨m
`=1B` ∨
∨n
`=1C` ∨
∨d
`=1(G` 4 H`) we have
j ∈
t
c∧
`=1
(E` 4 F`)→
m∨
`=1
B` ∨
n∨
`=1
C` ∨
d∨
`=1
(G` 4 H`)
|
.
But since I is absolute the same formulae of the form X 4 Y hold in the worlds i and
j, and thus we have j ∈ J∧c`=1(E` 4 F`)K and j /∈ JG` 4 H`K for every ` with 1 ≤ ` ≤ d.
Hence we obtain that j ∈ ⋃m`=1 JB`K ∪ ⋃n`=1 JC`K. If j ∈ JB`K for some ` ≤ m, then since
i ∈ JA` 4 B`K we find a world j2 ∈ S ∩ JA`K. Thus using validity of ∧c`′=1(E′` 4 F ′`) ∧ A` →∨`−1
`′=1B`′ ∨
∨n
`′=1C`′ ∨
∨d
`′=1(G`′ 4 H`′) and the fact that the same formulae of the form
X 4 Y hold in the worlds i and j2 we get that j2 ∈
⋃`−1
`′=1 JB`′K ∪⋃n`′=1 JC`′K. Iterating this
process we find a world j′ with j′ ∈ S ∩⋃n`=1 JC`K. If j′ /∈ JCkK, then there is an index ` with
` 6= k with j′ ∈ JC`K. On the other hand we have i /∈ JC` 4 D`K, and thus there is a sphere
S′ ∈ $i with S′ $ S and S′ ∩ JD`K 6= ∅ and S′ ∩ JC`K = ∅. Similar to above there is a world
j′′ ∈ S′ ∩⋃nt=1 JCtK = (S′ ∩⋃nt=1 JCtK)r JC`K. Iterating the argument we find a sphere S′′ ∈ $i
with ∅ 6= S′′ ∩⋃n`=1 JC`K = S′′ ∩ JCkK and S′′ ⊆ S. Thus we get i ∈ JCk 4 DkK and we are
done.
For RVNA4 : For an application of the rule Am,n with n ≥ 1 this follows as in the case for
VA4. For the case n = 0 it is easy to adapt the proof for VN4 to the additional context in
the fashion of the previous case.
The next step is to show cut-free completeness. We know from Proposition 5.3.1 that
the extensions of the calculus GcRV4CutCon with combinations of the rules corresponding
to the axioms characterising the logics are complete for the respective logics. Thus taking
the logic VC4 as an example we have that since GcRV4RCCutCon is complete for VC4, by
cut elimination the system Gc cc
(RV4 ∪ {RC})Con is complete for VC4 as well. Now if we
can show that all rules in cc
(RV4 ∪ {RC}) are derivable rules in RVC4ConW, then we are
done, since then as noticed in Remark 2.4.18 we can transform every (cut-free) derivation in
Gc cc
(RV4 ∪ {RC})Con into a (cut-free) derivation in GcRVC4Con. As it might be helpful
to visualise the rules, the rule doodles representing the rules RN,RT and RW are given in
Figure 5.4.
Lemma 5.3.5 (c). Let L be a logic in {VN4,VT4,VW4,VC4,VA4,VNA4}. Then the
sequent system given by GcRLCon is complete for L.
Proof. We show that if L is one of the logics considered and R is the rule set for this logic
given in Proposition 5.3.1, then all rules in cc (R) are derivable rules in RLWCon. In order to
show this it is enough to show that cuts between a rule Rm,n and possibly several instances of
the additional rules not in RV4 are derivable rules in RL. This is due to the fact that as we
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Figure 5.4: The graphical representations of the rules for extensions of V4
have seen in Theorem 5.2.3 cuts between two rulesRm,n and Rk,` are subsumed by the single
rule Rm+k−1,n+`−1, and thus if the construction of a rule in cc (R) involves such a cut, then
reordering the cut tree and replacing this cut with the rule Rm+k−1,n+`−1 gives a rule without
the cut which subsumes the original rule. We consider each of the rule sets in turn.
For RVN4 : A cut between the rule RN = {(p ⇒ ; C∅), ( ⇒ q; C∅)}/(p 4 q) ⇒ and a rule
Rm,n with n ≥ 1 simply deletes one positive literal in the conclusion of the latter, all heads
pointing to its first argument and all tails emerging from its second argument in the premisses.
Thus the resulting rule is subsumed by the rule Rm,n−1.
For RVT4 : A cut between the rule RT = {(p ⇒ C∅), ( ⇒ q; Cid)}/(p 4 q) ⇒ and a rule
Rm,n with n ≥ 2 similarly deletes a positive literal in the conclusion of the latter and all heads
pointing to its first argument. This is already enough to ensure that the resulting rule is
subsumed by the rule Rm,n−1. If n = 1, then the cut gives the rule Tm.
For RVW4 : The rules RT and RW are subsumed by the rules W1,0 resp. W0,1. Cuts between
the rules RT and Rm,n are subsumed by the rules Rm,n−1 for n > 1 or Wm,0 for n = 1. Thus
given cut between a rule Rm,n and multiple instances of the rules RT and RW it suffices to
first eliminate the cuts involving the instance of RT and then deal with the remaining cuts
between a rule Rm,n or Wm,0 and instances of RW. Cuts between a rule Rm,n and multiple
instances of the rule RW = {(⇒ p; Cid), (q ⇒ ; C∅)}/ ⇒ (p 4 q) are treated in the following
way. Assume that the cuts occur on the (negative) literals {(pi 4 qi) | i ∈ I} of Rm,n for
some I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. Then the cuts with RW have the effect of deleting all heads pointing
to the second arguments of the corresponding literals. Moreover, the cut on the literal
(pmax(I) 4 qmax(I)) produces a premiss which can be weakened to the premiss with heads
pointing to all qi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}r I and to all rj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and with heads pointing to
resp. tails emerging from all the context formulae. Thus the resulting rule is subsumed by
the rule Wm−|I|,n. In the case of a cut between the rules Wm,0 and RW the resulting rule is
subsumed by the rule Wm−1,0.
For RVC4 : The rule RC is subsumed by the rule RC2. On the other hand, a cut between the
rule Rm,n+` and ` instances of the rule RC on the literals (rn+1 4 sn+1), . . . , (rn+` 4 sn+`) has
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the premisses
P ′m,n = {(sk ⇒ q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rn; Cid) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}
∪ {(pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, r1, . . . , rn; Cid) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
∪ {(⇒ q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rn; Cid)} .
Thus an application of this rule is derived using multiple applications of first the rule RW2
and then the rule RC2 as follows. First we have a derivation D given by
Γ⇒ q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rn,∆
Γ⇒ q1, . . . , qm, (r1 4 s1), . . . , (rn 4 sn),∆ RW2
and for k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m derivations Dk given by
Γ, pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, r1, . . . , rn,∆
Γ, pk ⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, (r1 4 s1), . . . , (rn 4 sn),∆ RW2
Γ, pk, (pk+1 4 qk+1), . . . , (pm 4 qm)⇒ q1, . . . , qk−1, (r1 4 s1), . . . , (rn 4 sn),∆ W
Abbreviating the multiset (r1 4 s1), . . . , (rn 4 sn),∆ to Σ we then derive the conclusion using
multiple applications of RC2:
D1....
Γ, p1, (p2 4 q2), . . . , (pm 4 qm)⇒ Σ
Dm....
Γ, pm ⇒ q1, . . . , qm−1,Σ
D....
Γ⇒ q1, . . . , qm,Σ
Γ, (pm 4 qm)⇒ q1, . . . , qm−2,Σ RC2....
Γ, (p2 4 q2), . . . , (pm 4 qm)⇒ q1Σ
Γ, (p1 4 q1), . . . , (pm 4 qm)⇒ Σ RC2
This shows that the original rule is a derivable rule in RVC4ConW.
For RVA4 : The rule RA is subsumed by the rule A0,1, and for m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 the rule Rm,n is
subsumed by the rule Am,n. A cut between a rule Rm,n and the rule RA on the literal (pi 4 qi)
deletes all doodles representing premisses of Rm,n with tails emerging from pi and replaces
all heads in doodles representing the premisses of Rm,n pointing to qi with heads (resp. tails)
pointing to (resp. emerging from) context formulae ( t 4 u) and (v 4 w). Thus cuts between
Rm,n and ` instances of RA are subsumed by the rule Am−`,n.
For RVNA4 : Again the rules RA and Rm,n are subsumed by the rules A0,1 resp. Am,n. The
rule RN furthermore is subsumed by the rule A1,0. A cut between RN and RA gives the identity
rule. Cuts between a rule Rm,n and k instances of the rule RA and ` instances of the rule RN
are subsumed by the rule Am−k,n−`.
Together, these two lemmata give soundness and cut-free completeness of our rule sets.
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Theorem 5.3.6 (c). Let L be a logic in {VN4,VT4,VW4,VC4,VA4,VNA4}. Then the
sequent system given by GcRLCon is sound and complete for L.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5.3.4 and Lemma 5.3.5.
Remark 5.3.7. For the logics VN4,VW4,VA4 and VNA4 the proof of Lemma 5.3.5 is also
easily extended to show that the corresponding rule sets are principal-cut closed. Thus for
these logics we might also use derivability of the original rules and the generic cut elimination
theorem to show cut-free completeness. For the logics VT4 and VC4 we would need to add
further rules to the rule set, though, which is why this presentation was chosen.
We may now also use the explicitly constructed rule sets modified according to Definition 2.6.1
to show decidability of the logics in question.
Corollary 5.3.8 (c). The validity problem for the logics VN4,VT4,VW4,VC4, is solvable
in space polynomial in the circuit size of the input. The validity problem for VA4 and VNA4
is solvable in time exponential in the circuit size of the input.
Proof. Let L be one of the specified logics. Then the rule set RL is tractable. Moreover, by
Theorem 5.3.6 above and Theorem 2.6.5 the sequent calculus (GcRL)∗ is sound and complete
for L. Now using the procedures given in the proofs of Theorem 2.7.8 resp. Theorem 2.7.5 we
obtain the complexity bound.
5.4 Strong And Weak Counterfactual Implication
One of the original motivations for studying conditional logics stems from trying to formalise
counterfactual implications. But from this point of view it is more natural to take either
the strong counterfactual implication  or its weak version  as a primitive instead of
the comparative plausibility operator 4. Of course since these connectives are interdefinable
a decision procedure for a conditional logic formulated in terms of one of these connectives
immediately yields a decision procedure for the logic formulated in terms of the other ones. It
is not immediately clear, however, that the resulting procedure has the same complexity as
the original one. It is clear from the earlier mentioned translations of the strong and weak
counterfactual implications into the comparative plausibility operator given by
(A B)↔ ¬((A ∧ ¬B) 4 (A ∧B))
(A B)↔ (⊥ 4 A) ∨ ¬((A ∧ ¬B) 4 (A ∧B))
that the (formula) size might grow exponentially. On the other hand, the number of sub-
formulae grows only by a constant factor. Thus using the circuit representation of formulae
(Definition 2.7.2) we do obtain complexity results for these languages.
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Corollary 5.4.1 (c). Let L be one of {V,VN,VT,VW,VC} and let ∗ ∈ {,}. Then the
validity problem for the logic L∗ is in Pspace. If L ∈ {VA,VNA}, then the validity problem
for L∗ is in Exptime.
Proof. Translating a formula A of F() given in the circuit representation into the language
of 4 adds 3 additional nodes for each node labelled with. Similarly, the translation from
the language of  adds 6 additional nodes for each node labelled with . Thus in either
case if Aτ is the translated formula we have ||Aτ ||c ≤ 6 · ||A||c and are done using Corollary 5.2.5
resp. Corollary 5.3.8.
This reproves the known complexity results for the logics not including absoluteness from
[FH94] in a purely syntactical way. For the logics VA and VNA our Exptime-complexity
bound unfortunately is far from the coNP-bound established in the same article, but on the
other hand this might be expected of a generic procedure. Even though we have decision
procedures already, it is still interesting to construct explicit sequent calculi for the logics
considered in the language of counterfactual implication. We can do so for the strong
counterfactual implication by basically translating the rules for the comparative plausibility
operator into the other language. The idea for this is to make use of the translation axiom
(A B)↔ ¬ (A ∧ ¬B 4 A ∧B) (5.1)
from Section 5.1 to construct two “translation rules”. The extension of the rule set RV4 with
these translation rules then gives a rule set for the logic V4,. Moreover, since both for
the strong counterfactual implication and the comparative plausibility operator the principal
formulae of the translation rules contain exactly one literal with this connective as its main
connective, computing a cut between such a translation rule and a rule Rm,n has the effect of
replacing one literal in the principal formulae of the latter rule with a literal with the strong
counterfactual implication as main connective. Thus computing all possible cuts between a
rule Rm,n and the two translation rules yields a rule corresponding to Rm,n but in the language
of . The set of all these rules will then yield a sequent calculus forV. For extensions of
V the process is similar. The reason why this method does not work straightforwardly for
the weak counterfactual implication is that the principal formulae of one of the translation
rules constructed from the translation
(A B)↔ (⊥ 4 A) ∨ ¬(A ∧ ¬B 4 A ∧B)
contain two literals with the comparative plausibility operator as main connective. Thus a cut
between this rule and a rule Rm,n does not reduce the number of literals with the comparative
plausibility operator as main connective in the principal formulae of the latter rule. On the
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other hand, we could try to use the translation
(A 4 B)↔ (A ∨B ¬(A ∨B)) ∨ ¬(A ∨B ¬A)
but then again one literal from the principal formulae of a rule Rm,n would be replaced by two
literals with  as the main connective and we would not be able to derive a single formula
with  as the main connective. It is not clear whether the method can somehow be adapted
to work in this case as well.
So let us consider the strong counterfactual implication. Using the methods of Chapter 3
on the translation axiom given in (5.1) yields the two rules Rt1 and Rt2 given by
Rt1 :=Pt/(p 4 q), (r s)⇒
Rt2 :=Pt/ ⇒ (p 4 q), (r s)
for the premisses
Pt =
{
(p⇒ r; C∅), (p, s⇒ C∅), (r ⇒ p, s; C∅),
(q ⇒ r; C∅), (q ⇒ s; C∅), (r, s⇒ q; C∅)
}
Moreover, by construction we have equivalence of the translation rules with the translation ax-
ioms overRV4 . This gives us soundness and completeness of the rule sets from Proposition 5.3.1
not involving absoluteness extended with the translation rules.
Proposition 5.4.2 (c). The following calculi are sound and complete for the specified logics:
GcRV4Rt1Rt2CutCon for V4,
GcRV4RNRt1Rt2CutCon for VN4, GcRV4RTRt1Rt2CutCon for VT4,
GcRV4RTRWRt1Rt2CutCon for VW4, GcRV4RCRt1Rt2CutCon for VC4,
Proof. Applying the translation procedure from Theorem 3.2.14 to the axioms (p q)→
¬((p ∧ ¬q) 4 (p ∧ q)) and ¬((p ∧ ¬q) 4 (p ∧ q))→ (p q) yields exactly the rules Rt1 and
Rt2. Thus by the same theorem each of the rules is equivalent to the original axiom over
RV4 . This together with soundness and completeness of the rule sets in the language with 4
(Proposition 5.3.1) and the fact that the connective  is defined by the translation axioms
gives the stated result.
Again we now might exploit the representation of rules in the cut closures of these rule sets
to show decidability of the logics. For this we need to show that the cut closures of the rule
sets given above are contraction closed. We do this by considering the representation of such
rules in terms of cut graphs.
Lemma 5.4.3 (c). Let L be one of V,VN,VT,VW or VC and let R be the corre-
sponding set of modal rules as given in Proposition 5.4.2. Then the rule set cc
(RV4RRt1Rt2)
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Rt2 Rt1 . · · · . Rt1 Rt2
G2
G1 G
Figure 5.5: The cut graphs constructed in the proof of Lemma 5.4.3
is contraction closed.
Proof. In view of Theorem 4.1.29 we only need to check that contractions of path rules in
cc
(RV4RRt1Rt2) are subsumed. So let R be such a path rule. Then the cut graph G for its
representing cut tree is a path. On the other hand we know that the only rule in RV4RRt1Rt2
in which the connective  occurs on the left hand side of the principal formulae is the rule
Rt1 and likewise the only rule in which it occurs on the right hand side is Rt2. Thus whenever
one of these rules, say Rt1, appears in the cut graph for R but is not one of the two endpoints,
then one of the adjacent nodes must be the other of the two rules, in this case Rt2, and a
formula (p q) must appear in the principal formulae of both rules. But as is easy to check
the rule cut(Rt2,Rt1, (p q)) is subsumed by the congruence rule and thus also by the rule
R1,1. This means that w.l.o.g. we may assume that if the rules Rt1 or Rt2 occur in the cut
graph G, then they occur as one of its two endpoints. Now suppose we have a contraction of
R on literals occurring in the principal formulae of the rules at the two endpoints of G. If the
literals are of the form (r 4 s), then the connective  does not occur at all in G, and we are
done using Proposition 5.3.1. If on the other hand the contracted formula is (r s) for some
variables r and s, then the endpoints of G must be both Rt1 or both Rt2. We consider the
case that they are both Rt1, the other case is analogous. Let G1 be the cut graph constructed
from G by deleting the two endpoints, and let G2 be the one constructed from G by appending
nodes Rt2 to each of the endpoints of G (see Figure 5.5). Furthermore, let R1 and R2 be rules
such that G1 is the cut graph for the cut tree representing R1 and G2 is the cut graph for the
cut tree representing R2. Then again since the rule cut(Rt2,Rt1, (p q)) is subsumed by R1,1
the rule R1 subsumes R2 and vice versa. Now if a contraction of the rule R1 on the literals
not occurring in the rule R is subsumed by a rule in our rule set, then obviously the original
contraction of R is subsumed. Furthermore, if the latter is the case, then the corresponding
contraction of rule R2 is subsumed. Since R2 subsumes R1 this means that the contraction of
R1 is subsumed by a rule in the rule set if and only if the original contraction of R is subsumed
by a rule in the rule set. But by the reasoning above the connective  does not occur in G1,
and thus using Proposition 5.3.1 we know that contractions of this rule are subsumed by rules
in our rule set. Therefore the original contraction of R is subsumed by a rule in our rule set
as well.
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Πn ⇒ Σm := (r1  s1), . . . , (rn sn)⇒ (p1  q1), . . . , (pm qm)
R′n,m := P ′n,m/Πn ⇒ Σm where
P ′n,m :=
{
(rk, sk, ~sI ⇒ ~r[n]rI , ~pJ , ~q[m]rJ ; C∅) | k ≤ n, I ⊆ [n], J ⊆ [m]
}
∪{(pk, ~sI ⇒ qk, ~r[n]rI , ~pJ , ~q[k−1]rJ ; C∅) | I ⊆ [n], k ≤ m,J ⊆ [k − 1]}
T′m := P ′Tm/Π0 ⇒ Σm where
P ′Tm :=
{
(⇒ ~pJ , ~q[m]rJ ; Cid) | J ⊆ [m]
}
∪{(pk,⇒ qk, ~pJ , ~q[k−1]rJ ; C∅) | k ≤ m,J ⊆ [k − 1]}
W′n,m := P ′Wn,m/Πn ⇒ Σm where
P ′Wn,m :=
{
(~sI ⇒ ~r[n]rI , ~pJ , ~q[m]rJ ; Cid | I ⊆ [n], J ⊆ [m]
}
∪{(pk, ~sI ⇒ qk, ~r[n]rI , ~pJ , ~q[k−1]rJ ; C∅) | I ⊆ [m], k ≤ n, J ⊆ [k − 1]}
R′W2 := {(⇒ p; Cid), (q ⇒ ; Cid)}/(p q)⇒
R′C2 := {(⇒ p; Cid), (p⇒ q; Cid)}/ ⇒ (p q)
RV :=
{
R′n,m | n ≥ 0,m ≥ 1
}
RVN :=
{
R′n,m | n+m ≥ 1
} RVW :={W′n,m | n+m ≥ 1}
RVT :=RV ∪ {T′m | m ≥ 1} RVC :=RV ∪ {R′W2,R′C2}
Table 5.5: The rules and rule sets for strong conditional logics formulated using .
While this yields decidability results analogous to the ones in Theorem 5.3.2, we can also
use this result to explicitly construct sequent calculi in the language with  as the only
connective. For the basic logic V this is done by explicitly computing the cut between a rule
Rm,n and m instances of the rule Rt1 as well as n instances of the rule Rt2. Similarly, if L is
one of the other logics we compute the cuts between rules in RL4 and the appropriate number
of instances of Rt1 and Rt2. This gives the rules described in the following definition.
Definition 5.4.4. For variables p1, . . . , pm and a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of indices we write
~pI for the sequent consisting of all variables pi with i ∈ I, and for n ∈ N we abbreviate
{0, . . . , n} to [n]. Then the rules R′n,m,T′m,W′n,m,R′W2 and R′C2 as well as the rule sets RL for
L ∈ {V,VN,VT,VW,VC} are defined as shown in Table 5.5.
Then while the rules are by construction sound, we can prove completeness similarly to the
proof of Theorem 5.3.6 by showing that all the rules in the cut closure of the respective rule
set are subsumed by the constructed rules. Since the calculus given by the cut closure has cut
elimination, this gives cut-free completeness of the calculus given by the constructed rules.
Theorem 5.4.5 (c). Let L be a logic in {V,VN,VT,VW,VC}. Then the calculus
GcRLCon is sound and complete for L.
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Figure 5.6: Cutting with the translation rules in the proof of Theorem 5.4.5
Proof. For soundness we first check that indeed the rules of RV arise by cutting on every
principal formula of a rule in RV4 with the translation rules. Such a situation is shown
schematically in Figure 5.6. Here some of the premisses of the translation rules have been
omitted for clarity. This is no problem, since the omitted premisses do not contribute to the
premisses of the resulting rule. It can be seen that when cutting on a negative literal (pk 4 qk)
this literal is replaced by a positive literal (p′k q
′
k) and in every premiss d1 of Rm,n emerging
from the variable pk the latter is replaced by a tail emerging from p
′
k and a head pointing to
q′k. On the other hand, every premiss with a head pointing to qk is replaced by two premisses
pointing to p′k resp. q
′
k instead. Similarly for cuts on positive literals. Thus cutting on all
literals of Rm,n yields the rule R
′
n,m. Since the translation rules as well as the rules Rm,n are
sound for V4, this gives soundness of R′n,m using Lemma 2.4.5. The reasoning for the other
rules is similar, where in the case of the rule R′C2 in the presence of the premisses ( ⇒ p; Cid)
and (p⇒ q; Cid) we may safely omit the premiss (⇒ q; Cid) since it is derivable from the other
two premisses using cut.
For completeness we make use of the fact that if for one of the logics under consideration
the set R is the corresponding set of modal rules as given in Proposition 5.4.2, and if a
sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S(F()) is cut-free derivable in Gc cc (RV4RRt1Rt2)Con, then it has a
derivation in which the connective 4 does not occur. This holds since rules with restrictions
and therefore also cuts between rules with restrictions have the subformula property, and thus
if the connective 4 would occur in such a derivation, then it would also occur in the sequent
Γ⇒ ∆. Thus it suffices to show that the rules in cc (RV4RRt1Rt2) whose principal formulae
do not mention the connective 4 are derivable rules in RL . This is straightforward for the
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rules with only one formula in the principal formulae. So let R be a rule in cc
(RV4RRt1Rt2)
with at least two formulae in the principal formulae and let GR be the cut graph for a cut
tree representing R. Then as in the proof of Lemma 5.4.3 if in GR we have a cut between the
rules Rt1 and Rt2 on a literal (p q) we may replace this cut by the rule R1,1. Thus w.l.o.g.
we may assume that all cuts in the construction of R are on formulae with main connective
4. This means that nodes in GR which are labelled with a rule Rt1 or Rt2 must have degree
one. Omitting all these nodes yields a cut graph GQ for the cut tree representing a rule Q
from cc
(RV4R). But we know from the proof of Theorem 5.3.6 that such a rule is subsumed
by a rule Q′ in the rule set RL4 in case L 6= VC and a derivable rule in case L = VC. Thus
for L 6= VC we simply replace the subgraph GQ in GR by the cut graph GQ′ for a cut tree
representing the rule Q′. This yields a cut graph GR′ for a rule constructed from a rule in
RL4 by cutting on all principal formulae with the translation rules. Since this is exactly how
the rules in R′L are constructed, this rule is subsumed by a rule in R′L . In case L = VC
similar as in the case for 4 if the cut graph GQ involves a cut between a rule Rm,n and RC
the resulting rule is derivable using a number of applications ofR′W2 followed by a number of
applications of R′C2. Thus in any case the original rule R is a derivable rule in R′L , and thus
we obtain completeness of GcR′LCon for L.
Again this immediately yields complexity results for the logics under scrutiny.
Corollary 5.4.6 (c). For L ∈ {V,VN,VT,VW,VC} the validity problem for L
is in Pspace.
Proof. Let L be such a logic. Inspection of the rules shows that the rule set R′L is contraction
closed and tractable. Thus using modified applications of the rules (Definition 2.6.1) and the
procedure from the proof of Theorem 2.7.8 we obtain the complexity bounds.
5.5 Interpolation
Given a cut-free sequent system which is sound and complete for a logic, we often can use this
system to establish interpolation results for this logic. This is the case for the calculi for the
conditional logics considered as well. We begin by recalling the basic notions.
Definition 5.5.1 (c). Let L be a logic based on classical propositional logic. Given two
formulae A,B a formula I is called an L-interpolant for A and B if
1. |=L A→ I and |=L I → B
2. I satisfies the variable condition, i.e., var (I) ⊆ var (A) ∩ var (B).
We say that the logic L has the Craig interpolation property (or interpolation property for short)
if whenever for two formulae A,B we have |=L A→ B, then there exists an L-interpolant for
A and B.
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One standard method of obtaining the interpolation property for a logic is by lifting the
notion of an interpolant to the level of sequents using so-called split sequents, and employ an
induction on the depth of the derivation in a cut-free sequent calculus, see e.g. [TS00] for the
propositional and first-order case.
Definition 5.5.2 (c). A split sequent is a tuple of sequents Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 and Γ2 ⇒ ∆2 which
we write as Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2. We then say that Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2 is a splitting of
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2. If R is a set of rules with restrictions, we say that a formula I is an
R-interpolant for the split sequent Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2 if
1. `RCon Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, I and `RCon I,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2
2. var (I) ⊆ var (Γ1 ⇒ ∆1) ∩ var (Γ2 ⇒ ∆2).
A sequent admits interpolation in R if all its splittings have an interpolant in R. An application
of a rule R from R supports interpolation in R if whenever all its premisses admit interpolation
in R, then so does its conclusion.
Note that we allow Contraction in clause 1 of the above definition. If all rules of a
sequent calculus admit interpolation it is possible to show that all derivable sequents admit
interpolation as well. Provided the calculus is sound and complete for a logic this then yields
the interpolation property for that logic.
Lemma 5.5.3 (c). Let R be a set of rules with restrictions. If all the rules in R support
interpolation in R, then every sequent derivable in RCon admits interpolation. Thus if
furthermore →R is an invertible rule in RCon and RCon is sound and complete for a logic L,
then L has the Craig interpolation property.
Proof. The first claim follows by a straightforward induction on the depth of the derivation in
R. The base cases are analogous to the propositional case [TS00] and the induction step follows
since Con and every rule in R support interpolation. The second claim follows since if RCon
is sound and complete for the logic L and we have |=L A → B we obtain `RCon ⇒ A → B
and thus with invertibility of the rule →R also `RCon A ⇒ B. Since by the first claim this
sequent admits interpolation there is a R-interpolant for the split sequent A | ∅ ⇒ ∅ | B. By
soundness of RCon this is also an L-interpolant for A and B.
We now use this method to show that almost all of the conditional logics considered in this
chapter have the interpolation property. The main difficulty lies in showing that the rules in
RV4 support interpolation.
Theorem 5.5.4 (c). The logic V4 has the Craig interpolation property.
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Proof. We need to show that all rules in GcRV4 support interpolation. For the propositional
rules this is standard [TS00]. For an application of a conditional rule Rm,n we need to construct
an interpolant for a splitting of the conclusion from the interpolants of the corresponding
splittings of the premisses. We first deal with the case n = 2. So suppose the application of
Rm,2 has the conclusion
(A1 4 B1), . . . , (Am 4 Bm)⇒ (C1 4 D1), (C2 4 D2)
and premisses
{D1 ⇒ B1, . . . , Bm, C1, C2} ∪ {D2 ⇒ B1, . . . , Bm, C1, C2}
∪ {Ak ⇒ B1, . . . , Bk−1, C1, C2 | 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
and furthermore suppose that we have a splitting of the conclusion. In a first step we assume
that the splitting separates the two positive formulae and alternates on the negative formulae,
i.e., that it has the form Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2 with
Γ1 = {(Ai 4 Bi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i odd} Γ2 = {(Ai 4 Bi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}
∆1 = (C1 4 D1) ∆2 = (C2 4 D2)
(5.2)
Then for k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m let Ik be the interpolant for the corresponding splitting of the
premiss Ak ⇒ B1, . . . , Bk−1, C1, C2, i.e., for the split sequent
Ak | ∅ ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i odd} , C1 | {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i even} , C2
if k is odd, and for the split sequent
∅ | Ak ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i odd} , C1 | {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i even} , C2
if k is even. Similarly, for k ∈ {1, 2} let Jk be the interpolant for the corresponding splitting
of the premiss Dk ⇒ B1, . . . , Bm, C1, C2. Now for every odd k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m we define the
formulae Xk, Yk, Zk and Vk,Wk by
Xk :=
∨
1≤`≤k, ` odd I` Zk := J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I`
Yk :=

¬Ik+1 ∨ ¬J2 if k = max{` | 1 ≤ ` ≤ m, ` odd} and k 6= m
¬J2 if k = m
¬Ik+1 otherwise
Vk := (Xk 4 Yk) Wk := (Yk 4 Zk)
Then we can show the following.
Claim 1: For every odd k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m we have `GcRV4Con Γ1,Wk ⇒ ∆1, Vk.
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This can be seen by inserting Wk instead of the literal (Ak+1 4 Bk+1) and Vk instead of the
literal (C2 4 D2) into the rule pattern, checking that all necessary premisses are derivable and
applying the rule. Thus e.g. in case k < m− 1 we derive the necessary premisses as follows.
For the premiss emerging from D1 we have
D1 ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk, J1, Bk+2, . . . , Bm, C1
D1 ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk, J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I`, Bk+2, . . . , Bm, C1
W,∨R
D1 ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk, J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I`︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zk
, Bk+2, . . . , Bm, C1, Xk
W
The premiss emerging from Yk is derived using
⇒ Ik+1, B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1
¬Ik+1 ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1
¬L
¬Ik+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yk
⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk, Zk, Bk+1, . . . , Bm, C1, Yk W
For odd i with i ≤ k the premiss emerging from Ai is derived as in
Ak ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk−2, C1, Ik
Ak ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk−2, C1,
∨
`≤k I`︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xk
W,∨R
In order to derive the premiss emerging from the lower occurrence of Yk we use:
⇒ Ik+1, B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1
¬Ik+1 ⇒ B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1
¬L
¬Ik+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yk
⇒ B1,B3, . . . , Bk, C1, Xk W
And finally for odd i with k < i ≤ m we derive the premiss emerging from Ai as in
Ak+2 ⇒ Ik+2, B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1
Ak+2 ⇒ J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I`, B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1
W,∨R
Ak+2 ⇒ J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I`︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zk
, B1, B3, . . . , Bk, C1, Xk
W
Thus we may apply rule Rdm
2
e+1,2 to derive Γ1, (Yk 4 Zk)⇒ ∆1, (Xk 4 Yk). The cases that
k ∈ {m− 1,m} are similar. This proves Claim 1.
Claim 2: For every partition (F, S) of {k | 1 ≤ k ≤ m, k odd} we have `GcRV4Con Γ2, {Vk |
k ∈ F} ⇒ ∆2, {Wk | k ∈ S}.
This is shown similar to above by inserting for k ∈ F the Vk instead of the (Ak 4 Bk)
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and for k ∈ S the Wk as positive literals in place of (C1 4 D1) into the rule pattern. Then
again we check that all necessary premisses are derivable and apply the rule R|F |+bm
2
c,|S|+1.
So suppose we have an odd k with k ∈ F . Then we derive the premiss emerging from Xk by
I1 ⇒ C2
I1 ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i even}, C2 W . . . Ik ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i even}, C2∨
1≤`≤k, ` odd I` ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i even}, C2
∨L∨
1≤`≤k, ` odd I`︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xk
⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i even}, C2, {Y` | ` ∈ S}
W
Moreover, for every even k < m we derive the premiss emerging from Ak by
Ak ⇒ B2, B4, . . . , Bk−2,
Yk−1︷︸︸︷
¬Ik , C2
Ak ⇒ B2, B4, . . . , Bk−2, {Yi | i ≤ m, i odd}, C2 W
and in case m is even we have
Am ⇒ B2, B4, . . . , Bm−2,¬Im, C2
Am ⇒ B2,B4, . . . , Bm−2, {Yi | i < m− 1, i odd},¬Im ∨ ¬J2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ym−1
, C2
W,∨R
For the premiss emerging from D2 in case max{i | i ≤ m, i odd} 6= m we have
D2 ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}, C2,¬J2
D2 ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}, C2,¬Im ∨ ¬J2 W,∨R
D2 ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}, C2, ¬Im ∨ ¬J2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ymax{i|i≤m, i odd}
, {Yi | i ≤ m− 2, i odd} W
The case max{i | i ≤ m, i odd} = m is similar. Finally, we have for every odd k ∈ S:
J1 ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}, C2 . . . I3 ⇒ B2, C2 I1 ⇒ C2
J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I` ⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}, C2
W,∨L
J1 ∨
∨
k<`≤m, ` odd I`︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zk
⇒ {Bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i even}, C2, {Y` | ` ∈ S}
W
Thus we have all the necessary premisses to apply the rule R|F |+bm
2
c,|S|+1 and obtain the
sequent Γ2, {Vk | k ∈ F} ⇒ ∆2, {Wk | k ∈ S}. This shows Claim 2.
Now we define the interpolant I by
I :=
∧
1≤k≤m, k odd
(¬Wk ∨ Vk) .
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Then using the propositional rules from Claim 1 we get `GcRV4Con Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, I and from
Claim 2 we obtain `GcRV4Con I,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2. Moreover, since the formulae Ik for k ≤ m and J`
for ` = 1, 2 were interpolants, their variables occur both in Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 and Γ2 ⇒ ∆2, and since
the formula I is constructed from these formulae, it satisfies the variable condition as well.
Hence it indeed is an interpolant.
In the next step, assume that (still for an application of Rm,2 with principal formulae as
above) the splitting is Γ2 | Γ1 ⇒ ∆2 | ∆1 with Γ1,Γ2,∆1,∆2 as in (5.2) on p. 171 above. Then
we simply compute the interpolant I ′ of the splitting Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2 as before and set
I := ¬I ′.
In the case that n = 1 this procedure only needs to be slightly adapted. Suppose we again
have a splitting Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∅ | ∆2 of the principal formulae with Γ1 and Γ2 as in (5.2). Then
there is no interpolant J1, since the corresponding premiss does not exists. Instead we simply
use the formula ⊥. In case the splitting is Γ2 | Γ1 ⇒ ∅ | ∆1 the premiss A1 ⇒ C1 does
not mention any formulae in Γ2, so omitting I1 and exchanging the roles of odd and even
numbers in the construction of the interpolant as above gives the correct formula. In case we
have a splitting Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆ | ∅, then again we compute the interpolant I ′ for the splitting
Γ2 | Γ1 ⇒ ∅ | ∆ and set I := ¬I ′.
In the most general case in the splitting Γ1 | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2 we have alternating blocks of
negative literals, i.e., for some s we have 1 = k0 ≤ k1 < · · · < ks = m and
Γ1 =
⋃
1≤i≤s, i odd
Σi and Γ2 =
⋃
1≤i≤s, i even
Σi
where for 1 ≤ i ≤ s we define
Σi := (Aki−1 4 Bki−1), . . . , (Aki 4 Bki)
and two blocks of positive literals, i.e.,
∆1 = (C1 4 D1), . . . , (C` 4 D`) and ∆2 = (C`+1 4 D`+1), . . . , (Cn 4 Dn) .
For 1 ≤ k ≤ m we write I ′k for the interpolant of the corresponding splitting of the premiss
Ak ⇒ {B` | 1 ≤ ` < k}, {C` | ` ≤ n} and for 1 ≤ k ≤ n we write J ′k for the one for the premiss
Dk ⇒ {B` | 1 ≤ ` ≤ m}, {C` | 1 ≤ ` ≤ n}. Then in the construction of the interpolant above
we replace the formula J1 by
∨
(C`4D`)∈∆1 J
′
` and the formula ¬J2 by
∨
(C`4D`)∈∆2 ¬J ′`. The
formulae I` in Xk and Zk are replaced by
∨
k`−1≤j≤k` I
′
j , and the formulae ¬I`+1 in Yk are
replaced by
∨
k`≤j≤k`+1 ¬I ′j . Then in the proofs of the claims the formulae W` and V` are
inserted instead of the blocks Σ` = {(Ai 4 Bi) | k`−1 ≤ i < k`}.
The proof of Theorem 5.5.4 is also readily adapted to cover most extensions of V4 as well.
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Corollary 5.5.5. The logics VN4,VW4,VC4,VA4 and VNA4 have the Craig interpolation
property.
Proof. For VN4 we need to consider the additional case of a rule Rm,0. Similar to the case of
n = 1 in the procedure given above we replace the missing interpolants I1 and J1 by ⊥ and
J2 by the interpolant for the premiss ⇒ B1, . . . , Bn. For the rules Wm,n of RVW4 we modify
the construction by replacing the interpolants J1, J2 with the interpolant J of the contextual
premiss resp. its negation. The case that n = 0 does not cause any problems. For the rule
RW2 we simply use the interpolant of the contextual premiss. For RC2, if the splitting of the
conclusion is Γ1 | Γ2, (A 4 B)⇒ ∆1 | ∆2 and the interpolants of the corresponding splittings
of the premisses are I1 and I2 we use I := I1 ∧ I2. In case the splitting of the conclusion is
Γ1, (A 4 B) | Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | ∆2, then we use I1 ∨ I2. In each case it is easy to check that the
formula I is an interpolant. Finally, for the rules Am,n of RVA4 and RVNA4 the proof carries
over almost verbatim, we only need to add the context to the premisses.
Remark 5.5.6. The problem with adapting this proof to the case of VT4 is that in order to
prove Claim 2 for S = ∅ we would need to apply rule Tm. For this the second argument of one
of the Vk would need to contain the interpolant for the contextual premiss. But then showing
Claim 1, in particular the case Γ1,Wk ⇒ ∆1, Vk becomes problematic, since then the second
argument of Vk does not entail the disjunction of the Bi anymore. It is not clear whether this
problem can be avoided.
Since the weak and the strong counterfactual implication can be defined in terms of the
comparative plausibility operator, the interpolation results can also easily be transferred to
the logics formulated using these connectives.
Corollary 5.5.7. Let ∗ ∈ {,}. Then the logics V∗,VN∗,VW∗,VC∗,VA∗ and VNA∗
have the Craig interpolation property.
Proof. Let ∗ be one of , and let L be one of the logics specified. Furthermore, write
τ : F(∗)→ F(4) and σ : F(4)→ F(∗) for the translation functions given by extending the
translations
(p q)→ ¬((p ∧ ¬q) 4 (p ∧ q)) resp. (p q)→ (⊥ 4 p) ∨ ¬((p ∧ ¬q) 4 (p ∧ q))
and
(p 4 q)→ ¬(p ∨ q ¬p) resp. (p 4 q)→ (p ∨ q ¬(p ∨ q)) ∨ ¬(p ∨ q ¬p)
from Table 5.1 on p. 144 in the obvious way. Then it is not too difficult to check that for every
formula A ∈ F(∗) we have |=L∗ A ↔ σ ◦ τ(A). Thus for a L∗-valid implication A → B we
construct an interpolant I using the interpolant I ′ for the L4-valid implication τ(A)→ τ(B)
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by setting I := σ(I ′). Then we have:
|=L∗ A→ B ⇐⇒ |=L4 τ(A)→ τ(B)
=⇒ |=L4 τ(A)→ I and |=L4 I → τ(B)
=⇒ |=L∗ σ ◦ τ(A)→ σ(I) and |=L∗ σ(I)→ σ ◦ τ(B)
⇐⇒ |=L∗ A→ σ(I) and |=L∗ σ(I)→ B
Also it is clear that var (σ(I)) ⊆ var (A) ∩ var (B). Thus I indeed is an interpolant for the
implication A→ B.
5.6 Notes
Conditional Logics The formulation of conditional logics in terms of sphere semantics was
introduced in [Lew73b, Lew73a]. In particular [Lew73a] contains a thorough discussion of
the philosophical motivation and can only be recommended. A slightly earlier formulation of
counterfactual implications in terms of closest or most similar worlds can be found in [Sta68]
with many of the technical details in [ST70]. Good overviews over the general problem and
the history of conditional logics are also given in [ NC01] and [AC09]. The article [GGOS09]
includes a good and compact introduction to the various semantics. Due to the plethora of
proposed systems for conditional logics and the often slightly different axiomatisations by
different authors the task of navigating the conditional logic landscape can be a bit daunting.
The article [Nej91] provides welcome comparisons between the different formulations. The
original semantically driven proofs for the complexity results considered in this chapter can
be found in [FH94]. They are obtained using small model theorems and also give rise to
complexity results for fragments of the logics obtained by bounding the modal nesting depth.
Finally it should be noted that decidability for most of the systems of conditional logic also
follows from the generic decidability results for logics axiomatised by non-iterative axioms
provided in [Lew74].
Sequent calculi for conditional logics. The constructed calculi for strong systems of
conditional logics along with the results about interpolation were presented in [LP12b]. In
the case of VC4, our construction of a principal-cut and contraction closed rule set yielded
the sequent analogue of the tableau calculus for the same logic introduced in [dS83] and
subsequently corrected in [Gen92]. These works also presented a calculus for the logicVCS4,
an extension of the logic VC4 with Stalnaker’s Axiom (S) (p∧ q 4 p∧¬q)∧ (p∧¬q 4 p∧ q)→
(⊥ 4 p). Furthermore, these systems were used to give a decision procedure for the logics VC4
and VCS4. Most of the other approaches towards proof theory for conditional logic concentrate
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on the formulation with the weak counterfactual implication as the main connective. Labelled
tableau calculi for conditional logics in the language with extending the slightly weaker logic
PCL including the here considered logics V,VW,VC and extensions with the axiom
(CEM) (p q)∨ (p ¬q) or the universality axioms are considered in [GGOS03, GGOS09].
Since in these calculi each additional semantic property corresponds to a single rule, they have
the very desirable property of being modular. On the other hand they make essential use of
labels and only yield decision procedures of slightly sub-optimal NExptime-complexity. This
work also contains a very readable discussion of other approaches towards calculi for these
logics. An unlabelled system for the weakest of the logics considered there, the logic PCL,
was also given in [SPH10], where it is called S. The calculus gives rise to a Pspace-decision
procedure, but is slightly complicated.
Interpolation No interpolation results for stronger systems of conditional logic seem to
have been established before our [LP12b]. A stronger form of the Craig interpolation property,
the uniform interpolation property, states that the interpolant for derivable implications
A→ B is the same for all formulae B with the same common variables with A. The uniform
interpolation property for the logics V and VN follows from recent results in [Pat13] where
using coalgebraic semantics the very general result that every logic axiomatised in rank-1
enjoys the uniform interpolation property is established.
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6.1 Summary
Let us briefly summarise what we have achieved in this work. Motivated by the desire to
develop generic proof theoretic methods for the treatment of possibly non-normal modal
logics which might be based on non-classical propositional logics we found that we needed to
specify a format of sequent rules first. This led to the introduction of the formats of rules
with context restrictions and as a weaker version shallow rules, both extensions of the earlier
considered format of one-step rules. A closer investigation of sequent calculi given by sets of
rules with restrictions yielded a generic cut elimination theorem for rule sets satisfying the
criteria of principal-cut, mixed-cut, context-cut and contraction closure, which can be checked
by considering single rules or pairs of rules from the rule set. For rule sets which in addition
are tractable we were able to show a genericExptime-decidability result and noted that the
complexity can be lowered to (optimal) Pspace in case all the rules are shallow.
We then investigated the connections between rules with context restrictions and axioms
for Hilbert-style proof systems and developed a syntactic characterisation of a class of axioms,
the translatable clauses, which very closely corresponds to the class of rules with context
restrictions. This correspondence was established by explicit and automatic translations
between axioms and rules making use of the concepts of ω-sets of axioms and proto rules.
Limiting the rule format to shallow rules resulted in a correspondence between shallow rules
and non-iterative translatable clauses, which for modal logics based on classical propositional
logic gives a correspondence between shallow rules and non-iterative axioms in general. We
then used these correspondences to derive a number of results stating amongst others that
modal logic T cannot be captured by one-step rules, that K4 cannot be captured by shallow
rules and that the logics B,GL and S5 cannot be captured by mixed-cut closed sets of rules
with context restrictions.
While the translation from rules to axioms gave us mainly negative results the translation
from axioms to rules provided the starting point for an automatic construction of sequent
calculi from finite sets of Hilbert axioms. In order to produce cut-free sequent calculi we
investigated the concept of the cut closure of a rule set and found a representation of the rules
in the cut closure in terms of cut trees. Closing the original rule set under cuts with small rules
in a preprocessing step allowed us to limit the size and depth of the necessary cut trees and
thus to show that the cut closure of a finite set of rules is tractable. Using this we saw that
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contraction closure of the cut closure of finite sets of shallow rules entails Pspace-decidability
of the corresponding logic. For cases where the cut closure of a rule set cannot be seen to
be contraction closed or where for other reasons the manual construction of a principal-cut
closed set of rules with context restrictions is desired we introduced a graphical representation
of sequents as doodles and sequent rules as rule doodles. This tool allows us to manually
perform the operations of cuts between rules and contractions of rules in a very intuitive way
by simply connecting heads and tails of doodles. As simple examples for this technique we
considered Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability and weaker systems of conditional logic.
Finally, we applied the earlier introduced techniques and considered the extended example
of strong systems of conditional logic. The main results here were the construction of cut-free
sequent calculi for Lewis’ conditional logic V and extensions in the language of the comparative
plausibility operator 4 using rule doodles and the adaption of these calculi to the strong
counterfactual implication  as the main connective. In the case of VC we recovered the
sequent analogue of a previously known tableau calculus in a systematic and purely syntactic
way. Using the generic decision procedures developed earlier these systems yielded purely
syntactic decision procedures which, except for the logics VA and VNA, are complexity optimal.
As a further application we used the calculi to derive interpolation results for all of the logics
under consideration apart from the logic VT.
6.2 Applications and Alternative Approaches
It is to be hoped that the methods and results developed in this work will provide a toolkit for
the proof-theoretical treatment of non-classical logics in the spirit of logic engineering. Ideally
they should on the one hand enable a researcher interested in a particular logic to evaluate
whether this logic can be captured proof-theoretically in the framework of standard sequent
calculi. The methods for proving the limitative results of Section 3.4 provide some tools for
this purpose. On the other hand, if the logic at hand can be captured in the framework
of standard sequent calculi, then the main difficulty lies in the construction of a cut-free
sequent calculus for this logic. Here the generic cut elimination result of Section 2.4 provides a
guidance towards which kinds of logical rules should be constructed. Moreover, the translation
results of Chapter 3 together with the results about saturating a rule set under cuts using
the graphical representation of sequents as doodles and sequent rules as rule doodles provide
some tools to actually construct a calculus with logical rules satisfying the criteria for cut
elimination. Of course ultimately we would like to provide a fully automatic construction
of cut-free sequent calculi and (perhaps more importantly) decision procedures for suitable
modal logics given as a set of Hilbert-style axioms. While the tools presented here do not
yet give rise to such a fully automatic construction, they can be used to identify the crucial
property of contraction-closure of the rule set, and thus for some logics give rise to proofs of
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decidability and complexity results via establishing this property for a set of sequent rules.
The methods and results presented here are mainly theoretical, but in particular from the
engineering point of view it would also be desirable to have an implementation of these results
which given a number of axioms for a logic produces a cut-free sequent calculus or preferably
even a decision procedure for this logic. A similar implementation based on a different theory
exists in the Paralyzer system [CLSZ13] which transforms axioms of a certain form into rules
of a cut-free sequent calculus based on positive propositional logic. Such an implementation
would be especially powerful when combined with an implementation of the generic decision
procedures from Section 2.7 similar to the CoLoSS system [CMPS09] which implements a
generic decision procedure for rank-1 modal logics. If these methods are to be used as tools in
this general sense, it would of course be important to have a very high degree of confidence in
both the theoretical results and the implementations. On the implementation side for this
purpose it might prove beneficial to make use of e.g. a programming language supporting
functional programming with dependent types and its type checking feature. Since correct
programs in such a language need to pass type checking we would have a higher confidence in
the correct implementation of the compilations. On the theoretical side on the other hand
this could be ensured by using proof assistants such as Coq or Isabelle to formalise and verify
the main results of the theory, in particular the generic cut elimination theorem. Since the
proof of this theorem relies on the analysis of a variety of different cases it would lend itself to
such a formalisation.
Depending on which kinds of logics we are interested in and which applications we have in
mind we might also consider frameworks different from that of standard sequents considered
in this work. Thus for example if we are interested in modal logics based only on classical
propositional logic we might modify the theory presented here and develop it on the basis
of one-sided sequents in the style of Schu¨tte-Tait [TS00] instead of two-sided sequents. This
would arguably lead to a more streamlined and elegant formulation of the theory, in particular
if for each modality we also have a dual modality allowing us to push negations all the way
inside the formulae. An approach particularly suitable for dealing with modal logics based
on intuitionistic propositional logic on the other hand would be to consider the more general
framework of hypersequents [Avr96] instead of sequents. This approach has already been
employed successfully e.g. in the treatment of substructural logics [CGT08, CGT12] and
intermediate logics [CMS13]. It is to be expected that the additional structure provided by
hypersequents would allow for a treatment of some occurrences of non-invertible connectives
in the axioms, in particular of disjunctions. On the other hand we might lose some of the nice
properties and applications provided by the standard sequent framework: decision procedures
based on hypersequents in general seem to be of higher complexity compared to those based
on standard sequents, and the hypersequent framework seems not to facilitate proofs of the
interpolation property. We might also be willing to trade in even more of the tractability and
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applications of the standard sequent framework for the even further increased expressivity
allowed by the framework of display calculi [Bel82]. This framework is particularly convenient
for logics with pairs of connectives satisfying some kind of residuation property such as the
forward and backward looking modalities of temporal modal logic. The results from [Kra96]
and [CR13] on the connection between axioms and structural rules in this framework would
provide a benchmark for the theory and moreover a very interesting opportunity to merge
different approaches.
On the other hand, if the considered modalities are normal and in particular if we have
a Kripke-style semantics, we could also move to more semantically motivated frameworks
such as those of nested sequents [Bru¨09] or tree-hypersequents [Pog09, Pog11]. Since in these
frameworks the tree-like structure of (unravellings of) Kripke frames is matched by the tree-like
structure of nested sequents resp. tree-hypersequents, they might be better suited for the
construction of sequent calculi from semantical properties, although no generic treatment seems
to have been developed yet. Finally, when starting from such semantical characterisations of a
logic we might also consider internalising the Kripke semantics in the sequent framework by
moving to labelled sequents. This would also allow us to build on and combine our methods
with the extensive theory for this kind of sequent calculi developed in [NvP01, Neg05].
6.3 The Future
Concerning further research apart from the above mentioned modifications to incorporate
different frameworks there are two linked albeit slightly different major directions. From the
point of view of classification it would be very interesting to extend the limitative results
of Section 3.4 to formally establish the need for additional machinery beyond the standard
sequent framework for certain modal logics. From a more constructive point of view the
further development of the generic methods for the construction of cut-free sequent calculi is
well worth investigating. The most pressing concrete problem from the latter point of view
is the hole in the construction of contraction closed rule sets for non-iterative modal logics
via cut trees. We conjecture that it should be possible to close this hole by establishing a
polynomial upper bound on the number of duplicate formulae needed to derive a sequent, but
a proof for this has eluded all our efforts so far.
Problem 6.3.1. Extend the method of cut trees to produce also contraction closed rule sets.
From the classification point of view the most promising concrete problem is that of extending
the methods for showing limitative results by relaxing the condition of mixed-cut closure of
the rule set. While the relatively general form of context restrictions might make it difficult
to restrict the precise form of the corresponding axioms, it might still be possible to exploit
the fact that context formulae do not share variables with each other or with the principal
formulae.
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Problem 6.3.2. Show limitative results for rules with restrictions in general.
As a more general direction of further research it would be very interesting to extend the
format of rules with context restrictions to include more logics such asB or GL. A promising
way to do this seems to be the extension of context restrictions towards the notion of context
relations from [AL11]. An extension of the correspondence results of Chapter 3 to such
rules would serve to further classify modal logics and to better understand the strengths and
limitations of the different variants of sequent calculi. As a long term goal the resulting theory
should also incorporate extensions of the sequent format such as hypersequents, nested or
labelled sequents.
Research Programme 6.3.3. Develop an extensive classification of modal logics according
to the strength of logical rules necessary to capture them in a cut-free sequent calculus.
Finally, concerning the example of conditional logics, since the weak counterfactual im-
plication is usually taken to be the main connective, it would be very nice to have explicit
formulations of the sequent calculi presented in terms of this connective.
Problem 6.3.4. Find simple standard cut-free sequent calculi for the strong systems of
conditional logic extending V in the language of the weak counterfactual implication .
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split sequent, 170
standard form, 86
strong counterfactual implication, 143
substitution, 26
witnessing projectivity, 89
Supp (.), 27
support, 60
system of spheres, 143
top level, 26
tractable rule set, 60
translatable clause, 75
Validity in L, 58
valuation, 96
var (.), 25
variable condition, 169
variable condition
for a rule, 32
variable elimination, 38
on doodles, 128
weak counterfactual implication, 143
Weakening
admissible, 57
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